a few years had burst forth in fuch torrents, on every fide, amongst its younger members. Mr. Grey was not inferior to any of thofe who preceded him, in copioufnels and elegance of diction, in ftrength of argument, or in perfpicuity of arrangement, and fuperior to them all in the graces of elocution. It is to be lamented that we are not able to give our readers a fpecimen of his extraordinary talents; and muft content ourselves with a hare enumeration of the arguments he principally refied upon.

He agreed with Mr. Fox in confidering the general policy of the measure as by far the moft important object it involved; he stated at large the relative fituation and political interefts of the two nations, and from thence inferred the wifdom of that established fyftem of our policy, in which France had always been regarded with the moft fufpicious jealoufy at leaft, if not as our natural foe. He confirmed thefe opinions by a reference to our unvaried experience; and afked upon what grounds it was prefumed that the had at once totally abandoned all her ancient political principles, and had no longer any object in view inimical to our interefts?

He endeavoured to prove, that the prefent moment was perhaps that, of all others, in which our jealoufy ought to be the moft awake, and in which we had the leaft reafou for repofing any confidence in her. With this view he read a ftate paper, which had paffed between the French minifter and the plenipotentiary of the United States of America in Paris. It contained a propofition on the part of France to concede to that country, without ftipulation, a great variety of com

mercial advantages detrimental to her own revenues, in which no other European nation, not even the Spaniards, were indulged. And was it to be fuppofed that France. really expected no equivalent? She doubtless expected it in a monopoly of that trade which we once enjoyed, and which conftituted two-thirds of our commercial marine :-fhe expected it in the augmentation of her own navy, and in the ruin of ours. Whilft he was enticing us by what had been juftly called a tempting bait, to conclude a treaty of commerce with her for the fupply of her own market, fhe had been fecuring cuftomers to take the commodities off her hands; and thus not only to become the carrier, but to trade to an extent fhe had hitherto been unable to afpire at, upon the capital of this country.

Another object which he believed France had in view, was to render us as much politically infulated, as we were infulated in our local fituation.-One effect which he would look for in this tempting treaty. was, to draw us off from feeking alliances with the rest of Europe; it had already, in fome degree, produced this effect, as was manifeft from the coldness which ministers difcovered with respect to the Methuen treaty.

He earneftly recommended, inftead of the present treaty, a more intimate connection with America; fuch an intercourfe would be the moft eligible for Great Britain that could be devifed, and entirely confiftent with her true political interefts; and fuch an intercourfe he haɖ the beft reafons for believing America was both willing and eager to enter into upou fair and equitable terms.

He

Capt. Macbride condemned the treaty as highly detrimental, in many particulars, to our marine. The goods deemed contraband in the 22d article were, he faid, fuch as might be effential in a country whofe army was its first object, but had fcarce any reference to the prefervation of a navy. The 34th article he conceived gave fuch advantages to privateers as would enable them to get feamen much fooner than the king's fhips; and he reminded the houfe, that France, by the regifter of her feamen, had an evident periority in point of expedition in filling her fhips' complements; and he therefore warned them against throwing any additional difficulty in the way of manning Your navy. Lastly, he conceived, that the treaty in its general tendency went to increase the strength of the French navy, by throwing a greater proportion of the carrying trade into her hands.

Mr. Burke alfo took this opportunity of delivering his opinion of the treaty. He took notice of the narrow and confined views upon

Ireland was a weak, an infatuated ifland; Portugal an unnatural, a. bafe, a worthlefs, an ungrateful nation-nothing had been heard for fome time paft but panegyricks upon the French. And what were the topics we had chosen for our panegyrics? Did we commend the French gallantry, their valour, their ingenuity, their opulence, their wit?

No: it was their fincerity, their moderation, their truth, their kindnefs and good-will to this nation, that we were fo extremely taken with.

Mr. Burke then entered into a minute examination of the future and ultimate tendency of the meafure; and from a full and judicious comparison of the relative circumftances and fituations of the two countries, of which both fides of the houfe joined in applaufe, he inferred that we rifqued much by it, and could gain but little.

