people, whom he again subjects to the power of a tyrant. Nay, if a case could be imagined in which a people, exercising their own right of freeagency as a state, should, for no other reason than because such was their pleasure, achieve a change of dynasty, we acknowledge no right in their neighbours to interfere in behalf of that which is set aside. But if a pation is divided into parties, one of which is headed by the dethroned prince, an ally of the power whose assistance we invoke,-if he in his just cause is likely to be borne down by the superior force of his enemy, at all times, and in all countries, it has been held the bounden duty of his confederates to afford him such assistance to assert his lawful rights as they can do without prejudice to their own subjects; and this has been the universal practice of Europe. Now, what proofs could the provisional govern ment produce of representing the French nation, in whose name they pretended to treat? They could only refer to the momentary possession of the power which the abdication of Buonaparte had unexpectedly thrown into their hands. The self-chosen substitutes of an usurper, they could not even appeal to the poor farce of the Champ de Mai as a testimony of the adhesion of the French people. They dared not even attempt to command the few soldiers who remained to them, or the mob of the suburbs, in their own name, but had been compelled, greatly against their inclination, to use the name of Napoleon II., although in the conferences they affected to disown him. They had not, excepting in the vicinity of Paris, any personal partizans, and in the capital it was well known that the royalists greatly predominated. It is, indeed, probable, that nothing but the presence of the army prevented a complete counter-revolution taking place

there, even before the appearance of the allies.

In the departments, the cause of Louis XVIII. was every where reviving. The whole north of France was fast declaring for the king, and Picardy was already levying troops in his behalf. Marseilles, and a considerable part of the south of France, hoisted the white flag on news of the battle of Waterloo, excepting Toulon, which was overawed by its garrison. The dispositions of Bourdeaux, Tholouse, and the countries of La Vendee and of Britainy, were well known, and, in short, nothing, excepting terror of the army and the federates, prevented a declaration in favour of Louis as universal as that which preceded his first restoration. Wherever he went, subjects crowded around him with congratulations and rejoicings, and made manifest what we have already said, that the inclination of the people was strongly in favour of his person, although they had been unable to oppose effectual resistance to the more violent and energetic partizans of Buonaparte.

How, therefore, and in what respect, were the provisional government in the right of representing the people of France, entering into terms for that great kingdom, and stipulating the conditions on which her government was to rest in future? If they had the right of representing any party at all, it was only those who adhered to the dynasty of Buonaparte, which they found it necessary to disown, as a preliminary to any negociation whatever. The only effectual adherents whom they boasted, were the army and federates, who had plainly shown they only submitted to the present authority as representing Napoleon 11. So that if the sovereigns had gone into the views held out by the commissioners, of setting aside Louis and the Bourbons, on the

one hand, and Buonaparte and his family, on the other, the provisional government possessed no means of fulfilling such a treaty on their part; and their announcing the intention to do so, would very likely have led to a hasty termination of their authority, by the soldiers pulling them out of the Tuilleries by the ears.

At the conferences at Haguenau, La Fayette stated his constituents to be in the same situation as the Convention Parliaments of England, and the army encamped in Hounslowheath, at the time of the English Revolution. To have rendered this parallel apt, it required all the great circumstances of justice which attended the great event of 1688, The French should have been able to vindicate the reason of their proceedings by the aggressions of their exiled monarch, and by the will of the nation generally, nay, almost unanimously, expressed in consequence thereof. But the English history did afford one example of an assembly, exactly resembling their own, in absence of right, and exuberance of pretension, and it existed when the Rump-Parliament contrived to shuffle the cards out of the hands of Cromwell the Second, as the provisional commissioners at Paris were endeavouring to convey the authority from young Napoleon. This Rump-Parliament also sat for a little time as a government, and endeavoured to settle the constitution upon their own plan, in despite of the whole people of England, who were longing for the restoration of their lawful monarch, which speedily was shown to be the case, when Monk, with an armed force, appeared to protect them in the declaration of their real sentiments.

The conferences at Haguenau were speedily broken up; the French commissioners being given distinctly to understand, that the allies would not

consent to the establishment of any other than the lawful sovereign. As their system and authority rested in deception, they dared not communicate this answer to the Chambers; but veiled it under a false and evasive declaration, that the allies did not mean to interfere with the internal government of France.

