Express description required to take case out of Act. General description insufficient. Direction expressed in void deed. mode of regulating worship, be required to be taught or observed or 99 In order to take a case out of this section, the particular doctrines or mode of worship required or forbidden must be stated in express terms (c). The use of a general description, as, for example, the Protestant Dissenting Congregation then of New Row (d), or, having regard to the changes which have taken place in that sect, the use of the term "Presbyterian" (e), is not a sufficient requisition that any particular doctrines or mode of worship shall be taught or observed. Where, however, under a deed of 1766, property was held in trust for a meeting-house "for Protestant Dissenters of the Presbyterian or Independent denomination to worship in, as the same is now used, free of rent, so long as the laws of Great Britain shall tolerate Protestant Dissenters," it was held that the direction was sufficiently express to take the case out of this Act (f). It has been held that, even though the deed in which the direction is expressed is void under 9 Geo. II. c. 36 (g), the case is nevertheless taken out of the Act (h). (c) Att.-Gen. v. Hutton, Dr. 480. (e) Ibid.; Att.-Gen. v. Bunce, L. R. (f) Att.-Gen. v. Anderson, supra. (g) Now the Mortmain and Charit. Uses Act, 1888, Part II., post. (h) Att.-Gen. v. Ward, 6 Hare, at p. 483. A congregation of Unitarians, professing to be bound by no Unitarians. human authority, and to be at liberty to change their belief as often as their judgment satisfied them that they were in error, was held not to be deprived of the benefit of the Act by want of fixed doctrine, and to be capable of acquiring a right by twenty-five years' usage (i). In the absence of any direction taking the case out of the Act, Twenty-five years' usage twenty-five years' usage is conclusive (k). conclusive. A similar provision with regard to Roman Catholics is contained Roman in the Roman Catholic Charities Act, 1860 (7). By sect. 5 of that Catholics. Act it is enacted, with regard to charities connected with the Roman Catholic religion, that, where the original trusts are not ascertained by means of a written instrument, consistent usage during twenty years is conclusive evidence of the trusts on which the property was settled. trusts of The task of executing trusts of dissenting chapels has often been Difficulty of found to be one of the greatest difficulty (m), and it has been said executing that it is the duty of the founders of such trusts to declare their dissenting chapels. intentions clearly (n). Many dissenting sects endeavour to secure uniformity in the Dissenters' trusts of their chapels by means of " model deeds" or "forms" of chapels' model deeds, &c. deeds recommended for use. The model deed is an instrument prepared under the authority and with the approval of the leading members of the sect. It establishes and declares the trusts of a particular chapel, and is duly enrolled, and copies of it are printed and circulated. The trusts of any chapel requiring to be subsequently established can thus be declared by reference to the model deed. A table of the denominations of dissenters who have model deeds, Denomina with the date of such deed, is subjoined— tions having model deeds. Denominations having "forms" of deeds. Schemes by reference to model deed. The Wesleyan Methodists have also two model deeds of schools, dated respectively 16th November, 1848, and 14th June, 1849 (Bilston model deed) (0). The denominations which have no model deeds but which provide "forms" of deeds which they recommend, are the General and Particular Baptists, the Congregationalists or Independents, and the Presbyterian Church of England. The use of the model deed or form in declaring the trusts of a chapel is, of course, voluntary, but is obviously advisable. The Charity Commissioners establish numerous schemes relating to dissenting chapels, in which the trusts are declared by reference to the model deed; not, however, where the deed of trust of the chapel has been made since the model deed, and does not refer to it, there being, in such a case, a presumed intention on the part of the founder that the model deed shall not be made use of (p). (0) This is the deed commonly employed when Wesleyan Methodist schools are established by scheme or the Charity Commissioners upon the trusts declared by the model deed. (p) See further, as to this, n. (a) to sect. 15 of the Charit. Trusts Act, 1869, post. CHAPTER VI. ESTABLISHMENT OF CHARITIES. SECTION I. ESTABLISHMENT OF CHARITIES BY SCHEMES, ETC. Authorities for execution of Charitable Trusts. THE authorities upon