Imatges de pàgina
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CHAP. II.

Of the Article.

LANGUAGE is chiefly composed of general terms, most substantives being the names of genera or species. When we find a number of substances resembling one another, in their principal and most obvious qualities, we refer them to one species, to which we assign a name, common to every individual of that species. In like manner, when we find several of these species, resembling one another in their chief properties, we refer them to a higher order, to which also we assign a common, and more general name than that, which was affixed to the inferior class. Thus we assign the general name man to the human species, as possessing a common form, and distinguished by the common attributes of life, reason, and speech. If we consider man as possessed of life only, we perceive a resemblance in this respect between him, and other beings. To this higher class or genus, the characteristic attribute of which is vitality, we affix the more generic name of ani

mal*. Hence, when we use an appellative or common noun, it denotes the genus or class collectively, of which it is the name, as,

"The proper study of mankind is man," i. c. not one man, not many men, but all men.

"Metal is specifically heavier than water," i. e. not this or that metal, but all metals.

But, though our words are general, all our perceptions are individual, having single existences for their objects. It is often necessary, however, to express two, three, or more of these individual existences; and hence arises the use of that species of words, which have been called numerals, that is, words denoting number. To signify unity, or one of a class, our forefathers employed ae or ane, as "ae man," "ane ox." When unity, or the number one, as opposed to two or more, was to be expressed, the emphasis would naturally be laid on the word significant of unity; and when unity was not so much the object, as the species or kind, the term expressive of unity, would naturally be unemphatical; and hence, ae, by celerity of pronunciation, would become a; and ane be shortened into an. These words a and an are now termed indefinite articles; it is clear, however, that they are truly numerals, belonging to the same

* It must be obvious, that the terms general and universal belong not to real existences, but are merely denominations, the result of intellect, generalising a number of individuals under one head.

class with two, three, four, &c.; or, perhaps, more properly, these numerals may be considered as abbreviations, for the repeated expression of the term one. By whatever name these terms a, an may be designed, it seems evident, that they were originally synonimous with the name of unity, or rather themselves names of unity, emphasis only distinguishing whether unity, or the species were chiefly intended. Hence a and an cannot be joined with a plural noun.

Some grammarians, indeed, have asserted, that in every example, where a or an occurs, the term one may be substituted in its stead, without, in the least degree, injuring the sense. As far as the primary idea denoted by these words, is concerned, this opinion is, doubtless, incontrovertible; for they each express unity: but with regard to the secondary, or implied ideas, which these terms convey, the difference is obvious. An example will illustrate this. If I say, ~ Will one

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man be able to carry this burden so far?" I evidently oppose one to more, and the answer might be "No; but two men will." Let us substitute the term a and say, "Will a man be able . "to carry this burden?" Is the idea no wise changed by this alteration? I apprehend it is; for the answer might naturally be, "No; but a horse will." I have here substituted a for one; the converse will equally shew, that the terms are by no means convertible, or strictly synonimous. If

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instead of saying, "A horse, a horse, a kingdom "for a horse," I should say, "One horse, one "horse, one kingdom for one horse," the sentiment, I conceive, would not be strictly the same. In both expressions the species is named, and in both, one of that species is demanded; but with this difference, that in the former, the name of the species is the emphatic word, and it opposes that species to every other; in the latter, unity of object seems the leading idea; " one kingdom for one horse." In this respect, our language appears to me to have a decided superiority over those languages, where one word performs the office of what we term an article, and at the same time denotes the idea of unity. Donnez moi un livre means either, " give me one book," i. e. not two or more books, or " give me a book," that is, "a book, not something else; a book, not a ." pen," for example.

I acknowledge, that, in oral language, emphasis may serve to discriminate the sentiments, and prevent ambiguity. But emphasis is addressed to the ear only, not to the eye; it can, therefore, be of no service in written language. It is true also, that, by attending to the context, error may often be avoided; but let it be remembered as Quintilian observes*, that language should be, not

* Non ut intelligere possit, sed, ne omnino possit non intelligere curandum. Inst. Lib. VIII. cap. 4.

I am inclined to think, that our language possesses a superior

such as the reader may understand, if he will take the trouble to examine it carefully, but such, as he cannot, even without effort, fail to comprehend. When it is asserted, therefore, that one may in every case be substituted for a, without, in the least degree, injuring the expression, the position appears to me erroneous and false. Whatever creates ambiguity, whether with respect to the primary or secondary ideas annexed to words, in some degree, without question, violates the

sense.

It seems therefore undeniable that the word a, termed the indefinite article, was originally identical with the name of unity, expressing either

ity in this respect over the Greek itself. Εγενετο ανθρωπος απές ·aλμevos пaра тe ea may signify either "man in the species, or an individual was 66 sent from God." The author of the article Grammar in the Encyc. Brit. observes, "that the word av6pwπos " is here restricted to an individual by its concord with the verb " and the participle." If he mean by this, that the term must be significant of only one individual (and I can annex no other interpretation to his words) because a singular verb and participle singular are joined with it, he errs egregiously. Numberless examples might be produced, to evince the contrary. Job v. 7. aуOρшπos yενväтαι xояw, "man, (mankind) is born unto trouble," where the subject is joined to a verb singular, Psal. xlix. 12. ανθρωπος εν τιμη ων 8 συνηκε, man being in honour abideth not." Here also man for mankind is joined with a participle and verb singular. And here it may be pertinently asked, would not the term one for a in the first example somewhat alter the meaning, and convey an idea different from that intended by the evangelist?

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