66

were I to repeat the details I witnessed, but which to me were highly interesting, I will briefly state that, of 263 horses under his care, 200 were males, there not being a single mare within the building; that the stables, instead of containing, as at the Barrière de l'Etoile, only 20 horses, held each from 40 to 50; that they were well ventilated ; that the horses were separated in couples by swinging bails; that they were fed together in pairs with oats five times a-day; that at night they had as much hay as they could eat, with straw in the day pour s'amuser;"* that each horse usually worked from 15 to 16 miles per day (the horses of the Paddington omnibuses, at greater speed, go only eleven miles per day); that one man was required to look after eight, and also to clean their harness; and that by other men the carriages were washed every day. Lastly, that the sums paid by each passenger are as follows:-between any points within the barriers of Paris, 6 sous, with four additional if taken to places beyond the barriers. On Sundays the latter charge of 4 is increased to 6, the former charge remaining the same.

The establishment at the Barrière de Charenton in all main points was very creditably kept. On the whole, however, the horses were inferior to those working at the west end; indeed, although their health and comforts were essentially attended to, the locality seemed to authorize less attention to outward appearances.

While I was looking at the stud, I asked the chief superintendent what became of the company's horses-as they did not sell them when no longer capable of public service; and as he gave me the same answer I had received from M. Denault, namely, that they were usually sent to the horseslaughterers, called "équarrisseurs," at a considerable distance in the Plaine des Vertus, I begged he would give me a note of introduction, that I might ascertain what was the real conclusion of their career. He readily complied with my request, and accordingly, after thanking him for his great kindness, I managed to find another four-wheeled carriage, in which I drove off.

*To amuse themselves with.

THE ÉQUARRISSEUR.

As we proceeded, the houses of the environs of Paris very soon began to turn into small habitations, dead walls, and at last altogether to die away. The road also appeared gradually to be losing its senses, and to stagger as if it had no idea at all where it was going to; and as I also was destitute of any knowledge on the subject, I remained passive, excepting now and then when, in going over lumps of loose stones, which appeared exceedingly disposed to upset us, I deemed it necessary with extended arms to hold on to each side of the carriage. In about half an hour we drove through a temporary passage in the masonry of the escarp of the line of fortifications which surrounds the metropolis; and here, for a few minutes, I descended from the carriage.

The fortified line of enceinte round Paris, which has caused so much observation and discussion, is composed of a rampart, ditch, covered berm (broad enough to be manned by skirmishers, or riflemen), and raised glacis, as accurately as I could measure them-which any person is allowed to do-of the following dimensions :

Height of the masonry of the escarp, above

which is an earthen parapet

Breadth of the ditch from 55 to

Height of crest of glacis above the bottom of
the ditch

Feet.

33

150

26

The masonry of the escarp is so well covered in front that it would evidently be impossible to breach it from a distance; and the enceinte, being a bastioned line, is in every part thoroughly well flanked; besides which its extent is so great that, practically speaking, it possesses almost the advantage of being a straight interminable front, which, of course, would prevent an enemy from enveloping its works for the purpose of enfilading them.

The counterscarp has not been riveted; and thus not only has a great expense been saved, but, as the army of defence

would always be on a very large scale, the slope upwards to the covered berm and crest of the glacis would enable columns of troops of 10,000 or 20,000 men to make sorties on extended fronts from the ditch, which would again afford them most easy and convenient shelter if repulsed. The passage through the enceinte for the highroads (similar to that in which my carriage was standing) would, of course, have proper gates, barriers, and loopholed defences applied whenever there appeared any probability of their being required, and at the same time the works would be armed.

The fortifying of Paris is generally acknowledged to have been a very judicious measure, and in this opinion I quite

concur.

Wars will hereafter be more likely to be made by coalitions than formerly, and France more than any other country likely to be attacked by a powerful coalition. The armies of the Continent of Europe are much larger than they used to be; and from these facts combined it is undeniable that France may be assailed by 400,000 or 500,000 men at once. Under such circumstances the old lines of frontier-fortresses would not, as they were intended, afford the resource of checking the enemy at the threshold for months, because he would have forces enough to mask or watch them, as also his communications, and to make a dash at the capital with 100,000 or 150,000 troops, as was done in 1814, and again after Waterloo, and as, on similar principles of his own originating, Napoleon did in 1809 and 1812, &c.

