Imatges de pàgina
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CHA P. III.

The Reasonableness of Humility, wherein the particular Reasons why we should be Humble are confider'd.

MA

I. AN being a Reasonable Creature, expects, and has a Right to demand a Reason for every thing that he is either to believe or do, fince without it he can do neither. Not only in Philofophic Truth and Theory, but even in Matters of pure Faith, where the Reason of the thing it felf (as believed) is not regarded, nay, even in Matters that are above Reason, where we comprehend not the manner or poffibility of the Article; even in these things there must be a Reason to induce us to yield our Affent, though not from within, or the nature of the thing it felf, yet from without, viz. the Authority of the Propofer. For Faith, tho' in fome Refpects diftinguished from Reason, is yet Abfolutely confider'd a Rational A&, and the Reason and Motive of it must be Clear, tho' the Object of it may be Obfcure, or elfe either there will be no Affent given, or he that gives it believes like a Fool. But much more may a Reason be required in matters of Practice, where we have the Oppofi

tion of Lufts and Paffions to contend with, and to the doing of which, we are led by no Principle of Natural Inclination. Here will be the greater need of Reafon to supply this Defect, and to counterpoife that Difficulty. And therefore having in the Two former Chapters fhewn what Humility is, and the Foundation upon which it ftands, whenever and wherever it actually is, let us now confider the Reason why it should be, that fo the Foundation may not be without a Building.

2. Now though whatever makes for the Advantage of Humility, that is indeed, that fhews how Humility makes for our Advantage, may in a large fenfe come within the compafs of the reasonableness of Humility, as being a good Reafon why we should be Humble, in which Senfe the excellency and neceffity of Humility will be a part of its Reafonableness; yet defigning to confider thofe Matters diftin&tly by themfelves, by the Reafonableness of Humility, I here think more proper to intend fuch Confiderations or Arguments for it, as are taken from our felves, and the circumstances of our own Condition only. For Humility being a Low Opinion of our felves, the Reafon why we fhould be Humble, must be the fame as the Reafon why we fhould think Lowly of our felves. And it feems moft proper, that what is to make us think thus Lowly of our felves, or which

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is to be a Reason why we should do so,should be something in or belonging to our felves. Now there are a great many Reasons of this Nature, why we should be Humble, too many indeed to be all particularly confider'd and fome are too Obvious and Popular to be infifted upon; and therefore to be as Brief as may be in fo Copious an Argument, I fhall touch only upon the chiefeft things, and that too in their Generals, reducing what I have to offer to these Four General Heads, which perhaps will comprehend all that is confiderable, at least all that is neceffary to be con fider'd in this matter.

1. The Reafon Man has to be Humble, confider'd as a Creature.

II. The Reafon he has to be Eumble, confider'd as a finful Creature.

III. The Reafon he has to be Humble, confider'd as a Creature under certain natural Infirmities and Imperfections.

IV. The Reafon he has to be Humble, as having received all his Good from God.

These are all very Humbling Confiderations, fome one way, and fome another; and that we may proceed the more orderly in them, we will difpofe of them in fo many diftinct Sections as follows.

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SECT. I

The First Argument for Humility, taken from the Confideration of Man as a Creature.

I.

TH

HIS, though not the first thing that is conceivable in Man, (for we must conceive him as a Being in order of Nature, before we conceive him as a Created Being) yet it is the first thing in him that can be fitly used as an Argument to fhew the reafonableness of his being Humble. For if you confider him barely as a Being, there is no reafon why he should be Humble upon that Account, Being as fuch importing no Imperfetion, but the quite contrary. But no fooner do you confider him as a Creature, but the reafon of his Humility begins to appear. So that Humility feems to have been very early in fecuring a Right to our Duty and Obferand though it be one of the latest Vertues that we practice, as depending upon the Knowledge of our felves, which Men feldom arrive to till the fhadows begin to lengthen; yet 'tis one of the first that demands our regard, fince the reafon of it as it is from our felves, fo it begins also with our félves.

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2. Tis true indeed, that a Creature as such, implies no Sin in it; and accordingly, Crea

ture

ture and Sinner are here fet down as two di

Nothing Evil or hands of God,

ftinct Heads of Argument. Sinful can come out of the who is Holy in all his Works, as well as Righteous in all his Ways.

And therefore all Creation must be a state of Innocence, and every Creature as a Creature must be Innocent or Sinlefs. Again, as a Creature implies no Sin in it, fo neither does it any natural Faultinefs or Deformity. For God making all things with the best Art, and according to the best Patterns, even those Eternal and Immutable Reasons of things which are in his own infinite Mind,muft needs make them all perfect in their Kinds. And accordingly he that made them, fo pronounces of them. And therefore no Creature as fuch can be faulty, nor ought to be so esteemed by us. And accordingly St. Auftin confeffes it as a fault in himself that he had found fault with part of God's Creation, and cenfures the doing fo as Unfound, and as it

were Unorthodox. Non eft fa- Chap. 14. Confefs. Lib. 7.. nitas eis quibus difplicet aliquid

Creatura tuæ, ficut mihi non erat cum difplicerent multa que fecifti. And this he condemns as finding fault with God himself, when he gives this as the reason of his running into the (Manichean) error of the two Principles, because he was unwilling to acknowledge that to be God's which displeased him, and F 3

that

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