whom the duty of regulating the execution Authorities of charitable trusts may devolve are the Crown, the Court, and the Charity Commissioners. The jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioners is dealt with hereafter (a). to execute charitable trusts. The rule as to when the trusts should be executed by the Crown, When exeand when by the Court is as follows: cuted by Crown and Court. Crown. Where the property is not vested in trustees, and the gift is to when by charity generally, and the objects are not to be ascertained by the act of individuals referred to, the charity is disposed of by the sign-manual of the sovereign, who is the disposer of such charities in his character of parens patriæ (b). Where, on the other hand, the execution of the charitable pur- Court. pose is committed to trustees with general or particular objects pointed out, the Court and not the Crown is the authority to carry the trusts into effect (c). The rule is thus stated by Lord Eldon (d), "the general prin- Rule stated ciple thought most reconcileable to the cases is that where there is by Lord (a) Post, pp. 132 et seq. (b) Att.-Gen. v. Matthews, 2 Lev. 167; Clifford v. Francis, Freem. 329; Att.-Gen. v. Syderfen, 1 Vern. 224; Da Costa v. De Pas, Amb. 228. See Lord Hardwicke's note, cited Att.-Gen. v. Herrick, Amb. 712; Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36; Paice v. Archbishop of Canterbury, 14 Ves. at p. 372; Att.-Gen. v. Mayor of Galway, 1 Moll. 95; Att. Gen. v. Todd, 1 Keen, 803. (c) Moggridge v. Thackwell, supra; Paice v. Archbishop of Canterbury, supra; Att.-Gen. v. Gladstone, 13 Sim. 7; Reeve v. Att.-Gen., 3 Hare, 191; Copinger v. Crehane, Ir. R. 11 Eq. 429. (d) Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. at p. 86; and see Ommanney v. Butcher, T. & R. at p. 270. Eldon. Superstitious gift. General charitable objects. Renouncing executor. Application by Crown rare. Not where there is trustee or executor. Or trust imposed. Hayter v. Charitable trust, how executed by Crown. a general indefinite purpose, not fixing itself upon any object the disposition is in the king by sign manual; but where the execution is to be by a trustee with general or some objects pointed out, there the Court will take the administration of the trust." Where a charitable gift failed on the ground of its being superstitious, the rule was that the Crown should appoint by sign manual to some valid charitable purpose (f). The same was the case where the gift was for an improper charity (g), or for charitable uses generally (h), or where the charitable objects were uncertain (¿). So, also, where the choice of objects was left to an executor who renounced, the administration was held to be under the sign manual of the sovereign (k). The cases, however, in which administration by the sign manual is now required are very rare. It appears from the rule as stated above, that wherever there is a trustee or executor whose duty it is to carry the testator's directions into effect, the Court is the authority to administer (1). Wherever, therefore, a particular trust is imposed the Court will administer, although the trustee may have predeceased the testator (m) or disclaimed (n). In Hayter v. Trego (o) it was held that a legacy to a voluntary charitable society, which was dissolved after the testator's death, but before the assets could be administered, should be applied cyprès by the Court. Where the execution of the trust devolves upon the Crown, the Court merely declares that the gift ought to be disposed of in charity. This is communicated by the Attorney-General to the Queen, and the direction is given under the sign-manual (p). (f) Da Costa v. De Pas, Amb. 228; De Garcin v. Lawson, 4 Ves. 433, n.; Jones and Cross' Case, cited nom. Gates and Jones' Case, 2 Vern. 266; Att.-Gen. v. Guise, ibid.; Cary v. Abbot, 7 Ves. 490; Att.-Gen. v. Power, 1 Ball & B. 145; De Themmines v. De Bonneval, 5 Russ. 288; Att.-Gen. v. Todd, 1 Keen, 803. As to gifts for superstitious uses being applicable cy-près, see ante, p. 24. (g) Att.-Gen. v. Whorwood, 1 Ves. (h) Att.-Gen. v. Herrick, Amb. 712. (k) Att.-Gen. v. Fletcher, 5 L. J. Ch. see administration by sign manual, Denyer v. Druce, Taml. 32; Simon v. Barber, ibid. 14; Ware v. Att.-Gen., Att.-Gen. v. Londonderry, Sanford v. Gibbons, Thorley v. Byrne, and Re Dickason, all cited 3 Hare, at p. 195, n.; Felan v. Russell, 4 Ir. Eq. R. 701. (1) Paice v. Archbishop of Canterbury, 14 Ves. 372; other cases cited supra. (m) Att.-Gen. v. Gladstone, 13 Sim. 7; but see Felan v. Russell, 4 Ir. Eq. R. 701. (n) Reeve v. Att.-Gen., 3 Hare, 191; but see Denyer v. Druce, Taml. 32. (0) 5 Russ. 113. (p) See Da Costa v. De Pas, Amb. 228. |