Besides this, the frontiers of France, by the peace of 1815, have been left comparatively open, as regards the covering by fortresses, and thus all the studies and labours of Vauban, Louis XIV., and Bonaparte, have been completely annulled.

If Paris, therefore, could be made defensible, so as to afford time, before it were taken, to give to the government a chance of re-organising new armies, and of then acting upon the more extended lines of operations of the invader, it would more than replace the advantages of the frontier-fortresses, inasmuch as the movements against it would be much more difficult to support, and consequently much more dangerous to attempt.

The practicability of giving to Paris sufficient defensive powers depends upon two things:

1st, On its fortifications being compact, and with ground around them favourable in form, and in freedom from buildings, enclosures, &c.

All which are peculiarly the case at Paris.

2nd, On the constant presence of a garrison sufficient in numbers and quality, without trenching upon the strength of the regular army for the field,

Which is found in the hundreds of thousands of National Guards, who, under a certain military organization, are well armed, equipped, and accustomed to turn out and take ordinanary military duties; and although they would be very inferior as a manœuvring army in the field, yet backed by all the resources of Paris and the greater part of the population, including the Ecole Polytechnique and élèves of all sorts, who, for some unaccountable reason, in battles in Paris always seem to take the lead-they would form an excellent garrison in a fortress.

In France all military men seem to agree in the propriety of fortifying Paris, and the details of the execution of the "enceinte continue" are certainly extremely well adapted to the circumstances and object. The main foundation is laid, and seems to be carefully maintained; the filling up, by planting artillery, fixing a few barrier-gates and palisadings, and establishing some outworks in earth, would be readily added where most required, and the whole would bethen most formidable.

The only discussion of any importance has been against the detached forts; and that has been raised by the ultrarepublican party entirely on political grounds. They foresee that these forts would act as citadels to repress popular insurrections. This they would certainly help to do,

1st, By securing arms, ammunition, and military means, &c., from the insurgents.

2ndly, By keeping the troops separated from the people. 3rdly, By placing small numbers i nsecurity to hold posi tions, containing prisons for safely guarding political offend ers, &c. These advantages the Red Republicans, of course, deprecate; but, constitutionally speaking, ought the stability of even a Republican government to exist at the mercy of any sudden popular effort, founded, perhaps, on a delusion or fallacy, and always leading to absolute anarchy? And, again,

could these forts really impede any well-considered reform that the public generally desired?

The ultra party, in their efforts to gain their point, have endeavoured to show that the detached forts of Paris have been constructed on faulty principles, even as a means of defence against a foreign enemy; but I believe it is generally admitted they are decidedly wrong; for there cannot be a doubt but that, when considered only in a military point of view, they would afford a very important support to the lines of circumvallation around Paris, besides forcing an enemy to keep at a greater distance, and to extend to a greater degree his communications.

It would no doubt be necessary that these detached forts should be garrisoned by good troops; still they need not be all from the most efficient regulars; invalides, pensioners, gendarmes, and other old soldiers, who must always be in Paris, might form the bulk of them, the remainder being composed of the National Guard.

With respect to the continued lines-" enceinte continue" -around Paris, it may be said that even the large body of National Guards would not be sufficient fully to man their numerous bastions, &c., &c.; but it must be recollected that Paris could not in such a case by possibility be attacked, or even threatened, all round. It could only be attacked or seriously threatened by a very large force; and such a one could not be moved round by stealth, but would require days to be transported from one side to another, while the garrison would make counter-movements in hours; therefore at least two-thirds or three-fourths of the garrison would be on the sides liable to be attacked.

There exists, however, one consideration that would, of course, affect the whole question of the permanency of the organization of that National Guard on which the whole defence depends.

The army, and the ultra advocates for order and for a strong government, under the plea that the National Guard has been the pivot on which all the popular movements have turned, would be very desirous of disbanding and abolishing it, but it may be presumed they are little likely to succeed.

On passing through the cutting, the magnificent plain before me appeared not only admirably adapted for the purposes