It may be added, that the experience of other countries had not warranted a very fanguine expectation from the interference, of rival and powerful ftates. Happy is that nation which is able to maintain the balance of its internal political forces without recurring to foreign mediation. But when two great foreign powers acquire leading interefts, and intermingle themfelves intimately in the diffentions of any ftate, it is hardly poffible that thofe diffentions fhould have a favourable iffue. A fincere difpofition to refolve all partial and particular interefts into the general mafs of the national intereft, is to be expected only from a patriotifm of no ordinary clafs, and yet is effential to the accommodation of national troubles. All that is to be hoped from foreign fincerity is, to prevent things from running to extremes, and to keep the fcale even between the parties for a time. The intereft of the flate to be pacified is not the intereft of the mediators, who moftly endeavour to fight their own political battle on the ground which is neutral, but which each endeavours to appropriate. Whatever were the intentions of the powers now in question, their negociation ended in a civil war.

Under fuch doubtful, and indeed inaufpicious afpects, was this negociation commenced.

The prince of Orange kept his court at Nimeguen, whither the Count de Goertz departed in the latter end of December; leaving M. de Thulemeyer to tranfact the business on the spot with the French minifter, while he was himself the medium through which the correfpondence was conveyed. The Count

carried with him a draught of the conditions, which the States of Holland laid down as the basis of a final accommodation. By this arrangement the ftadtholder was to renounce the influence which he poffeffed in the feveral town fenates or regencies, by giving up his right of rejection or nomination in filling up the occafional vacancies. Upon acceding to this propofition, he was to be restored to the nominal office of captain-general; he being bound to receive it on the new and heavy condition of furrendering that right or prerogative, by which he was enabled to march the troops into or out of any province; whereas he was now to be reftrained from any fuch measure, without a previous communication with, and leave obtained for the purpose from, the refpective ftates of the provinces concerned. By the final propofition, he was to be reftored to the government and command of the garrison of the Hague; but this was likewife clogged with another condi❤ tion, which was that of compliance with a refolution paft fome time before by the fenate of Amfterdam, that the command fhould at all times be revocable at the pleasure of the ftates of the province.

By the first of these propofitions, that of the ftadtholder's giving up the right of nomination, and confe quently all influence in the town fenates, it was conceived the exe, cutive power would have become totally inefficient in the ftate; as nothing less than a ftrong prefiding influence, which otherwife could only be obtained by an expence in money, far beyond the revenues of the fadtholderate, could poffibly produce unanimity or decifion a

[4] 3

mong

mong fuch a number of petty fovereignties and difcordant interefts; it being one of the most apparent vices of that conftitution, that though well enough calculated for the internal government of their towns individually, their public union can only be procured by the fordid means of corruption. An opinion confirmed by the most indubitable authorities, through various parts and different periods of the history of the republic; and a circumftance, which has heretofore, as well as now, afforded an opportunity to France to domineer in their interior as well as public councils.

The fecond propofition, with refpect to the difpofal and movements of the troops, would, if acceded to, have been infinitely more dangerous to the ftate, than in any other degree prejudicial to the ftadtholder, as it would have difabled him, in cafe of fudden emergency and unforeseen danger (things which they now had fufficient caufes to be apprehenfive of) from providing thofe immediate means for the public defence on which the prefervation of the country might depend. The laft condition would have expofed him to continual degradation and infult in the place of his refidence, and in the view of all the world, and have rendered him contemptible even to his own guards, whenever his mafters (which was now the favourite language) fhould choose to remind the public of their fupreme power, and of his fervile dependence' on them. **i

Now as public opinion, and the reverence founded on it, are indifpenfably neceffary to the fupport of all government, fo thefe conditions, taken all together, would have

proved fuch a degradation of the ftadtholder in the eyes both of natives and foreigners, as would render him totally incapable of difcharging the duties, and incompetent to the filling, with propriety or effect, the various great offices which he still retained, whether perfect or mutilated. They would befides have eftablished a precedent the most ruinous to himself and his fucceffors that could be devised. For if it was once found that the established conftitution could thus cafily be broken through, and that he fubmitted in facrificing to the pretenfions of a faction or a province, thofe rights and authorities which had been deemed inalienable, and inherent to his office, he furrendered the only principle on which he could defend the remainder; and every other faction, and every other province, might in its turn and proper feafon follow the example.