If any thing had been wanting to justify the rejection of terms offered by persons so little entitled to act in the name of the nation as the present provisional government of France, it is to be found in the now admitted fact, that the most sagacious and powerful of their own number had, long before, offered his services to aid in the restoration of the Bourbons. The mild government of Augustus obliterated the memory of the cruelties of Octavius the Triumvir; and from the consideration which the Duke of Otranto showed to heal the wounds of France, while they bled so profusely, he must be allowed to have made some atonement for the deeds. of Fouché of Nantes. Whatever hopes he had entertained of increasing the liberties of the French, or of serving his own political purposes by the elevation of Napoleon, they had soon disappeared, and Fouché's most conspicuous part in the new imperial ministry became that of affording protection, or means of escape, to those who fell under the suspicion of Buonaparte. It has been supposed, that, even before Napoleon's defeat, he was in active correspondence with the king at Ghent; and although, doubtless, he would have disavowed this connection, in case of the emperor's success, yet the battle of Waterloo decided Fouché as a rational be ing, and one who had not, in the mist of his own prejudices and prepossessions, lost sight of the real interest of his country, that her safety was only to be sought in returning to

the allegiance of the lawful sovereign. In the mean time, and it is there that we give him credit for his patriotism, he laboured to accomplish the restoration of the king, under such circumstances as should give least occasion for bloodshed, revenge, and retaliation. He availed himself of all the interest and skill which he possessed to moderate the republican rage of Carnot and Davoust, and to neutralise the efforts by which they were prepa ring a frantic and insane resistance; while, on the other hand, the services which he offered in secret to Lou's were qualified by the condition, that, in a case where defection had been so general, vindictive measures should be avoided, and a general amnesty resorted to as speedily, and upon a footing as extensive, as should be found possible. Thus, like a ship beating up against the wind, which appears to move by the impulse of that resistless element, but is, in fact, directed by the unseen manœuvres of the pilot, Fouché, without openly opposing the opinions of his brethren, or of the Chamber of Representatives, gave the vessel of the state a secret impulse in a very different direction. The return of this statesman to his allegiance, a fact of which the allies were well aware, threw still more contempt on the negociation offered by the provisional government, since one of the most powerful of their body had thus, in secret, declared for the king's interest.

In the mean time, the tempest darkened around France. The remaining armies of the allies, far exceeding in number, upon each point, those of the British and Prussians, had already commenced their opera tions on the frontiers.

The Austrians crossed June 19 the Rhine at Manheim, Prince Wrede, with the Bavarians, forming the corps in ad

vance. The Bavarian general carried Sarreguemines by force, and entered Nancy by the voluntary surrender of the inhabitants, who declared for the Bourbons. A body of three thousand French, with cavalry and artillery, forming a corps of observation between Metz and Longwy, were defeated, and driven into Metz. Toul and Maresall were invested, as they refused to surrender; and the Bavarians advanced on Chalons. A reconnoitring party of an hundred Ba varian hussars surprised the gate of the city, and rushed into the town. The garrison flew to arms, recovered possession of the gate by which the assailants had entered, and cut off their retreat. But the cavalry, instead of losing heart in a situation so precarious, charged through the town, overthrew all opposition, and escaped at the gate on the opposite side from that at which they had entered. The Bavarian advanced-guard had, in the meanwhile, come up, and desirous to succour the reconnoitring detach. ment, whom they supposed to be cut off, blew open the gate of Chalons with their flying guns, entered at the gallop, cleared the streets of the garrison, already stunned by the audacity of the first assault, and took possession of the town without much opposition. Chalons, a fortified town, was thus strangely assaulted and ta ken by an advanced-guard of cavalry, six guns, and about six hundred pri soners, falling into the hands of the victors.

Another Austrian army, under the Prince Royal of June 24. Wirtemberg, so often distinguished in the campaign of 1814, and General Walmoden, crossed the Rhine at Philipsberg, and masking the strong fortress of Landau, advanced into France. Near the village of Sarbourg, June 26. they were suddenly at

tacked by the French, who at first obtained considerable advantage; but were finally repulsed, and driven across the Saar. On the June 27. next day, the battle was

renewed near Haguenau but General Rapp, who commanded the French, about eleven thousand strong, found it necessary to fall back to Vendenheim, where he took a strong position, with his right covered by the Rhine, his left by some strong heights, and a ravine along his front, which could only be passed by the bridge over the high road at two other points. The superiority of numbers, joined to the present high state of spirits among the Bavarian soldiers, forced this difficult position; and General Rapp, after great loss, was compelled to retreat to Strasbourg, which was instantly invested and blockaded by the victorious Austrians.

