the stones beneath our feet. If our passions regarded only the present, we should remain in a state of unresisting misery. It is manifest, therefore, that every being which contrives must possess desires which extend to the future.

SEC. IX. OF POWER.

Power is the tendency of the will of an intelligent being, to produce the event willed.

There can be no reason known to us, why an intelligent being should possess power. The fact that they do possess it, like the most simple and general laws of matter, can only be learned by experience. If a man is asked how he came by the power of moving his arm at pleasure he can give no answer. If we are asked how God came by the power of creating worlds, by the act of his will, we may answer that he derives this power from the external laws, by which his mind is governed, but why these laws should be such as they are, we know not.

Every being that has produced any thing by contrivance, or indeed in any other way, must have power. A being destitute of power could not carry his contrivance into execution, neither could he contrive. Attention and abstraction, as they depend on the will, imply power, and I have shown that without these faculties no being could contrive.

It may, at first view, appear paradoxical to assert, that the power of every being who contrives, must be limited; yet if a being possesses infinite power, I cannot conceive what use he may have for contrivance.-He certainly can have no use for means, and for these all contrivances are intended. If God possesses in

finite power, that is, if he has the power of producing whatever sensation he pleases, I cannot conceive what motive he may have for producing worlds, that possess an external existence.

THE CONCLUSION WHICH WE MUST DRAW FROM THE
FOREGOING ANALYSIS.

If we review the foregoing Analysis, we shall find that there are a large number of principles, or laws of mind, without which no being could contrive. The laws and powers, which I have shown to be necessary to contrivance, are fourteen, viz: Two kinds of ideas corresponding to sensations and conceptions--The power of distinguishing these ideas from each otherThe superior pleasure which is derived from sensations which are agreeable, and the greater degree of misery which arises from those which are odious-Attention-Abstraction-Association-Imagination-Memory--Belief--The truth of our belief--Desire, or the preference of some sensations above others- A regard for the future--and lastly, Power. Remove any of these, from the mind of a being that possesses them, and his nature is so changed, that he can produce nothing by design.

We have therefore in every being that contrives, an arrangement and disposition of laws, to the production of certain effect, a subserviency of means to an end, a relation of instruments to an use, which must, according to the principles of belief given in our first chapter, imply the presence of intelligence and mind, in the power which produced that being. We perceive that the laws and ideas of a designing mind must be so formed, so adapted to each other, that should any of

them be changed or removed, either no effect would be produced, or none similar to design and contriva ce, the effects which arise from mind, under its present state and laws. We infer from this, that such mind must be created for, and adapted to a purpose, if we may ever discover a purpose in the works of a being with whose desires we are unacquainted.

I have shown plainly in the preceding chapter, that no reason can be given, for the existence of any of the laws, by which our minds are governed. We cannot possibly conceive that their existence is necessary.We might with as good reason impute a necessary existence, to the wheels and springs of a watch, to the organs of plants and animals, as to the laws of intelligence and thought. But shall we affirm, or even con-jecture, that these laws so complex, yet possessing an order and regularity among themselves perfectly harmonious and necessary, to the effects which they produce, are the result of chance alone. There is nothing possessing a material existence, which we may not, with as great reason, suppose to have fortuitously sprung into existence. There remains yet one supposition more, namely, that every mind which contrives is designed and created by an intelligent being. This is the supposition which we must undoubtedly adopt. I am of an opinion that the argument for the existence of such an intelligent being, which may be derived from the harmony of the laws of mind, is stronger than that which may be drawn from the order and regularity of the universe, or of the organs and members of the animals and plants which it contains. We behold nothing in the animal or material world, which possesses a greater number of parts, separated from each other, in any considerable degree, than the mind possesses laws ; nor are these parts in any body organic or inorganic, adapted to each other with greater harmony than the laws of mind. There is no animal, whose members show so clear works of an adaptation

to a purpose, as the laws by which all beings who contrive must be governed.

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But the question may perhaps be asked, whether the faculties I have mentioned, are absolutely necessary to contrivance. It must be acknowledged by all, that as our minds are formed, the removal of any of these faculties would destroy the power of contrivance, if no others were substituted in their place; but is it not possible that a being should exist, destitute of a part of these, who should be yet able to contrive, through the influence of some faculties, which we do not possess. The Atheist may hope to weaken my demonstration, by questions like this. I answer to this, that I shall not attempt to demonstrate that there can be no being having power to contrive, whose faculties are dif ferent from ours, but I am confident that no being can contrive, who does not possess faculties, that show marks of design. If we were told that a time piece had been found, of a construction never before known,. and set in motion by a power never before used, or discovered; that its motions were regulated neither by a pendulum, a balance, nor a spring, but in a way with which we were unacquainted, that this machine kept good time, and pointed out every hour and min-ute of the day, with the regularity and exactness of a clock, we should not conjecture that, this might be the work of chance, or of an unintelligent author. should not assert that we knew nothing of the adaptation and arrangement of the wheels of this new machine, and that therefore we could not pronounce it the product of design; but that the effect produced was such as we know could not arise except from such an arrangement of parts, such a subserviency of means to an end, as must have arisen from contrivance. fact that we were unacquainted with the nature of the machinery, instead of weakening our conclusion, that it was produced by design, would only serve to increase our opinion of the genius and wisdom of the contriven.

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