exhaufted, and that it is become impoffible to raife large fums of money upon that fyftem, but upon very disadvantageous terms to the public. We were told alfo that the plan now before the Houfe was nothing but the charge of the falvage of the property of every human being in the kingdom; that nothing could anfwer this purpose but that of raifing a large fum of money within the year. Now, he conceived that this expedient was liable to many objections; and he must first obferve, that if the fyftem of funding was to be departed from at all, it thould be abandoned altogether; or in other words, if we raifed fome we thould raife the whole of the fupplies within the year. By this half measure we had none of the advantages of either fyftem, but we were expofed to the inconveniences of both. The money will not be collected in the metropolis, which is the cafe, generally fpeaking, when a loan was made; but here was to be accumulated at laft in the capital, an immenfe fum of money, and the contributions towards it are made in the country, the confequence of which was very unfavourable to the kingdom at large. But to fuppofe, for the fake of argument, that this plan was a good one, that would raife the price of Stock, and produce other advantages, fuch as tend to the refloration of public credit. That the Stocks are better now than they were fome months ago was true; but he would afk, whether that was owing to any plan of raifing the fupplies within the year? he believed it was owing to no fuch cause. Indeed various caufes were affigned for this rife in the funds: We were fometimes told that the plan for the redemption of the land tax was one cause of it; we were told at other times that the improvement in the agriculture of the country was alfo a caufe of the advancement of our credit; we were told also that our naval victories were the caufes of our improvement in public: this he was inclined to believe, and he gloried in the cause of it.

In examining the propriety of railing large fupplics within the year, a question naturally arofe, efpecially upon fuch a meafure as that which was now before the House, whether the legislature ought or ought not to repeal the affeffed taxes adopted laft year, and form a new mode upon the old bafis ? For his own part, when he remembered what was faid by the minifter, and thofe who generally fupport him in every meafure, how confident they all were of the excellence of the plan, he could hardly conceive the reafon why they dropt it now but fuppofe it was proper to repeal the affeffed taxes, he would then fay, that the queftion was, what other mode

of

of taxation should be devifed? That property, fome how or other, ought to be the object of taxation, was manifeft. The queftion then would be, whether the tax ought to be on capital, or on income? or rather, whether they fhould not be both blended together? He thought that if thefe very extraordinary contributions were to be levied, there ought to be half per cent. upon the capital, and five per cent. only upon income. A double advantage would be derived from this, because those who had nothing but income to depend upon, would be confiderably relieved; whereas those who had both income and capital would be made to pay more than is proposed by the prefent plan. For his own part, he could not conceive any thing more improper than the plan of making income alone the fubject of taxation. There was a variety of publications upon this fubject, to which, however, he should not now allude. But he fhould ftate a cafe by way of illuftration. Suppose an individual got 6ool. a year by the profeffion of the law, and another had 20,000l. in three per cents. confolidated annuities, the income is the fame to both, but the unfortunate lawyer must deduct 60l. a year immediately out of his income, whereas the capital of the other may increafe; for that would be the cafe if the funds fhould rife, as they were expected to do, by this very measure. He therefore thought that the tax ought to be both on capital and upon income, in order to be equitable. It might be faid, that a great difficulty would arife in eftimating capital; for his part, he faw no more difficulty in that refpect than there will be in afcertaing the different incomes of indiuiduals. There were three forts of income. The landed, the commercial, and the profeffional income. It might be fuppofed, that a perfon poffeffed of a landed income, can always ftate what it is; but there were difficulties in many cafes: he might be fubject to a variety of expences of a legal and unavoidable nature in defending his right among gentlemen of the law. He was liable to many deductions on account of the improvement of his eftate, which he could not feel the effect of for many years. He had many expences that were incidental to his ftation; there was much expence upon his appearance; he might be called upon to go through the of fice of theriff; he might be applied to for his contribution to build a bridge; to make a road; to cut a canal; or for fuch like affairs, which might be very confiderable, and which, from his flation, he could not decently avoid Theft 'confiderations

confiderations entitled the man of landed income to confiderable deductions from the impoft, as it now stood.

The income of the commercial man was ftill more difficult to be known. It was a thing in its nature not capable of fair calculation, for it depended on fituation, on friends, on connexion, on talents, and on industry; and indeed on various other things. It was hardly poffible to lay an equitable tax on fituation; that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had difcovered by the operation of the fhop-tax. It founded oddly to fay that a man fhould be taxed because he had friends; nor did it seem much better to say that a man fhould be taxed because he had genius, or because he was induftrious. If we did, we destroyed industry, we damped the ardour of genius, and favoured idlenefs and dulnefs: a mode of conducting the affairs of a State not much to be commended.

But if there were any difficulties in afcertaining the income of the landed and the commercial, they were multiplied ten fold in the cafe of the profeffional man, for he was liable not only to a diminution, but the utter deftruction of his income from unavoidable accidents, and often by the most whimsical prejudices of a political or any other nature. Public diftrefs

might perhaps deftroy the whole of his income by putting an end to his employment; nay, there might be many profeffional men whofe noble income might be deftroyed by this very meafure, which calls upon them for a contribution of a tenth of it.

