permanency or change. Some parts of the terrestrial system are under the dominion of powers which act energetically to prevent all motion, as the crystalline forces by which the parts of rocks are bound together; other parts are influenced by powers which produce a perpetual movement and change in the matter of which they consist; thus plants and animals are in a constant state of internal motion, by the agency of the vital forces. In the former case rigid immutability, in the latter perpetual development, are the tendencies of the agencies employed. Now in the case of objects affected by friction, we have a kind of intermediate condition, between the constantly fixed and the constantly moveable. Such objects can and do move; but they move but for a short time if left to the laws of nature. When at rest, they can easily be put in motion, but still not with unlimited ease; a certain finite effort, different in different cases, is requisite for this purpose. Now this intermediate condition, this capacity of receiving readily and alternately the states of rest and motion, is absolutely requisite for the nature of man, for the exertion of will, of contrivance, of foresight, as well as for the comfort of life and the conditions of our material existence. If all objects were fixed and immoveable, as if frozen into one mass; or if they were susceptible of such motions only as are found in the parts of vegetables, we attempt in vain to conceive what would come of the business of the world. But, besides the state of a particle which cannot be moved, and of a particle which cannot be stopped, we have the state of a particle moveable but not moved; or moved,

but moved only while we choose: and this state is that about which the powers, the thoughts, and the wants of man are mainly conversant.

Thus the forces by which solidity and by which organic action are produced, the laws of permanence and of development, do not bring about all that happens. Besides these, there is a mechanical condition, that of a body exposed to friction, which is neither one of absolute permanency nor one naturally progressive; but is yet one absolutely necessary to make material objects capable of being instruments and aids to man; and this is the condition of by far the greater part of terrestrial things. The habitual course of events with regard to motion and rest is not the same for familiar moveable articles, as it is for the parts of the mineral, or of the vegetable world, when left to themselves; such articles are in a condition far better adapted than any of those other conditions would be, to their place and purpose. Surely this shows us an adaptation, an adjustment, of the constitution of the material world to the nature of man. And as the organisation of plants cannot be conceived otherwise than as having their life and growth for its object, so we cannot conceive that friction should be one of the leading agencies in the world in which man is placed, without supposing that it was intended to be of use when man should walk and run, and build houses and ships, and bridges, and execute innumerable other processes, all of which would be impossible, admirably constituted as man is in other respects, if friction did not exist. And believing, as we conceive we cannot but believe, that the laws

of motion and rest were thus given with reference to their ends, we perceive in this instance, as in others, how wide and profound this reference is, how simple in its means, how fertile in its consequences, how effective in its details.

BOOK III.

RELIGIOUS VIEWS.

THE Contemplation of the material universe exhibits God to us as the author of the laws of material nature; bringing before us a wonderful spectacle, in the simplicity, the comprehensiveness, the mutual adaptation of these laws, and in the vast variety of harmonious and beneficial effects produced by their mutual bearing and combined operation. But it is the consideration of the moral world, of the results of our powers of thought and action, which leads us to regard the Deity in that light in which our relation to him becomes a matter of the highest interest and importance. We perceive that man is capable of referring his actions to principles of right and wrong; that both his faculties and his virtues may be unfolded and advanced by the discipline which arises from the circumstances of human society; that good men can be discriminated from the bad, only by a course of trial, by struggles with difficulty and temptation; that the best men feel deeply the need of relying, in such conflicts, on the thought of

a superintending Spiritual Power; that our views of justice, our capacity for intellectual and moral advancement, and a crowd of hopes and anticipations which rise in our bosoms unsought, and cling there with inexhaustible tenacity, will not allow us to acquiesce in the belief that this life is the end of our existence. We are thus led to see that our relation to the Superintender of our moral being, to the Depositary of the supreme law of just and right, is a relation of incalculable consequence. We find that we cannot be permitted to be merely contemplators and speculators with regard to the Governor of the moral world; we must obey His will; we must turn our affections to Him; we must advance in His favour; or we offend against the nature of our position in the scheme of which He is the author and sustainer.

It is far from our purpose to represent natural religion as of itself sufficient for our support and guidance; or to underrate the manner in which our views of the Lord of the universe have been, much more, perhaps, than we are sometimes aware, illustrated and confirmed by lights derived from revelation. We do not here speak of the manner in which men have come to believe in God, as the Governor of the moral world; but of the fact, that by the aid of one or both of these two guides, Reason or Revelation, reflecting persons in every age have been led to such a belief. And we conceive it may be useful to point out some connexion between such a belief of a just and holy Governor, and the conviction, which we have already endeavoured to impress upon the reader,

of a wise and benevolent Creator of the physical world. This we shall endeavour to do in the present book.

At the same time that men have thus learnt to look upon God as their Governor and Judge, the source of their support and reward, they have also been led, not only to ascribe to him power and skill, knowledge and goodness, but also to attribute to him these qualities in a mode and degree excluding all limit:-to consider him as almighty, allwise, of infinite knowledge and inexhaustible goodness; everywhere present and active, but incomprehensible by our minds, both in the manner of his agency, and the degree of his perfections. And this impression concerning the Deity appears to be that which the mind receives from all objects of contemplation and all modes of advance towards truth. To this conception it leaps with alacrity and joy, and in this it acquiesces with tranquil satisfaction and growing confidence; while any other view of the nature of the Divine Power which formed and sustained the world, is incoherent and untenable, exposed to insurmountable objections and intolerable incongruities. We shall endeavour to show that the modes of employment of the thoughts to which the well conducted study of nature gives rise, do tend, in all their forms, to produce or strengthen this impression on the mind; and that such an impression, and no other, is consistent with the wisest views and most comprehensive aspects of nature and of philosophy, which our Natural Philosophy opens to us. This will be the purpose of the latter part of the present book. In the first place we shall proceed with the object first mentioned, the connexion which may