whether a child be sufficiently acquainted with the nature of an Oath, to be admitted as a witness, the only answer which is considered satisfactory to the question- What do you think will be the consequence, if you should not tell the truth after being sworn?'—is an answer, which conveys that the child considers he must in that case be sent to hell.

Indeed if the meaning of the phrase-So help me God! were what I so long strove to think it might be, a prayer for the divine help to keep the promise; (to say nothing of its being contradicted by the propriety of the English language) it would be very hard to say, in what consists the peculiar solemnity of obligation which all writers attribute to an Oath. According to this interpretation, a person taking the Oath of Allegiance, for instance, merely says "I will bear true allegiance, &c. “ and I pray God to help me to do so." A very suitable prayer certainly, after such a promise. But really I could suggest twenty other forms more solemn than this. Yet even those writers, who express themselves most loosely upon the subject, always describe a kind of mystic solemnity as attaching to the obligation of an Oath. And in what that peculiar mystery of solemnity consists, it is not very difficult to discern, if we are willing to see it. And whatever be the form of an Oath, that its designed import is of the same imprecatory nature; that, as Plutarch observes, every oath terminates either explicitly or implicitly in a curse; (was ignos εις καταξαν τελευτα της επιορκίας) I scarcely think requires any argument to establish or illustrate.* I observed some time ago an account of a Japanese being sworn as a witness in one of our courts; and sworn, of course, according to the form of oath considered binding in his country. For this purpose he held up a porcelain bowl; and after pronouncing certain words, dashed the bowl with force against the ground, so that it was broken in pieces. What was the evident import of this, but an imprecation, that his idol-gods might similarly execute destruction upon him, if he should falsify?-Well; in this Christian country, in which Christianity forms part of the law of the land, the evidence of the Japanese cursing himself by his gods was legally established as credible; but the most solemn testimony of a Christian is not legally admissible evidence, unless he will, before giving it, violate the express command of Christ, by binding himself under a still more awful curse to declare the truth.

Yet let me now put it to the reader's candid consideration, whether it is possible that any such imprecatory engagement can constitutein the view of a Christian-the obligation binding on his conscience not to falsify. That binding obligation is imposed on him by the word of God. Nothing which he or others may do or say, can either release him from it, or strengthen the validity of the obligation. And I confess that the man, who would solemnly and deliberately declare in evidence that which is false, must appear to me a very dubious witness, though he should confirm his testimony by a thou

Any reader, who wishes for more upon this subject, may consult the 34th vol. of the Monthly Review, for the year 1766; where there is a curious account of a work published by a M. Herrort, a citizen of Bern, for which he was put under arrest by the secret council.

sand oaths. I do not go so far as to deny, that some persons of this character may be restrained, by superstition, from falsifying upon oath. I admit, for instance, that there are multitudes in Ireland who will give false testimony without scruple, if they can contrive to kiss their thumb instead of the book, or if the book has not the sign of a cross imprinted on its cover: yet some of them will shrink from the same perjury, if they be sworn according to the form which they consider binding. But really superstition affords a very precarious security, and at least as frequently operates against the interests of society, as it promotes them. The same persons, to whom I have alluded, will conceive themselves under a moral obligation to cut your throat, if they have bound themselves to do so under the curse of an oath.

Having touched upon this subject, let me be pardoned for enlarging a little more, and examining what I am persuaded is a vulgar prejudice. There are many vulgar prejudices not confined to the vulgar.

Much of the language which I have met with upon Oaths, both in conversation and in reading, proceeds upon the assumption-that Oaths are the grand bond of civil society; that if they were abolished, society must be dissolved. Any principle founded in truth, the more it is examined, will be the more established and confirmed. Let not therefore the advocates of this sentiment be afraid to look at the following considerations.

Oaths are commonly divided into two kinds,-promissory oaths, and oaths of testimony. There is no real difference between them, as legally employed in this country. They are all promissory engagements, in which the juror binds himself under a curse as to his future conduct. The only shade of difference, which can be truly marked, is that some of these engagements have a prospective bearing to a very long period, perhaps to the whole life of the juror; but others to a much shorter period and a particular occasion. However, adopting the popular distinction, let us take a view of each kind of Oaths, to see if they really possess that political utility which is attributed to them.

