ment."

tus, who gave sentence of death against his own sons for a conspiracy, when as a magistrate he had power to pardon them he says "just so God is represented, as strugling between compassion and justice, and as proceeding with reluctance to the execution of ultimate and remediless judg. By whom is God thus represented as at variance with himself? By the advocates of endless misery. But the scriptures do not so represent him. God is not divided against him. self. By representing God as "struggling between compassion and justice" he is degraded into an "image made like to corruptible man ;" whereas he is in reality "of one mind and none can turn him."

Mr. P's recapitulation, on the 32, and 33 pages of his book, we need not answer; for after attending to every particular which he has noticed, we have seen he has failed to show that justice requires any thing more than a discipline "intended for the good of the offender" The justice of God certainly does not oppose, if it does not require the salvation of all mankind.

1. Mr. P. says "It is said that there is not sufficient difference between the most imperfect character of the righteous, and the best character of the wicked, to make it reasonable to doom one to eternal punishment and not the other. This argument is destitute of force, if both deserve eternal punishment, and one is forgiven, and the other falls under the sentence of the law. The argument as you see, is a mere begging of the question, as it takes for granted the very thing

in dispute, viz. that the sinner does not deserve eternal punishment." "If both deserve eternal punishment." Why did he not attempt to prove that sinners deserve eternal punishment, instead of supposing it? It never has been, and we presume never will be proved that sinners deserve eternal punishment. "A mere begging of the question." This is a mistake; the argument does not take it for granted that the "sinner does not deserve eternal punishment"-it merely affirms that to make one eternally miserable and not annother, when there is scarcely any perceptible, and but very little real difference of character, would be unreasonable. Universalists are not accustomed to beg the question, in dispute. We have already spoken of forgiveness. If all deserve eternal misery and some are forgiven, and others never will be forgiven, are they all treated alike?

2. Mr. P. says, "it is argued that life is too short for a man to contract guilt enough to deserve an eternal punishment." Though there is manifestly a very great disproportion between the sins committed in this short life, and an eternity of suffering; yet the shortness of human life, unconnected with any other consideration, is not an argument relied on by Universalists to show that sinners do not deserve eternal punishment. We may therefore safely admit what Mr. P. contends for, viz. "that length of time has no necessary connexion with the enormity" of guilt: because a man can commit a great crime in as short a time as may be required to commit a

small one. If man possess capacity to commit crime which deserves eternal punishment, mortal life is long enough to enable him to commit it. But the truth is, man possesses no such capacity. Mr. P. says "The atrocity of crime depends upon the importance of the law, and the sacredness of the authority which is violated" &c. In this definition one very important item is omitted, viz. the capacity of the transgressor. An idiot cannot violate any moral law. As every transgressor possesses limited powers only, he cannot justly deserve unlimited punishment for the abuse of those limited powers. Mr. P. says "And none will deny that this, (the everlasting favor of his Maker) is offered to him, (man) in the gospel." In the Presbyterian confession of faith to which Mr. P. has solemnly subscribed before God and man, are the following sentiments. "By the decree of God for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others fore-ordained to everlasting death. These angels and men thus predestinated and fore-ordained; are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite that it cannot be either increased or diminished." Is it weakness, or wickedness-is it ignorance, or hypocrisy, which induces a man to make solema profession of faith in such sentiments, and then offer "God's eternal favor" to all men?

Mr. P. says "It is alleged that the creature is finite, and therefore cannot deserve an endless punishment." He says, "to this I reply that his

D

powers of sinning are not more limited than are his susceptibilities of suffering,-hence there is no more reason why his punishment should not be endless, than there would be if his powers were indefinitely increased." Granted. Let the powers of the sinner be increased ever so much, if those powers still fall short of infinity, he cannot deserve infinite or endless punishment, & an infinite being, having no superior, to whom he is in subjection-having no temptation from without, or within himself, cannot commit sin. Mr. P's. argument therefore falls short of his object. Because sinners live several years in this world without being reclaimed-and we do not deem this an impeachment of divine justice; Mr. P. says, "God cannot be under any obligation ever to reclaim them-there is no injustice in leaving them to live in sin and misery to all eternity." But if God should leave them, strictly speaking, they would not live at all! The supporting power of God is constantly required to preserve existence, If any part of mankind be eternally miserable, God does not merely leave them

he constantly exerts his power to sustain, and make them miserable. Is there no injustice in this? There is positive injustice and cruelty in giving life to a moral being, whose whole existence is worse than nothing. God certainly knew the final result of every creature's existence. The most malicious being could do no worse than to cause life with the positive knowledge that it would be perpetuated in endless agony. The justice as well as goodness of God forbid our as

Mr. P's. argucribing such conduct to him. ment on this point is very much like the following-if a man can live comfortably without food for the space of six hours-he can so live, ten, fifty, or one hundred years! He says "If men are saved because justice requires it, then there is no special favor in their salvation, and no forgiveness; and no deliverance from the curse of the law through Christ." This would

he correct if favor, grace or mercy were opposed to justice-if forgiveness were a liberation from just punishment-if deliverance from the curse of the law were a deliverance from the penalty due to sin. But we have already shown that justice & mercy barmonize-forgiveness does not liberate the sinner from a just punishment & deliverance from the curse of the law may consist in a deliverance from sin-consequently from the Mr. P's concurses denounced against sin. clusion is therefore incorrect.

Let us examine the design of punishment. If God punishes, he must design it for the good, or the injury of his creatures, i. e. if he has any design concerning it. If he has no design, why does he administer it? To say that God punishes for the ultimate injury of his creatures is to ascribe to him disgraceful malignity! That God 'punishes for the good of his creatures is the most consistent with his perfections and his word "Now no chastening for the present seemeth to be joyous, but grievous nevertheless afterwards, it yieldeth the peaceable fruit of righteousness unto them which are exercised thereby."

12. 11.

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