Such, however, were the preliminaries laid down by the province of Holland, as the ground-work of an accommodation!

The event foon confirmed the opinion of thofe who had placed no confidence in the fuccefs of the prefent negociation. The princess of Orange, whofe genius, fpirit, and abilities were well understood on all fides, undertook to fupply the place of the prince in the conduct of this bufinefs; and her management of it did not in any degree derogate from thofe qualities. It would feem, however, that she was by no means difpofed to give up any of the ftadtholderian rights; nor perhaps fufficiently practicable with refpect to fmaller compliances. The corre fpondence between Nimeguen and the Hague was carried on for seve

ral

ral weeks; but was at length abruptly broken off by M. de Rayneval, who fuddenly fet out upon his return to Paris about the middle of January 1787.

Nothing could exceed the bitter nefs of recrimination which paffed between the contending parties upon the failure of this treaty or negociation. It was faid on the fide of the stadtholder, that it pro ceeded entirely from the precipitate arrogance, the haughty affectation of fuperiority, and the imperious spirit of the French minifter. That he would liften, to no terms, but thofe of his own prefcribing, or fuch as were dictated by the adverse faction. That he appeared rather as the appointed advocate of that party, than in the character of a common friend, or a cool and impartial mediator. That he rather feemed to confider the stadtholderasa guilty perfon interceding for favour and forgiveness, than as a prince, who was placed by the conftitution at the head of the republic, claiming his just rights, and demanding redrefs of the injuries he had sustain ed.

In defcending to particulars, they faid, that the French minifter had laid it down as an indispensable preliminary condition to his being reftored to his office of captain-general, that the prince fhould make fuch a public fubmiflion to his fovereigns the states of Holland, as would have been an acknowledgement to all the world of his deferv ing the fufpenfion laid on, and of his being culpable in all the accufations which they had brought against him. That as it would be ridiculous for the ftadtholder, who bad committed no fault, to make apologies or to alk pardon, fo it

would be in the highest degree in tolerable, that he fhould acknow ledge a guilt where none existed. That the French minifter had required as another preliminary, that, in order to gratify the ftates of Holland, the ftadtholder fhould vio-: late the conftitution, and invade the rights of other provinces, by binding him to bring the ftates of Gueldres and Utrecht, without regard to the means which he was to ufe for accomplishing fo abfurd and extraordinary a measure, to refcind refolutions which they had paffed, and forego measures which they hadi already adopted for their own in-. ternal regulation; and, as if it were to render him ftill more culpable, by exceeding his own authority,. and a farther violation of the conftitution, it was infifted that he fhould withdraw the garrifons from Elbourg and Hatter, without any regard to the fovereignty under whofe orders he had acted in placing those garrisons, and by whose com mands they were ftill continued. And, finally, that the French envoy, inftead of giving time for paffion to cool, or prejudices to fubfide on either fide, as foon as he found that his arbitrary dictum was not in ftantly obeyed, and all his propofi<" tions immediately, and implicitly: acceded to, abruptly broke off the negociation, when, by a better tem-) per and difpofition on his fide, there were very good reafons for believ ing, that things might in a little> time have been put in a fair train of accommodation,

On the other fide it was infisted: with great acrimony, that the failure of fuccefs proceeded entirely from the inflexible obftinacy of the court of Nimeguen,, That, far from paying any deference to the ftatest [4] 4

of

of Holland, who were his lawful fovereigns, the ftadtholder had infifted in the most peremptory manner upon every part of his claims, not relaxing any more in the most inconfiderable than in the most ma terial articles. That he fhewed no difpofition to accommodate himself tothe unfortunate fituation in which he was involved, nor to the temper and circumstances of the times. That he had not fhewn the fmalleft regret for any of the unjuftifiable meafures into which he had been precipitated, but, on the contrary, feemed difpofed pertinaciously to fupport and defend them to the laft. And, in a word, that a fingle conceffion had never even been hinted at from his court; but that all the advances which had been made, and all the inftances of moderation at any time given, had been difplayed by the states of Holland.

