was discontinued, Sugden, L. C., said: "There is no pretence for saying that it (the rent-charge) has ceased by reason of the school having been discontinued. Suppose the school-house had been burned down by accident, could it be contended that the rentcharge ceased until the house was rebuilt ?" (i). So, also, where the payment is for the maintenance of almspeople answering a certain description, the land charged with such payment is not discharged, although there are not sufficient persons in the parish answering the required description (). Similarly, it is a breach of trust to conceal the existence of the Concealment trust by not communicating it to parties interested (7). of trust. Nor can trustees convert the funds to other purposes than those Conversion to marked out by the instrument of foundation or the scheme regu- purposes. improper lating the charity. And although a cy-près application may be desirable, it is not for the trustees to make that application on their own authority (m). Where the gift is for the poor of one parish, it is a breach of Parochial trust to apply it in such a way that the poor of another parish charities. have the benefit of it (»). And where several parochial charities are given for several purposes, no agreement of the parishioners can divert them to other uses (o). A fund directed to be applied in specific ways for the benefit of a town cannot be applied to other purposes of general utility (p). Nor could an estate given for the maintenance of decayed householders be applied for the poor of the parish generally (1). In Att.-Gen. v. Leage (r), it was held that a stipend of 1207. Rector's under an Act of Parliament "to be raised within the district," stipend not payable out and paid to the rector in lieu of burial fees, was not payable out of charity for of charitable funds vested in the parish authorities upon trust for benefit of the poor generally or for a particular class of poor, or for the repair of the church, but only out of such moneys as the whole parish was beneficially entitled to for its public purposes. poor. Similarly, it is a breach of trust for trustees of several charities Funds of one charity can (i) Incorporated Society v. Price, 1 J. & Lat. 499. (k) Aylet v. Dodd, 2 Atk. 238. (1) Att.-Gen. v. Alford, 4 De G. M. & G. 843,852. In this case an executor who had retained the trust funds in his hands uninvested, but had made no profit by his misconduct, was held to be chargeable only with simple interest at 4 per cent. per annum. (m) See Att.-Gen. v. Kell, 2 Beav. 575; Att.-Gen. v. Coopers' Co., 19 Ves. 187; Att.-Gen. v. Vivian, 1 Russ. at (n) Att.-Gen. v. Brandreth, 1 Y. & C. (0) Man v. Ballet, 1 Vern. 43. (1) Ex parte Fowlser, 1 J. & W. 70. not be applied to apply the funds of one to the objects of another (s). Otherwise, of course, where one fund is given for several institutions (t). to another. Subscription to school in return for Where a charity was for the support of a guild and its poor brethren, it was held to be no misapplication to subscribe out of admission of the funds towards the erection of buildings in connection with a boys. charity school in return for a right to have a certain number of boys educated and maintained gratuitously (u). Grammar school. Gift to pro Where a school is established as a grammar school for instruction in the classics, the trustees cannot convert it into a school for teaching merely English, writing, and arithmetic (x). Nor can they apply the revenues in enlarging the school chapel for the benefit of the inhabitants of the town (y). If the gift is to provide a preacher in one parish, it is a breach vide preacher. of trust to provide a preacher in another parish. If the gift is to find a preacher, it is a breach of trust to apply it to the poor (≈). Repair of church. Pulling down chapel. Religious restriction. Charity for Where the trusts of a charity are for the repair of one church, it is improper to apply the funds for the benefit of another church (a); or to mix them up with the produce of parochial rates and out of the general fund to defray the cost of repairing the church and other parochial expenses (). In Ex parte Greenhouse (c), where the trustees of a chapel had pulled down the chapel, sold the materials, and converted a buryingground to other uses, Plumer, V.