The Arch-Duke FerdiJune 26. nand, at the head of a third Austrian army, crossed the Rhine at Grenzach, occupied Basle, and on the next day, defeated the French General Lecourbe, with great loss, near the village of Wicklesheim. A second attack, between Donnemarie and Belfort, drove the French General from another very strong position, where he lost several pieces of artillery, and more than a thousand men. The arch-duke continued to pursue, and in a third welldisputed action, carried, June 29. and finally obtained possession of a very strong position near Montbeliard. Chevremont, Besencourt, and Montbelliard, were successively stormed and taken by the Austrians, who, having nearly destroyed Lecourbe's army, proceeded to advance on Langres, in full communication with the invading army under the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg.

A fourth Austrian corps,

under General Frimont, June 28. crossed the Arve near Ge

neva.

The army of Suchet had previously made some progress in this direction, which was now speedily checked by the advance of the Austrians in great force. The French division, posted near Carouge, offered to evacuate the strong ground in the valley and defiles of the Arve, and twentyfour hours were granted for this purpose. The city of Geneva, of which Suchet had possessed himself, was occupied on the same day. And the victorious corps of Austrians advanced upon Paris by the way of Chalons, a line of advance already occupied by the Bavarians.

The élite of that Austrian army which had defeated Murat crossed Mont Cenis, to take June 28. the route of France, under General Bubna. They attacked the strong tete-de-pont of Arly, near Conflans, where a body of French troops defended themselves bravely. It was at length carried, with the loss of two thousand Austrians and half the French defenders. The road to the interior was thus completely open along the Swiss frontier.

Besides these immense armies, there yet remains to be mentioned the Grand Russian army, at the head of which, with many Prussian, Austrian, and other German troops, the Emperors of Austria and Russia, and the King of Prussia, themselves advanced into France. They crossed the Rhine at Spires, and June 27. advancing by the route of Haguenau and Saarebourg, had reached Halle when the July 3. fate of Paris was decided.

From the magnitude of these military operations, it was evident that Europe, grown wise by experience, had combined her united

and gigantic force for the execution of her purpose, and, trusting as little as possible to the fickle chances of war, had brought into the field such a preponderating strength of numbers, as, employed with ordinary discretion, could hardly fail, either effectually to improve victory, or speedily remedy defeat. Nor was this an unnecessary precaution, considering the advantages which Buonaparte possessed, acting as sole and uncontrolled commander-inchief against the various generals of a confederated army-advantages of which he had so ably availed himself in the campaign of 1814. He was even heard to assert, that, if he had won the battle of Waterloo, the coalition would not have subsisted twenty-four hours; and without resting much on the declaration of a person who never allowed truth to stand in the way of his interest, or even the humour of the moment, there is no doubt that such an event might have called forth the steadiness of the allied sovereigns, and exhibited the wisdom of their precaution in assembling such an immense army. But Providence had ordained otherwise, and the allied armies of reserve advanced on every side unopposed, as to a triumph in stead of a battle. The strong places of Metz, Lisle, Valenciennes, Conde, and other frontier fortresses, were blockaded. They were chiefly defended by troops of the line, who could no longer keep the field, and did not therefore fall, like Cambray and Peronne, into the power of the allies by storm or submission. The number of allied troops which entered France on this memorable occasion, has been roundly computed as high as a million, but certainly exceeded eight hundred thousand men.

The government against whom these immense armaments were directed, were placed in a predicament of singular difficulty. The Additional Act, or new Constitution, through

which they held their power, had two fundamental principles, one negative, the other positive: the latter vested the hereditary right to the crown in Napoleon and his dynasty; the former declared, that in no chance should the Bourbon family be recalled to the government. The provisional government, notwithstanding each basis had been equally recognized by the ratification of the Champ de Mai, and that they could reject neither, except upon such principles as might be fatal to both, shewed, as we have seen, no reluctance to relinquish the cause of Napoleon II., providing that the allies did not insist upon the restoration of the Bourbons. But while the sovereigns refused thus to divide the difference concerning the points in dispute betwixt them and France, the French soldiers and federates, who constituted the only strength of the government, gave plain symptoms that their adhesion was not to the provisional rulers, but to the cause of Napoleon. When Mouton-Duvernet harangued, in the name of the national representatives, the disbanded soldiers, who, in troops, crowded the roads to the capital, they answered to his exhortations, "Why should we fight any more? we have no longer an emperor;" an answer which sufficiently shows how completely these military partizans of Buonaparte considered the interest of the conflict as ended by his abdication. The federates, that is, the armed part of the rabble, held the same opinion and predilections with the army. The royalists were increasing in numbers and audacity, and gained daily accessions from the constitutionalists. Indeed, if any of the latter still continued to dread the restoration of the Bourbons, it was partly from the fear of reaction and retaliation on the side of the successful party, and partly because it was apprehended that the late events might have made on the mind of