beggary, and an incapacity of carrying on bufinefs, by withdrawing its allotted quota of revenue entirely from their difpofal. This meafure admitting of no alternative, ferved to cure that flacknefs and indecifion which had marked the conduct of the provincial ftates, and compelled them to adopt the most vigorous measures for reducing that turbulent city to obedience. For this purpofe their own troops, in concert with thofe of their allies the ftates of Guelderland, and fuch as the ftadtholder could furnifh, feemed to be competent; but the great clog to the undertaking lay in the apprehenfion and danger, that Holland would take an open and direct part in the conteft, and, throwing its whole force into the oppofite fcale,, fink the balance entirely against them. For though fuch a meafure would not only be a direct breach, but amount to a diffolution of the general confederacy (Utrecht, like every other province, being abfolutely paramount and fovereign within its own territories) yet they bad feen fo many inftances of the daring fpirit of that party now dominant in Holland, that they trufted as little to their prudence in weighing general confequences, as to their juftice with refpect to the rights of others. It became accordingly the firft object of policy with the ftadtholder's friends, as well as with the ftates of Utrecht and Guelderland, to ufe all the civil means which the nature of the conftitution and government admitted, to reftrain the violence of Holland; and if these failed of effect, their fecond object, and laft apparent refource was, to call in the aid of the provinces of Zealand and Frief land (which they had a well-founded hope of obtaining) and prepare to defend their territorial rights, and vindicate their fovereign authority by arms. The ftates general had hitherto preferved the moft guarded neutrality through the whole courfe of thefe diffenfions; fo that it could not even be furmifed what their private opinions as men might be, relative to any of the questions which had been fo violently agitated. In fact, by the conftitution of that body, though their powers and authority were great, they were directed rather to general than to particular objects. Their high mightineffes were the watchful guardians of the interefts of the republic as a whole; they were to look particularly to them with refpect to foreign nations; they were to watch the approach of danger from without, to eftimate its degree, and to make a timely provifion for the public fecurity. In war, their powers were great, and their authority in a great measure conclufive; and in peace, they were to prefcribe the force to be fupported by fea and land, to infpect into the ftate of the fleets and armies, and to look to every part of the public defence at home and abroad. But with refpe&t to internal affairs, or the differences between particular ftates, their powers of controul, if not abfolutely limited, are at leaft unknown, as their exertion is probably without a precedent. But in cafes of extreme neceffity, even with refpect to internal affairs, where the peace or unity of the republic were endangered, the occafion would undoubtedly fanctify the application of thefe undefined powers, and the effect would be the greater from the rareness of the exertion. It seemed as if the ftates general confidered the occafion for calling forth that fupreme power, which, however concealed or dormant, muft fubfift in all ftates, as now arrived, by that war which was on the point of breaking out between Holland and the ftates of Utrecht with their allies. But, previous to their direct interference, the friends of the ftadtholder deemed it neceffary to obtain the fan&tion of another great body in the state, as an effential preparatory measure. This was the council of ftate for the feven provinces, a body of the firft dignity and power with respect to the mere executive authority in the republic. This council, which fits conftantly at the Hague, is compofed, like the ftates general, of deputies from all the provinces of the union; and is the conftant reprefentative of that body, which meets only on ftated days, not only in those fhorter intervals, but in the cafes of feparation or prorogation, and in thefe feafons fuperintend the execution of all fuch refolutions as they have paffed on public affairs. The council of ftate likewife fuperintend the public revenues, the neceffary provifions for the army, and the affairs of the generalité; by which term is to be understood thofe countries, districts, or towns, which, by conqueft or otherwife, have fallen to the republic fince the union, and which confequently are not included in it. The stadtholder, in better times, had ufually poffeffed a great and neceffary influence in this body; but the diforders and confufion which fo long prevailed, perhaps rendered their prefent difpofition doubtful. However that was, the council of ftate now declared themselves, and paffed a refolution, on the 28th of April, forbidding all colonels, or other officers commanding regiments, from marching their troops upon the territories of any other province, without the confent of that fovereignty firft obtained; and difcharging them from all obedience to any orders whatever of a contrary nature. This refolution being confirmed by the ftates general, became an abfolute decree. This produced