Amendment Act of 1874 revives hus ried (i). The effect of this enactment was that if a woman possessed of property, and owing debts, married without a settlement, so that her property passed to her husband, her creditors were without remedy. The Act deprived them of the right to sue the husband, and it would have been of no use to sue the wife, as she would have no property to meet the demand. This defect was remedied by the Married Women's Property Act Amendment Act, 1874 (k), which repeals, band's liability so far as respects marriages after the 30th July, 1874, assets acquired So much of the Act of 1870 as enacted that a husband to extent of from wife. Provision of Act of 1882 as to liability of wife for her ante-nuptial debts, should not be liable for the debts of his wife contracted before marriage, and substitutes other provisions, making the husband liable in a joint action brought against both to the extent only of the assets therein specified, being in effect all property acquired by him in his wife's right, or which he might with reasonable diligence have so acquired. The Acts of 1870 and 1874 are, both of them, repealed by the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, by which last-mentioned Act it is provided, that a woman after her marriage shall continue to be liable in respect and to the extent of her separate property for all debts contracted and all contracts entered into, or wrongs committed by her before her marriage, including any sum for which she may be liable as a contributory under the Act relating to joint stock companies, and that all sums recovered against her in respect thereof as for costs, shall be payable out of her separate property, and that between her and her husband, unless there be any contract between them to the contrary, her separate property shall be primarily liable for all such debts, contracts, or wrongs, and all damages and costs recovered in respect thereof (7). But this provision is not to increase or decrease the liability of any woman married before the commencement of the Act for any such debt, contract, or wrong (i) Sanger v. Sanger, L. R. 11 Eq. 470. (k) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 50. liability of as aforesaid, except as to any separate property to which she might become entitled by that Act, and to which she would not have been entitled under the Acts of 1870 and 1874, or otherwise, if that Act had not passed. And it is also provided that a husband shall and as to be liable for the debts of his wife contracted, and all husband for contracts entered into or wrongs committed by her same. before marriage, to the extent of all property of the wife acquired by him from or through her, but this provision is not to increase or diminish the liability of any husband incurred before the commencement of the Act. liability ceases on wife's death. On the death of the wife, the husband's liability for Husband's her debts ceases, if he was married before 1883 (m), but if the marriage was after that date, it is apprehended that his liability, to the extent of property acquired by him from or through her, continues (n). The Act of 1882 does not abolish the liability of the husband for his wife's wrongful acts during the coverture (o). a protection nuptial, but The contracts and engagements of a married woman Restraint on cannot be enforced against income which she is re- anticipation strained from anticipating, nor can she be made liable against postthereout, for the consequences of fraud committed by not anteher (p), or be committed to prison, under sect. 5 of the nuptial debts. Debtors Act, 1869, for non-payment of debt, when such income constitutes her only means of payment (q). But a restraint on anticipation contained in a marriage settlement of the wife's own property has no validity against debts contracted by her before marriage (r). The Act of 1882 (s) provides that a married woman carrying on a trade separately from her husband, shall, in respect of her separate property, be subject (m) Bell v. Stocker, 10 Q. B. D. 129. (n) Sects. 14, 15. (o) Seroka v. Kattenburg, 17 Q. B. D. 177. (p) Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer. 483; Clive v. Carew, 1 J. & H. 199; Arnold v. Woodhams, 16 Eq. 30; Chapman v. Biggs, 11 Q. B. D. (9) Draycott v. Harrison, 17 Q. (r) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 19. See Bursill v. Tanner, W. N. 1884, p. 153. (8) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 1, sub-s. 5. Deserted wife may now obtain order to protect earnings. After judicial separation wife to be sole as to pro purposes of of suing and being sued; to the bankruptcy laws as if she were a feme sole. It has been held that the expression "separate property" does not include property over which she has only a general power of appointment, and that she cannot be compelled to execute the power in favour of the trustee in bankruptcy (†). V. The effect of desertion, or separation, as to the wife's property, and her capacity to contract. A woman deserted by her husband is empowered by the Divorce Act, 1857 (u), to apply to a magistrate, or to justices in Petty Sessions, or to the Divorce Court, for an order to protect "any money or property she may acquire by her own lawful industry, and property which she may become possessed of after such desertion, against her husband, or his creditors, or any person claiming under him." By sect. 25 of the same Act it is provided that in every case of a judicial separation the wife shall from deemed a feme the date of the sentence and whilst