The Houfe would recollect the very able and elaborate fpeech of the right hon. Gentleman in opening this business; he dwelt a great deal on the antiquated notions of Davenant, and the mere gueffes of fome modern authors concerning the amount of the income of the people of this country. Suppofing the calculation he made was right, that the income of the people of this country was 100 millions, yet it was worth while to examine whether they can afford to pay away one tenth of that income; for it thould be remembered that this tenth was in addition to all the other taxes which they pay already, and thofe which they will be called upon to pay.

He thought the people of this country might be divided into three claffes. First, thofe who have been in the habit of faving fomething out of their income. Secondly, thofe who have not, but who might fave. Thirdly. thofe who neither have faved, will fave, or can fave. The first clafs, by this bill, would foon be reduced, and fo would the fecond,

to

to the condition of the third. He was now fpeaking generally; allowance was of course to be made for fome exceptions. But this was fuppofed to have a great deal of merit, on account of its aiming at the mifer. He wifhed the Chancellor of the Exchequer had stated the income of individuals of this defcription in his opening fpeech upon this fubject. He had not done fo. He would do it for the minifter. He believed that we could not eftimate that there were above three thousand mifers in this country; and the whole income poffelfed by mifers did not exceed three millions fterling; and therefore the whole tax upon their property would not, by this measure, amount to more than three hundred thoufand pounds fterling. The next clafs of the community were those who have not hitherto faved any thing, and he had no hesitation in saying that, after this measure fhall have paffed, ⚫ if it fhould pafs, they would never be able to fave any thing; and if they were only prudent enough to keep out of debt, the Exchequer would lofe from it in the diminution of their confumption of all articles taxed by way of excife, customs, or otherwise, so that in reality Government could not gain at all from this clafs, by this new impofition. The fame obfervations were applicable to the next clafs, with this difference, that the little capital they have will be diminished continually in endeavouring to exist.

The next point of objection which occurred to him was, that this measure would cause emigration. If the people of this country were under the neceffity of making a disclosure of their property or income, and paying feverely for that property or income, he was afraid that the confequence of fuch a fyftem would be much emigration.

The next head of objection was, that this impoft was to affect property that was in other parts of his Majefty's dominions. This was a measure of feverity, for which there was not so much as an example. The Houfe would easily fee that he applied this obfervation to property that was in the Weft Indies, and in Ireland. They were under the privilege of being taxed only by thofe who reprefented them; and here he could not help quoting the expreffion of the ceJebrated Blackftone, who faid, "that a tax is a contribution of property, in order to fecure the remainder." If fo we could not tax Ireland, but for the protection of Ireland; we could not tax Jamaica, but for the protection of Jamaica. We might say we had the right, but he queftioned the policy of the measure in this particular. Cc

VOL. I. 1798.

The

The next objection he had was to the inquifitorial power which this tax gave to those who were to affefs upon it. He though that fome regulations might be made to prevent evafions; but he could have no hesitation in declaring, that the provifions of this bill, as they ftand, are totally repugnant to all the principles of our conftitution, and fuch as would be difgraceful to that Houfe to adopt.

If

There were other objections which were of a minor nature to thofe of which he had been fpeaking. The taxing the funds was neither more nor lefs (let what will be faid of it) than a breach of faith with the public creditor. The public creditor was told by law he was to have his money paid to him without any deduction whatever, and indeed fo he was still to be paid without any deduction, but the money was no fooner in his pocket, than it was to be taken out again; for he was told by this bill, "fail not at your peril to give an account of all the money you have received as a public creditor, and give up a tenth of that property." He muft fay that this was a miferable evafion of the fpirit of the Jaw by which the public creditor was protected in the receipt of his money. He would fay, that we fhould follow the principle of our ancestors on this occafion, if we must raise a large fum of money within the year; for they defrauded nobody; indeed they had no funded debt, and if they had, he was perfuaded they would not have defrauded their creditors, as this measure would be the means of doing if carried. we were to expect money from thofe who have property in the funds, let books be opened at the bank, and let thofe who like it fubfcribe their money, and let it go no further than it did on a former occafion. But it might be faid, that fome great measure of finance is neceffary for the prefent fituation of the country; and it might be added, that fuch is the exigency of public affairs, that no Gentleman ought to object to any meafure of finance, without being ready to fuggeft fomething elfe in its ftead. He diffented from that doctrine altogether; for it was fufficient for a member of that Houfe to fee that a meafure which was propofed was bad, in order to justify him in oppofing it. But there was not any real difficulty upon that head; let a committee be appointed, and let it be compofed of proper perfons, and he had no doubt that a much better plan than the prefent would be adopted, and indeed when the Houfe knew that much bufinefs upon this plan, out of that Houfe, and by many perfons who were not members of it, had been done, he did not fee what ob

jection