a reMay 10th. ply from the fates of Holland, in which they declared, that the refolution of the states general would have been perfectly conclufive on them, if the confederacy had maintained its proper fituation; but that this had been already changed, by the hoftile march of the troops of one province against the inhabitants of another; from which they confidered the bond of union as broken, and confequently were no longer bound to its obfervation. At the fame time they deemed it neceffary to try, what effect this interference of the ftates general might have upon the difpofition of their troops, and accordingly iffued an order, that the officers fhould peremptorily declare, whether they were ready to obey their mafters, the provincial ftates, in all cafes without exception; and that thofe who refused, or who hefitated in giving a fatisfactory explanation, fhould be immediately fufpended. But in the intermediate time, things were arrived at fuch a crifis on the fide of Utrecht, as to preclude all farther hope of fuccefs from civil intrigue or negociation, [B] 3 towards towards the prefervation of peace, or the restoration of harmony; and the firft blood was now publicly drawn in a military manner through thefe contefts. We have already feen that the provincial ftates affembled at Amerffort, had at length determined to proceed to the laft extremities, in order to restore the government of their turbulent capital, and to reduce it to a due ftate of obedience to and conformity with the ancient government and conftitution. The better to effect this purpose, it was refolved in the first inftance, as the neceffary prelude to a fiege, to feize the principal pofts which furround the city of Utrecht, and thereby cut off its communications in general, but particularly with the province of Holland, from which only it looked for support and affiftance. Nomeasures were ever worse conducted than those adopted upon this occafion. The poffeffion of the poft of Vreefwyk, near Utrecht, was a matter of the utmost importance to both parties, and neither seemed to make a proper estimate of its value. Its fituation upon a great canal, rendered it the medium of communication between Utrecht and South Holland, and it was befides the feat or head of the fluices, by which a confiderable part of the neighbouring territories in both provinces were liable to be laid at any time under water. Yet the city of Utrecht had not placed the fmalleft guard to protect a place fo near, and of fo much confequence to its fecurity. On the other fide, the states fent the Count d'Efferen, with a weak battalion of his regiment, amounting only to about 350 men, with out artillery, and, lo far as appears,, without any means of throwing up intrenchment or defence of any fort, not only to poffefs and maintain this poft, but another, at a confiderable diftance, on the way to Utrecht, which was neceffary to its prefervation, being a village called Jutphaas. It cannot but appear aftonishing, how any council, however ignorant of war, or any commander of a regiment, however little verfed in actual service, could deem it poflible for fuch a handful of men to maintain their ground in two potts confiderably feparated, and in the vicinity of a great and turbulent city, poffeffing feveral thoufands of well-armed and longdifciplined burghers, whofe courage was inflamed by the violence of their enthusiasm, and the long fuccefs which had attended their proceedings. Count d'Efferen fully fucceeded in performing the first part of his miffion, by taking poffeffion, on the 'afternoon of the 9th of May, both of Vreefwyk and Jutphaas; pofting four companies of his detachment in the first, and three in the other. The furprise, and the delay of affembling the council in Utrecht, occafioned its being about seven o'clock in the evening, before a fmall party, which feemed insufficient for the purpose, were permitted to march to repel the invaders; for, whether it proceeded from their contempt of the regular troops (whofe force they were acquainted with) or from whatever other caufe, the eagernefs of the burghers to go as volunteers was fo ftrongly controuled, that only 200 of that body, accompanied with 30 light marksmen, were fuffered to proceed on this fervice; they how ever were supported by three pieces of cannon. This party was commanded by the Baron d'Averhoult, one of the new members who had come into the fenate upon the change of government in Utrecht. Upon their approach to Jutphaas, the three companies ftationed there fell back, until they were supported by the other four from Vreefwyk; the volunteers coming on in the dark, for it was then ten o'clock, were fuddenly fired on by the regular troops, who had opened to the right and left to receive them. The volunteers did not difplay the furprise or diforder fo natural to raw troops upon this unexpected fire, but, bringing up their artillery coolly, engaged and foon routed the enemy. The news of this affair was brought to Utrecht after midnight, and nothing could exceed the triumph of the people, at feeing a number of firelocks and other trophies, with about 20 prifoners, appear as the fruits of their firft effay in arms. A fmall reinforcement, with a convoy of artillery and ammunition, was directly fent off to Averhoult, who continued that night at Jutphaas, but proceeding betimes