generally more for their interest than falsehood, and that they, therefore, generally prefer it. But we have no experience concerning the character of God; it cannot therefore have taught us that he should prefer truth to falsehood.

I know it is the opinion of some, that we are induced to believe the testimony of other men, by a natural principle, which teaches us to place confidence in their words. Those who hold this opinion, support it from the fact, that children, when language is first understood by them, believe whatever is told them, with implicit confidence. These, say they, could not have concluded, from their experience, that men always speak the truth, for if their observation was sufficiently extensive to justify any inference, they must have been the witnesses of many falsehoods; nor is there any reason why early experience should induce them to believe that men always speak truth, and further observation correct this error, since they meet with nearly the same proportion of truth and of falsehood in infancy and in age. Still I believe that no natural principle, beyond the confidence which we place in our experience, is necessary to account for this phenomenon. A falsehood is lost on a child who is but partially acquainted with language, when a truth would be understood by him. He in fact can only

learn a language from truth. If I tell a child that a chair which is placed before us, moves, if he knows the meaning of the word chair, and if the assertion be true, he gathers from it the meaning of the word moves, if he was before ignorant of it, but if the assertion be false, it is not understood, and the child cannot conclude from it, that men do always speak truth, because he would not know that it was not true.Hence we need not wonder, that at the time, his knowledge of his native tongue was first obtained, he should believe all that is said, since before that time he could never know a falsehood. As in all other cases, he

must here learn the general rule, before he learns the exceptions.

If my adversaries should still hope to prove that God cannot be a deceiver, I would remind them that when they have effected this, they will have proved that the scriptures are not from God. I have already given the arguments by which the infidels maintain, that these writings are inconsistent with themselves, and I think these are incontrovertible. But waving these, it is asserted by Miciah, 1. Kings, xxii. “ that God wishing to persuade Ahab to attack Ramoth Gilead, where he would be slain, sent a lying spirit into the mouth of all his prophets, that they might deceive him, by prophesying that he should succeed in his poses." Did not God here use deception, and that too to effect the destruction of Ahab, whom he could easily have cut off by other means. As he had a right to destroy his own creatures, he seems not to have regarded the manner in which it was done, and none may complain if he chose such a method as pleased him best.

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If these arguments shall be found sufficient to remove the doctrine of future punishment from the christian religion, I shall pride myself on having exonerated it from a load that weighed it down, and on having silenced some of the most powerful objections of the infidels. I shall also have delivered it from the tenets which were most injurious to mankind; for no one will torment himself, or others, for the good of their souls, when it is believed that after death all are to be admitted to equal happiness. For this I shall expect and deserve the thanks, not only of christians but of all mankind,

It may perhaps be objected to this inference, that as the supposition that God will not inflict on the unrepenting, the punishment which he has threatened, is only the most probable, and not capable of positive proof,

we ought to take precautions against the possibility of evil, and make the same preperations for our future state, that we would if we believed God would fulfil his promises to the uttermost. As it is possible that

God will inflict the punishment of eternal woe on those against whom it has been threatened, those are in the safest condition to whom he has promised salvation, we should therefore endeavor to make ourselves of that number. But here lies the error; the condition of those whom God has said shall be saved, is not more safe than that of others. It is indeed possible that God as he has asserted, will punish the unregenerated, but it is equally possible, that he may have purposes which will justify and require the punishment of those to whom he has promised salvation. For fear that his church should be filled with hypocrites, God appears to have given the christian no advantage over the infidel.

CHAPTER III.

SECOND OBJECTION-TO THE EVIDENCE OF THE PER
FORMANCE OF THE MIRACLES, BY WHICH THE SCRIP-
TURES ARE PROVED TO BE A REVELATION FROM

GOD, AND THE ANSWER TO THE SAME.

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THE second objection to the divine origin of the scriptures, or rather to the evidence of their divine origin, which I shall notice, is one which has been brought forward by Mr. Hume, in his chapter on miracles, as well as by other philosophers. I do not refer to Mr. Hume's doctrine, that no testimony, except that of our senses, is sufficient to establish a miracle, or to justify the belief that it has existed. This doctrine has been sufficiently discussed by other authors. The objection which I shall here endeavor to refute, that which he derives from the contradiction between the doctrines which are supported by the different miracles, which are said to have been performed at different times and in different regions. It is alledged (and very truly too) that the ancient heathen of Greece and Rome, the Persians, the Indians, the Mahometans, as well as the christians, all had, or have, their miracles, (miracles too which are very well attested,) by which their religions are supported. Only one of these religions can be true, and only one of them can be supported by miracles, if miracles do in fact prove their truth. All the miraculous tales, therefore, which are told by the advocates of one religion, are false, if

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those related by the partizans of another, are true, and if the miracles of all, are equally well attested, we shall not know which to receive, since the evidence of one contradicts, if it does not destroy, the evidence of the others.

That other religions, besides the christian, are supported by well attested miracles, is not, and indeed cannot be denied. So well proved are the miracles performed by the heathen Gods, and their ministers, that the christians, in the primitive ages of the church, did not pretend to doubt their existence, but they endeavoured to prevent the effect, which they were intended to have upon the people, by asserting that they were performed by devils, or by beings who derived their power from the prince of the infernal regions. It was asserted that the images of the heathen Gods, were forced to acknowledge this, whenever any of the sacred relics were brought into their presence, and frequently by the prayers of the saints. Tertulian

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asserted that any christian might by his prayer, compel the image of the Goddess of the Moon, in Africa, to acknowledge itself a devil, and consents that if this should be tried, the christian who should fail in such an attempt, should immediately be put to death. lin considers this challenge, as very honorable to the christian religion; how far he is correct, the reader may judge for himself. The same author, in his ancient history, is compelled to acknowledge, that the answers of the heathen oracles, were some times true prophesies, and such as must beyond a doubt be miraculous. He accounts for this, by supposing that God wished mankind to be deceived for a time, and therefore gave these evil demons power to deceive them, by performing miracles, and foretelling future events.

I am not to determine whether the heathen Gods: were or were not actually infernal beings; but I should imagine, that the united testimony of all the fathers, N