He feemed to agree with the oppofite fide of the houfe, that there was

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no immediate danger to be apprehended from a free commerce with France, either to our trade or manufactures. He conceived that our manufacturers, in point of ingenuity, induftry, and skill, had fo far got the start of our neighbours, that they could not, for a confiderable time at leaft, rival us in our commodities. But it was the fuperiority we poffeffed in capital which enabled us, he faid, to fet all their efforts to cope with us at defiance; a capital formed and fupported by that general partnership between the landed property, the monied property, and the commercial property of the nation, which, from the peculiar nature of our establishments, exifted in this country. The powers of this capital were irrefiftible in trade; it enticed the ftrong, it controlled the weak; it over-awed, it domineered, it even tyrannized, in all the markets of the world. This capital the treaty had a direct tendency to open gradually to France. The moment the prohibitions upon her trade were taken off, fhe would begin to infinuate herself into the partnership, and in the end come in for a fhare in the capital; and fhe was content to fubmit to any temporary lofs in trade, which might arife from the fuperiority of our manufactures, for the fake of greater and more permanent future advantages.

The fame provident policy, he remarked, appeared to direct her conduct towards America, which it was evident could make no return at present for the bounties and free ports fo liberally granted her; and was even unable to pay the debts fhe had contracted with the French government and merchants. When to thefe proofs of this evident line of policy were added many other

circumftances which he enumerated, fuch as her negociations with Portugal, her unceafing attention to her navy, the ftupendous works fhe was erecting at Cherbourg, and others of a like nature, by which the appeared as it were ftretching her arms all round to grafp and itifle us, he faid he conceived the ftrange and unnatural defire that had all at once poffeffed us of running into her embraces, to be nothing lefs than infatuation.

The treaty was ably fupported by Mr. Grenville, Mr. Pulteney, Lord Mornington, and others, upon the grounds which have already been ftated; but at a late hour an objection to the addrefs,of another nature, was ftarted by Mr. Welbore Ellis. He contended that the motion for an addrefs in the prefent ftage of the bufinefs was premature, unprecedented, and unparliamentary, tending to deprive the house of its powers of deliberation, and to pledge them to pass bills for carrying the provifions of the treaty into effect.

The proceedings of parliament upon the treaty of Utrecht were referred to as a cafe in point, and as an ufeful leffon to the house against haftiness and precipitation. That treaty was laid before the house by a meffage from the queen. A committee of the whole houfe was appointed to take the 8th and 9th articles into confideration. After a long debate in that committee, on the queftion, that the house be moved for leave to bring in a bill to make effectual the 8th and 9th articles of the treaty of commerce, the queftion was carried by a very large majority, greater than on any vote on the prefent treaty. The bill was brought in, and read a first time, at the distance of a fort

night from the vote in the firft committee. There was an interval of a week between the first and fecond reading of the bill. Petitions now came in from all quarters; and the committee on the bill fat for many days to hear the petitioners by their counfel against the treaty. The report from this committee was received and agreed to. But on the queftion, that the bill with amendments be engroffed, it was carried in the negative by a majority of nine. No addrefs was prefented to the queen till after the rejection of the bill.

This proved the importance of a regular compliance with the forms of the houfe, and a due exercise of their deliberative powers. A large majority had thus been, by mere dint of debate and difcuffion, converted into a minority, and one of the worst, and moft hoftile treaties to the British conftitution that ever was heard of, was put an end to and annihilated. The reafon that the minifter did not proceed in the fame way now was obvious. Aware of the event of 1713, he was determined to proceed in another manner; and in order to enfure the fuccefs of his treaty, instead of rifking the chance of deliberation, he had profited by the fate of the treaty of Utrecht, and had caufed an addrefs to be moved, to tie up the hands of the house, and preclude all debate and all danger of future oppofition.

In anfwer to thefe objections, the chancellor of the exchequer infifted apon the addrefs on the Irish propofitions, but two years before, as a precedent in point, in favour of the Hode of proceeding he had adopted.