-C., said that it was "the grossest and most indecorous breach of trust, by violating the burial-ground and pulling down the chapel without any authority or sanction... The bell is carried to the market place, and the pews to the parish church, and the stones of the church are used in repairs of a bridge. It is an enormous breach of trust, and such as could not be expected in a Christian country." We have seen that sometimes the benefits of a charity are restricted to persons holding a particular form of religious belief (d). Where this is so, it is a breach of trust to extend the benefit of the charity to persons not possessing the qualification (e). Thus, if it appear that only persons belonging to the Church of England are intended to be objects of the charity, it must not be extended to members of Dissenting sects (ƒ). (s) Att.-Gen. v. Corporation of New- (t) Att.-Gen. v. Geary, 3 Mer. 514. (x) Att.-Gen. v. Earl of Mansfield, 2 (y) Att.-Gen. v. Earl of Mansfield, supra. () Duke, 116. See Wivélescom Case, Duke, 94; Att.-Gen. v. Goldsmiths' Co., If, on the other hand, the objects of the trust are Protestant Dissenters. Dissenters, none but Protestant Dissenters can partake in the benefit of them (g). Similarly, where persons not believing in the doctrines of the Trinitarians. Trinity and Original Sin were intended to be excluded from parti cipation in the charity, it was held that it was wrongly applied for the benefit of Unitarians (). Even if the charity is not established for a purpose purely reli- Charity not gious, yet if an intention is expressed that only persons professing purely religious. a particular form of belief shall be objects of it, that intention will be enforced. If, for example, the charity is established for providing secular education, but an intention is expressed that religious instruction of a particular character shall form part of the instruction given, the Court will follow that direction, though the effect may be to exclude a large portion of the community most in need of the charity from deriving any benefit from it (i); and the same may be the case although the primary object of the charity is eleemosynary (k). Where a chapel is established for the observance of a particular Dissenting chapels. form of religious worship it is a breach of trust to convert it to any other form of worship (7). trustees and Nor can it be so converted even though the trustees and the entire Consent of congregation consent, still less where there are dissentients (m). congregation. "If . . . the institution was established for the express purpose Rule stated by of such form of religious worship or the teaching of such particular Lord Eldon. doctrines as the founder has thought most conformable to the principles of the Christian religion, I do not apprehend that it is in the power of individuals having the management of that insti tution, at any time to alter the purpose for which it was founded, or to say to the remaining members, We have changed our opinions; and you, who assemble in this place for the purpose of hearing the doctrines and joining in the worship prescribed by the founder, shall no longer enjoy the benefit he intended for you, v. Calvert, 23 Beav. at p. 255. See Att.Gen. v. Pearson, 3 Mer. at p. 409. (g) Att.-Gen. v. Murdoch, 7 Hare, 445. (h) Shore v. Wilson, 9 Cl. & F. 355; Drummond v. Att.-Gen., 2 H. L. C. 837. (i) Alt.-Gen. v. Calvert, 23 Beav. 248, 257, per Lord Romilly. (k) Att.-Gen. v. Calvert, supra, at p. 258. See Shore v. Wilson, supra. (1) Broom v. Summers, 11 Sim. 353; Dill v. Watson, 2 Jones' Ex. R. 49; 1tt.-Gen. (m) Att.-Gen. v. Aust, 13 L. T. N. S. Presbyterians. Particular Trustees can what doc trines re unless you conform to the alteration which has taken place in our opinions.' In such a case, therefore, . . . where a congregation become dissentient among themselves, the nature of the original insititution must alone be looked to, as the guide for the decision of the Court; and that to refer to any other criterion-as to the sense of the existing majority-would be to make a new institution, which is altogether beyond the reach, and inconsistent with the duties and character, of this Court" (n). Thus, a chapel established for the doctrines of the Established Church of Scotland could not be converted to the use of members of the Free Church (0). And where a chapel was established for Protestant Dissenters of the Presbyterian or Independent denominations, it