And first, the Oath of Allegiance: which I find by a work already referred to (Mr. Herrort's) was not introduced in Christendom till the seventh century, and was then invented by the Clergy. I would put it to the consideration of my reader, whether he seriously believes that any man, disposed to engage in treasonable practices, was ever restrained from them by the consideration, that he had taken the Oath of Allegiance. It would be absurd to imagine it. Many may have been restrained by the fear of discovery, of failure, and of the gibbet: but really persons who have a taste for treason are not often distinguished for regarding the obligation of an oath.

Again; when the Directors of the Bank of Ireland dismissed from their service (and perhaps were obliged by charter to do so) six of my brethren, because they preferred the loss of their employmeuts to the violation of Christ's precept against swearing; was it because the Directors apprehended that these persons would proceed to embezzle the property of the Bank, unless they annually bound themselves under a curse not to do so? Was it because they suspected that old

Mr. LAWRENCE, for instance, after thirty-four years' faithful discharge of his duty, aimed at becoming false to his employers, when he was just on the verge of the grave? No such thing. I may confidently appeal to the Directors themselves, whether they did not at the time consider these persons as among the most confidential servants in their employ. But they thought it necessary to uphold the practice of their annual Oaths, as importantly conducive to the interests of their Establishment. Yet do they really believe that it is by those annual oaths any of their servants are kept to the faithful discharge of their duties? They find from time to time, that persons in their employment commit depredations on the property of the Bank. Yet have not these persons taken the Oaths? And was there ever an instance in which one of them, forming a scheme of peculation, was restrained from putting it in practice by the recollection of his oath? The superabundance of securities, which our Banks require from their servants, is amusing. There is a district of Ireland in which, according to old tradition, every creditor used to require from his debtor a threefold security for payment, viz. a pledge, a bond, and an oath. The Bank Directors require all the same securities from their Clerks. They have their necks in pledge, forfeited to the law, if they should embezzle Bank property. They have also a bond from two solvent sureties, to the full amount of any possible loss which can be sustained. And one might imagine that these two securities (not to speak of regard to character, interest, &c.) were sufficient, so far as any securities can avail. But, no: they must also bind their souls with an oath of cursing. I cannot but say that in my view, the wickedness of the practice is only equalled by its absurdity.

I have myself had an opportunity formerly of observing, how little these promissory Oaths really influence men's conduct. There is plenty of such swearing in the University, of which I was long a member. Every lectureship or other collegiate office, to which a Fellow is appointed, brings its own Oath with it: for the first sweeping oath for the faithful discharge of his duties, which he has taken on his election to the fellowship, is considered insufficient; unless on each new change of office, however trifling, he again stake his soul's salvation for doing his duty. Well: (without intending to say any thing against that learned body, or any particular individuals composing it) it was a notorious fact, that some discharged their collegiate duties, and others—were not equally exemplary in the matter. But was it the Oath that influenced those who discharged them most carefully? For myself, I candidly avow that it was not; and that I am persuaded I should have been equally diligent and attentive as a lecturer, &c. though I had never bound myself by oath to be so. Indeed, any one, who rationally considers the real springs of human conduct, must be landed in the same conclusion.

Before we proceed to the Oath of testimony, let us look for a moment at the Oath by which a JURY, in this country, bind themselves to bring in a verdict according to the evidence laid before them, without favour or affection to either party.-(Any honest men in such circumstances will be on their guard against favour or affection to either side: but those, who are most aware of the danger and evil

of such sinister bias on their judgments, will perhaps be most slow to put themselves under an awful imprecation in case it should influence their verdict. But waving this-) Is it to this Oath we are indebted for the honesty, which commonly marks the verdict of a British Jury? Some may be surprised at my answering that question confidently, with a decisive negative. But I think I can establish the truth of my reply by the evidence of incontrovertible fact. If it were by their Oath that a Jury were determined, in any case, to bring in an honest verdict; the same oath must similarly determine the same Jury in any other case. But it is notorious that there are cases, in which a Jury the most respectable will bring in a verdict contrary to the evidence laid before them, and contrary to their oath. Let one example suffice; though I might adduce others. On a trial for murder in a duel,-if the evidence which establishes the fact, satisfy the Jury that the murder was committed, as is called, fuirly. according to the laws of honour,-where is the Jury who will not bring in a verdict of acquittal or at least of mere manslaughter? And is this because the Jury doubt the evidence? No. Or, because they conceive that the fact proved in evidence does not, according to the British Law, amount to murder? No: the Judge himself commonly informs them that it does; and probably they were all well aware of this before. But they think it a case, in which the law should not take its course; and without scruple assume to themselves the prerogative of the Executive; and without scruple, because the violation of their Oath in this instance is much more creditable in society than the observance of it;-because they leave the jury-box with characters unimpeached, and without even a reprimand from the Judge.