the separation shall perty, and for continue, be considered as a feme sole with respect to contract, and property of every description which she may acquire, or which may come to or devolve upon her; and such property may be disposed of by her in all respects as a feme sole, and on her decease the same shall, in case she shall die intestate, go as the same would have gone if her husband had been then dead; provided that if any such wife should again cohabit with her husband, all such property as she may be entitled to when such cohabitation shall take place shall be held to her separate use, subject, however, to any agreement in writing made between her husband and herself whilst separate. And (by sect. 26) that in every case of a judicial separation the wife shall, whilst so separated, be considered as a feme sole, for the purposes of contract, and wrongs and injuries, and suing and being sued in any civil (t) Ex parte Gilchrist, 17 Q. B. D. 321. (u) 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 21. See also 21 & 22 Vict. c. 108, s. 6. proceeding, and her husband shall not be liable in respect of any engagement or contract she may have entered into, or for any wrongful act or omission by her, or for any costs she may incur as plaintiff or 'defendant, provided that where upon any such judicial separation alimony has been decreed or ordered to be paid to the wife, and the same shall not be duly paid by the husband, he shall be liable for necessaries supplied for her use, provided also that nothing shall prevent the wife from joining at any time during such separation in the exercise of any joint power given to herself and her husband (x). perty belong executrix or By the Divorce Act Amendment Act (y), it is de- and also as clared that the provisions contained in that Act and regards proin the Divorce Act respecting the property of a wife ing to her as who has obtained a decree for judicial separation, or trustee. an order for protection, shall be deemed to extend to property to which such wife has become or shall become entitled as executrix, administratrix, or trustee, since the sentence of separation or the commencement of the desertion (as the case may be); and the death of the testator or intestate shall be deemed to be the time when such wife became entitled as executrix or administratrix. protecting In the case of a judicial separation, or of the wife Cases to which obtaining a protection order, she is entitled absolutely order has been not only to property given to her afterwards (2), but held to apply. also to property which was reversionary or not reduced into possession before the separation or protection order, and which falls into possession, or she reduces into possession afterwards (a). But sect. 25 of the Act of 1857 does not apply to property belonging to the wife in possession at the date of the separation decree, and if she is entitled to income for her separate use without power of anticipation, the restraint on anticipation remains in force (b). (x) Sect. 26. (y) 21 & 22 Vict. c. 108, s. 7. (z) Re Kingsley, 26 Beav. 85. (a) Re Insole, L. R. 1 Eq. 470; Johnson v. Lander, ib. 7 Eq. 228; Re Coward and Adam's Purchase, ib. 20 Eq. 179; Nicholson v. Drury, (b) Waite v. Morland, 38 C. D. Protecting order should be general. After divorce or judicial separation, Court may order settle fit of innocent party and children. A protecting order should be in general terms, for the Court has no power to decide what title the wife has to specific property (c). By the Divorce Act, 1857, it is provided that in any case in which the Court shall pronounce a sentence of divorce or judicial separation for adultery of the ment for bene- wife, if it shall be made to appear to the Court that the wife was entitled to any property either in possession or reversion, it shall be lawful for the Court, if it should think proper, to order such settlement as it shall think reasonable to be made of such property, or any part thereof, for the benefit of the innocent party, and of the children of the marriage or either of them (d). After (but not after judicial separation) Court may alter antenuptial or post-nuptial settlement. Power of wife during transportation of husband. Before the passing of the Divorce Amendment Act, the Court had no jurisdiction to release a husband from the stipulations contained in his marriage settlement after a decree for dissolution of his marriage (e). By that Act, however, it is provided that the Court, after a final decree of nullity of marriage or dissolution of marriage, may inquire into the existence of ante-nuptial or post-nuptial settlements made on the parties, and may make such orders with reference to the application of the whole or a portion of the property settled either for the benefit of the children of the marriage, or of their respective parents, as to the Court shall seem fit (f). It has been held that a separation deed is a postnuptial settlement for the purpose of the last-mentioned enactment, and that the Court may, after a dissolution of the marriage, relieve a husband from a covenant in a separation deed (g). But this power cannot be exercised after a judicial separation (h). If the husband abandon his country or is transported, it appears that during the period of such (c) Ex parte Mullineux, 1 S. & T. (d) 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 45. (f) 22 & 23 Vict. c. 61, s. 6. (g) Worsley v. Worsley, L. R. 1 P. & M. 648; Bullock v. Bullock, 2 ib. 389. See also Morrall v. Morrall, 6 P. D. 98. (h) Gandy v. Gandy, 7 P. D. 168. |