could not be transferred to the Presbyterian Church of England (p). In that case, the trust being expressed to be for Presbyterians or Independents, both were held to be objects of the charity (1). Where, however, a chapel was established "for the use and benefit of a congregation of Particular Baptists," it was held that Baptists accepting the doctrine of free communion were proper objects, on the ground that that was not one of the fundamental doctrines of Particular Baptists, but that Baptists were divided with regard to it, and each congregation regulated its own practice (››). It is not, however, for the trustees to determine whether the not determine existing congregation hold the doctrines required to entitle them to the benefit of the charity or not, or to take steps to eject them on the ground that they do not hold the proper doctrines. That is a question for the Court (s). quired. Acquiescence. Acquiescence by minority of congregation. And if the trustees have for a long series of years recognized the title of their cestuis que trust, they cannot turn round and refuse to do so any longer (†). In the same way the dissentient minority of a congregation may become bound by acquiescence. Thus, where the majority of the congregation, including the minister, joined another dissenting body which was considered to hold the same doctrines, it was held that a small minority of the original congregation, who had raised no opposition at the time, (n) Per Lord Eldon in Att.-Gen. v. Pearson, 3 Mer. at p. 400; see also pp. 418, 419. (0) Craigdallie v. Aikman, 1 Dow, 1; Att.-Gen. v. Welsh, 4 Hare, 572; Att.Gen. v. Munro, 2 De G. & Sm. 122; Att.-Gen. v. Murdoch, 7 Hare, 445. Sec, however, Westwood v. McKie, 21 L. T. N. S. 165; and cf. Att.-Gen. v. Wilson, 16 Sim. 210; Cairncross v. Lorimer, 3 Macq. 827. (P) Att.-Gen. v. Anderson, 57 L. J. Ch. 543. (2) Ibid. (r) Att.-Gen. v. Gould, 28 Beav. 485; Att.-Gen. v. Etheridge, 11 W. R. 199. (s) Newsome v. Flowers, 10 W. R. 26. (t) Ibid. could not, after the lapse of more than three years, maintain a suit to have it declared that the chapel was to be held for the use of those only who adhered to the original doctrine (u). power to Although power may be expressly given to the majority of a Express congregation to make new laws or alter old ones, yet such power alter laws. does not extend to enable the majority to alter the fundamental trusts, but only to vary the laws and make new ones, so far as may be consistent with the primary trusts (x). In all matters, however, not involving an interference with the Matters not trusts, there is nothing to prevent the congregation from effecting terference involving inany changes they choose. In Att.-Gen. v. Murdoch (y), Knight Bruce, L. J., laid down the principle that it was competent to a congregation of Dissenters, acting unanimously, and with the concurrence, where they had trustees, of those trustees, from time to time to introduce into their system and constitution new regulations, regulations at least not in contravention of the deed of trust or of the foundation, and not subversive of or opposed in principle to the original system or constitution. with trusts. If, therefore, it is no part of the essence of the trust that a par- Doctrines not ticular doctrine should be inculcated, the majority of the members fundamental. may alter the usage of the congregation with respect to it. Thus, where the trusts of a chapel were for a congregation of Particular Baptists, and it appeared that among Particular Baptists the doctrines of strict and free communion were both admitted, it was held that the majority of members might, notwithstanding long contrary usage, adopt strict or free communion, as they should from time to time determine (≈). So, also, the majority may make decisions as to the interior Interior regulations of the chapel (a). regulations of chapel. SECTION II. ALIENATION OF CHARITY PROPERTY. Although the presumption is that land devoted to charitable Alienation of purposes is intended to remain so devoted, there is no positive rule charity pro (u) Cairncross v. Lorimer, 3 Macq. 827. This would not, however, affect the Attorney-General's right to protect the charity: Corporation of Newcastle v. Att.-Gen., 12 Cl. & F. 402. (x) Milligan v. Mitchell, 3 My. & C. at pp. 74, 83. () 1 De G. M. & G. at p. 114. (a) Att.-Gen. v. Anderson, 57 L. J. perty. |