in the morning to Vreefwyk, the regular forces were fo far from fhewing any inclination to retrieve the honour of the preceding night, that they immediately abandoned the place. This paltry affair, which afforded fo little credit to the military forces of the ftate, ferved to raise the spirits of the burghers of Utrecht, and the opinion they held of their own prowefs, to fo high a pitch, that it seemed nothing in war could afterwards be difficult. Only two perfons, one of whom was of fome confideration, were killed on their fide, and about a dozen wounded. The dead heroes were interred, at the expence of the state, with the greateft pomp; and the fenate pafied a refolution that a monuinent thould be raised on the ipot where they fell, to eternize the memory of thofe who had thus bravely fhed their blood, in the first conteft for the defence of the city, and the new conftitution. The ftates of Holland, upon the firft news of this fkirmith, did not hefitate a moment in ordering their troops to march directly into the territories of Utrecht; they placed garrifons immediately both in Vreefwyk and Jutphaas. and the troops. of Salm were fent to reinforce the capital. A birmith foon took place between the latter and a party of the troops of the ftate, who met them on their march, and who feem to have been as unfuccefsful in this fecond effay as in the first. In the mean time, the most unqualified menaces were thrown out, both in the declarations of the states of Holland, and of those affembled at Amersfort; while thefe applied to all the neighbouring provinces for afliftance, to repel this violent invafion of their territories; and the conduct of Holland feemed to excite a very high and general indignation. In the mean time the ftadtholder took the field with the forces attached to him, and every thing, on every fide, tended to immediate war. A fudden and unexpected revolution, which took place in the affairs of Holland, feemed, however, to hold out hopes, that thefe extremities might still poffibly be avoided. We have feen the test propofed by the ftates of that pro[B] 4 vince 1 vince to try the fidelity and obedience of their officers; the late refolution of the states general had afforded ample room for pretence to thefe, not to depart from their political opinions or principles, and a great majority of them refused to fubfcribe to the propofed declaration. Whatever degree of diffatiffaction this defection excited, it did not seem at all to embarrass the proceedings of the states of Holland; for they immediately fulfilled the threat of fufpending the officers; and with equal celerity, appointed new ones to fill their places. The refractory officers were, however, foon confoled, by a refolution of the ftates general to take them under their immediate protection, and this accompanied with an order, that their customary pay should be continued, and duly difcharged by the public treasury of the state at large. But previous to thefe events, the ftadtholder had published a manifefto, on the 26th of May, which could scarcely be confidered as lefs than a declaration of war against the province of Holland, or at least against that aristocratical cabal, as they are called in it, who are charged, in direct terms, with having overturned the conftitution and government of several of the most confiderable cities, and in a great measure of the province at large; while their leaders, difdaining to pay any regard even to the forms of law or the conftitution, had depofed the legal fenates by force, and compelled them, at the point of the bayonet, not only to fubmit to a furrender of their own rights, but to abandon the trufts repofed in them by their country, and the duties of which they were bound to perform. That this cabal, which was represented as being not lefs contemptible in point of number than in all other refpects, had been enabled to commit thefe exorbitances, merely through the circumftance, that their leaders had been fervants of the ftate, and treache roufly turned thofe powers with which they had been endued for its prefervation, to its absolute subverfion. That now, in fome meafure to cover their enormities at home, and hoping to have time, during a ftate of general calamity and confufion, to establish their ufurped power, they were hoftilely preparing for a violation of the rights, and an invafion of the territories of another state, thereby intending to involve the whole republic in all the miferies andhorrors of a civil war. That the ftadtholder, whofe long bearing, and long fuffering, had been confpicuous to all the world, partly from the gentleness of his own nature, partly from the hope that the evils arifing from the conduct of this faction would long fince have cured themselves, and partly that the nefarious defigns of their leaders might become apparent to all people, had hitherto refrained from proceeding to thofe extremes which the cafe would have fully warranted, in order to restrain those enormities; but that now the neceffity and danger were fo vifible and urgent, that he could no longer abftain from the exercife and due application of thofe coercive powers with which he was endowed by the conftitution, for preferving the public tranquillity, preventing any farther violation of the general union, and restoring the legal government, and the due operation of |