In holding so plain a language upon this subject, I really do not wish to give offence; and I regret the necessary offensiveness of truth. It is obvious, that the only consistent course for a jury in such a case would be, to find the accused guilty of murder, but to recommend to mercy. The other course is sanctioned by current practice: and I believe there is no instance known, in which their Oath forms any impediment to it.-Now can any one rationally come to the conclusion, that the verdicts of our Juries would not be as honest, as they confessedly are in general, if—instead of attempting to bind them under a curse to judge faithfully, they were solemnly reminded of their duty, and made a solemn declaration of their serious purpose to fulfil it?

But in our judicial trials, how should the truth be elicited from witnesses, unless they gave their evidence upon Oath? Just as effectually, under a solemn Affirmation, enforced by the same penalties on wilful and corrupt falsification, as are now annexed to perjury. Does the Oath prevent witnesses from concealing or disguising the truth ? The conflicting testimonies, which are continually produced in our Courts of Judicature, prove the contrary. Yet I believe, that, in general, the truth is effectually elicited. But how? By the comparison of evidence, by estimating its internal characters, and especially by cross-examination. These form the security of the public against the known facility of obtaining any evidence, the

most false, for money. And so far as the witnesses are persons of respectable character and integrity, their regard to character, their sense of shame, and their sense of right, form sufficient guards on the honesty of their testimony. Where a witness is of an opposite character, insensible to these considerations, and under strong inducements to suppress or disguise the truth; I believe the Oath is not found sufficient to restrain him.

Let me be pardoned for briefly suggesting what has often occurred to me, (perhaps very foolishly,) as likely to be an improvement in our judiciary proceedings. We know that if a person has been convicted of perjury, his evidence afterwards is not legally admissible. But the instances of prosecution for perjury are very rare, in comparison of the multitude of cases in which both Judge and Jury are convinced in their consciences that a witness has falsified or prevaricated. In such cases, might it not be useful that a record should be made, under the report of the Jury and sanctioned by the Judge, that the evidence given by N. M. has appeared to be not worthy of credit; and that this record should be legally considered as more or less affecting the credibility of his testimony on any future occasion?

As to the inutility, or rather pernicious mischievousness, of Oaths employed in the Custom-house and Excise, little needs to be said. Christians, (I mean those who are Christians indeed,) acknowledge the divine obligation imposed on them by the word of GOD-to "render unto Cæsar the things that are Casar's"—" tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom :" an obligation, which nothing can annul, and which no Oath can strengthen. And no doubt there are many others, who by various motives are influenced to a fairness of conduct in this matter. But as to Custom-house ОATHS, are they not notoriously and proverbially considered an empty form by the majority of those who take them, and even by those who administer them?

If any of my readers think this language too strong, let them look at a pamphlet lately published in Edinburgh, by a person connected with the Excise, and addressed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is there proved beyond contradiction, that there is a case-in which our exporters are made to swear that they have paid a duty, which they not only have not paid, but which the officer who takes the affidavit knows has not been paid, and will not be paid for many weeks!

Yet-Christianity is part of the laws of England.-In fact, there is more wilful and corrupt perjury committed in our Courts of Law and Custom-house in the course of a year, (perhaps I might say in the course of a week,) than there was for centuries in the republic of heathen Rome. I might make a similar remark on the crime of adultery, and some other crimes most deeply affecting the wellbeing of society. Some of the professed friends of Christianity, (who mistake the nature of the thing which they profess to patronize,) may be shocked at the plainness of this testimony; though I am sure they can never invalidate its truth. They will be apt to think that I concede some vantage-ground to the Deists; and rob