As to the merits of the objection itself, he observed that the delibe

rative function of the house in the prefent cafe was confined to one general point, whether they should carry into effect the treaty at large; it left the difcuffion of the mode of doing it perfectly open and free. Such gentlemen as felt themfelves. prepared to decide in favour of the treaty, were certainly bound to vote for the addrefs, as there could be nothing improper in any perfon's undertaking to do at a future period that, which, if circumstances were ripe, he should be willing at present to do.

The debate continued till near three in the morning, when the previous queftion, which was moved. by Mr. Ellis, being put, the same was carried in the affirmative, bý 236 to 160, and the address was afterwards agreed to without a divifion.

Feb. 23d.

On the 23d the addrefs was communicated, at a conference, to the lords, and their concurrence requested; and the first day of March was appointed by them for taking the fubject into their confideration.

Whilft the commons were engaged in the difcuffion of the commercial treaty, the attention of the houfe of lords was called, by the viscount Stormont, to a question in which the conftitution of that branch of the legiflature, together with the rights of the Scottish peerage, were effentially concerned. It arofe out of a circumftance, already mentioned, that took place during the late prorogation of parliament

the creation of two of the fixteen peers of Scotland to be peers of Great Britain; and it was fimply this, whether or not, after fuch creation, they could continue to fit as reprefentafives of the peerage of Scotland?

The

The act of union was filent upon the fubject; the only precedent that exifted, that of the duke of Athol, upon whom, in 1736, being then one of the fixteen peers, the English barony of Strange devolved by inheritance, was for the affirmative; and it was well known that the lord chancellor's opinion was in favour of the fame fide of the queftion. On the other hand, the negative appeared to lord Stormont fo ftrongly fupported by every principle of equity, analogy, and fair conftruction, as to induce him to bring the queftion, in the face of all thofe difficulties, to a public decifion.

Accordingly, on the 13th of February, the lords having been previously fummoned, the house refolved itself into a committee of privileges, for the purpose of taking it into their confideration. The motion made by lord Stormont was as follows:

"That it is the opinion of this "committee, that the earl of Abercorn, who was chofen to be of "the number of the fixteen peers, "who by the treaty of union are "to reprefent the peerage of Scot"land in parliament, having been "created viscount Hamilton by "letters patent under the great feal "of Great Britain, doth thereby "ceafe to fit in the houfe as a reprefentative of the peerage of "Scotland."

In fupport of this motion, he obferved, that the question appeared to him to lie in a narrow compafs, and was to be decided upon a few plain obvious principles, which he would endeavour to ftate to the committee.

It is provided by the act of union, that the peers of Scotland, who were, thought too numerous to be admit

ted tohereditaryfeats in parliaments, fhould be reprefented by fixteen, to be chofen out of their own number. By this act the peerage is made to confift of two diftinct orders of men, having different rights, and standing in very different fituations. The one, together with all the other privileges of peerage, have individually a right to a feat in parliament, whofe authority now extends over the whole united kingdom.

The other has the inferior rights of the peerage throughout the whole kingdom alfo; but is abridged of the moft valuable right of all, an hereditary feat in parlia ment. They are therefore in fact two diftinct orders of men, the one having individually a share in the legislature, the other only a virtual fhare by reprefentation. No line of diftinction can be more ftrongly drawn.

The queftion then, fairly ftated, is this, what, according to the true meaning and intent of the union, is to be the condition of him who paffes from the one order to the other, from the reprefentative to the individual claís? Why clearly this ; he acquires all the rights of an hereditary feat as an individual, and of courfe the rights of reprefentation ceafe, as appertaining exclufively to that condition in which he no longer remains, No one can appcar in perfon, and at the fame time be reprefented by his proxy. The one right being in lieu of the other, they cannot be co-existent.

The committee, he said,well knew that the right of reprefentation is fo far from being inherent in peers, that it was ftrenuoufly contended at the union, that it was inconfiftent with and repugnan to the nature of peerage. It certainly is a right incidental