Upon the whole, without expect ing accurate ftatements of fact in violent political altercations, we muft, however, obferve, that an in vincible obftinacy has long been charged, as one of the peculiar and diftinguished characteristics of the policy of that court.

The king of Pruffia, upon the breaking up of the negociation, and the departure of Rayneval, immediately recalled the Count de Goertz, fending a fhort letter to the states general, in which he only expreffed his concern for the failure of his good withes and offices towards reftoring the tranquillity of the republic, without any obfervation on the causes of that failure, or the smallest hint by which any conjecture could be formed of his further intentions, any more than of his present temper and difpofition. This reserve, and laconic

concifenefs, was immediately turned to good account by the adverfe party, who, interpreting it intirely in their own favour, triumphantly published this conftruction, as an evidence, that the king was fo much difgufted with the ftadtholder's incurable obftinacy, in not agreeing to thofe reasonable conceffionswhich the ftates of Holland required, and which he had himfelf recommended, that he would now take no farther concern in his affairs, but abandon him entirely to their mercy. And this had fuch an effect, that a report was fpread, and credited in other countries as well as Holland, that a ferious misunderstanding had taken place between the two courts.

In the mean time, the Pruffian minifter extraordinary had returned directly from Nimeguen to Berlin, having enclofed the king's letter to the flates general, accompanied with one of his own, in which he apologized for not having taken leave of them formally and in perfon at the Hague.

Previous to thefe negociations, during the time of their continuance, and for several months after, continual changes were taking place in the conduct, views, connection, and ftrength of the numberless parties and factions which were spread throughout the republic. Thefe were fo fudden and various as to prefent nothing but a general chaos of diforder and confufion to all diftant fpeculators. In general, however, the democratical interest was gaining ground; and it was in that refpect, and in that only, that the prefent contefts held out a profpe&t of amendment and benefit (and a most effential one it would have been) to the conftitution, by admitting the body of the citizens to a

fhare

fhare in their respective governments. Though it must be acknowledged, that if that great change had taken place, the whole conftitution and form of government must have been new modelled; or otherwife, the executive power would have been totally incapable of fulfilling its purpofes, and the centre of union between the refpective parts of the republic would be too feeble to refift danger, or to admit of public exertion.

In the city of Utrecht, the ancient government was entirely overthrown, and the democratical completely eftablifhed; while, to infure its permanence, a college of tribunes was inftituted as an inherent part of the new conftitution, whofe office it was not only vigilantly to guard and defend the rights of the burghers or people at large, but who were likewife furnished with such strong powers of controul in refpect to the election, and even to the after conduct of the fenators or regents, as threw the government in a great meafure entirely into their hands. They were, however, verging faft to a civil war with the ftates of the province; to which the numbers, wealth, and power of that city had rendered them more than competent; even if they had not been openly encouraged, and ftrongly fupported, by Holland. That aid was, however, neceffary to counterbalance the fupport which the ftates were likely to receive from the ftadtholder, as well as from their neighbours of Guelderland, and perhaps other provinces; who feeing the danger of fuch innovations to themselves, were likely to oppose the establishment of a precedent, which they faw too

general a difpofition in the people to follow.

The government established in Utrecht was confidered as a model of perfection by the democratical parties in other places. The idea of a college of tribunes, which would render the feveral town regencies entirely fubfervient to the people, and lay the fenators individually at the mercy of every factious or tur bulent demagogue who became a member of that office, was generally and peculiarly captivating; feveral of the towns in Holland, as well as other places, eagerly adopting it in their projected fchemes of reform. The aristocratics were not, however, by any means idle, and, where the inequality in power was too great to admit of an open refiftance, all covert means were ufed to procraftinate the event, if it was found impoffible to defeat the attempt. Thus the democratic parties experienced not a few revolu tions of fortune in places where they thought themfelves fecure, and were not feldom surprised with an ingenious after-game when it was leaft expected.

The ftates of Holland were in a critical fituation. Nothing could be more alarming or painful to them than the rapid progrefs which the democratical spirit was making in that province; and yet they were involved in fuch untoward circumftances, through the measures which they had fo long purfued against the ftadtholder, that they dared not openly to oppofe the popular difpofition, left they might have thrown the great and numerous body of burghers into his arms, which would have decided the conteft at once against them.

This