kind of composition. In matters of science, for instance, whose terms, from the nature of the thing, are not capable of such a currency as those which belong to ordinary subjects, and are within the reach of ordinary readers, there is no necessity of confining an author within a very narrow circle. But in composing pieces which come under this last denomination, as history, biography, travels, moral essays, familiar letters, and the like, it is safest for an author to consider those words and idioms as obsolete, which have been disused by all good authors, for a longer period than the age of man extends to. It is not by ancient, but by present use, that our style must be regulated. And that use can never be denominated present, which has been laid aside time immemorial, or, which amounts to the same thing, falls not within the knowledge or remembrance of any now living.

This remark not only affects terms and phrases, but also the declension, combination, and construction of words. Is it not then surprising to find, that one of Dr. Lowth's penetration, should think a single person entitled to revive a form of inflection in a particular word, which had been rejected by all good writers of every denomination, for more than a hundred and fifty years?* But if present use is to be renounced for ancient, it will be necessary to determine at what precise period antiquity is to be regarded as a rule. One inclines to remove the standard to the distance of a century and a half; another may, with as good reason, fix it three centuries backwards, and another six. And if the language of any of these periods is to be judged by the use of any other, it will be found, no doubt, entirely barbarous. To me it is so evident, either that the present use must be the standard of the present language, or that the language admits no standard whatever, that I cannot conceive a clearer and more indisputable principle, from which to bring an argument to support it.

Yet it is certain, that even some of our best critics and grammarians, talk occasionally, as if they had a notion of some other standard, though they never give us a single hint to direct us where to search for it. Dr. Johnson, for example, in the preface to his very valuable Dictionary, acknowledges properly the absolute dominion of custom over language; and yet, in the explanation of particular words, expresses himself sometimes, in a manner that is inconsistent with this doctrine; "This word," says he in one place, "though common, and used by the best writers, is perhaps barbarous." I entirely agree with Dr. Priestley, that it will never be the arbitrary

In a note on the irregular verb sit, he says, "Dr. Middleton hath, with great propriety, restored the true participle sitten.”

rules of any man, or body of men whatever, that will ascer tain the language, there being no other dictator here than use.

It is indeed easier to discover the aim of our critics, in their observations on this subject, than the meaning of the terms which they employ; these are often used without precision; their aim, however, is generally good. It is, as much as possible, to give a check to innovation. But the means which they use for this purpose, have sometimes even a contrary tendency. If you will replace what has been long since expunged from the language, and extirpate what is firmly rooted, undoubtedly you yourself become an innovator. If you desert the present use, and by your example, at least, establish it as a maxim, that every critic may revive at pleasure, oldfashioned terms, inflections, and combinations, and make such alterations on words as will bring them nearer to what he supposes to be the etymon, there can be nothing fixed or stable on the subject. Possibly you prefer the usage that prevailed in the reign of Queen Elizabeth; another may, with as good reason, have a partiality for that which subsisted in the days. of Chaucer. And with regard to etymology, about which grammarians make so much useless bustle; if every one has a privilege of altering words, according to his own opinion of their origin, the opinions of the learned being on this subject so various, nothing but a general chaos can ensue.

On the other hand, it may be said, "Are we to catch at every new-fashioned term and phrase, which whim or affectation may invent, and folly circulate? Can this ever tend to give either dignity to our style, or permanency to our language?"-It cannot surely.

If we recur to the standard already assigned, namely, the writings of a plurality of celebrated authors, there will be no scope for the comprehension of words and idioms, which can be denominated novel and upstart. It must be owned, that we often meet with such terms and phrases, in newspapers, periodical pieces, and political pamphlets. The writers to the times, rarely fail to have their performances studded with a competent number of these fantastic ornaments. A popular orator in the House of Commons, has a sort of patent from the public, during the continuance of his popularity, for coining as many as he pleases. And they are no sooner issued, than they obtrude themselves upon us from every quarter, in all the daily papers, letters, essays, addresses, &c. But this is of no significancy. Such words and phrases are but the insects of a season, at the most. The people, always fickle, are just as prompt to drop them, as they were to take them up;

and not one of a hundred survives the particular occasion or party-struggle which gave it birth. We may justly apply to them, what Johnson says of a great number of the terms of the laborious and mercantile part of the people; "This fugitive cant cannot be regarded as any part of the durable materials of a language; and therefore must be suffered to perish, with other things unworthy of preservation."

As use, therefore, implies duration, and as even a few years are not sufficient for ascertaining the characters of authors, I have, for the most part, in the following sheets, taken my prose examples, neither from living authors, nor from those who wrote before the Revolution; not from the first, because an author's fame is not so firmly established in his lifetime; nor from the last, that there may be no suspicion that the style is superannuated. The present translation of the Bible, I must indeed except from this restriction. The continuance and universality of its use, throughout the British dominions, afford an obvious reason for the exception.*

Thus I have attempted to explain, what that use is, which is the sole mistress of language; and to ascertain the precise import and extent of these her essential attributes, reputable, national, and present; and to give the directions proper to be observed in searching for the laws of this empress. In truth, grammar and criticism are but her ministers; and though, like other ministers, they would sometimes impose the dictates of their own humour upon the people, as the commands of their sovereign, they are not so often successful in such attempts, as to encourage the frequent repetition of them.

CHAPTER II.

The nature and use of verbal Criticism, with its principal

canons.

It may be alleged by some persons, that "if custom, which is so capricious and unaccountable, is every thing in language, of what significance is either the grammarian or the critic?" -Of considerable significance notwithstanding; and of most then when they confine themselves to their legal departments, and do not usurp an authority that does not belong to them. The man who, in a country like ours, should compile a succinct, perspicuous, and faithful digest of the laws, though no

The vulgar translation of the Bible (says Dr. Lowth) is the best standard of our language.

lawgiver, would be universally acknowledged to be a public benefactor. How easy would that important branch of knowledge be rendered by such a work, in comparison of what it must be, when we have nothing to have recourse to, but a labyrinth of statutes, reports, and opinions. That man also would be of considerable use, though not in the same degree, who should vigilantly attend to every illegal practice that was beginning to prevail, and evince its danger, by exposing its contrariety to law. Of similar benefit, though in a different sphere, are grammar and criticism. In language, the grammarian is properly the compiler of the digest; and the verbal critic, the man who seasonably notifies the abuses that are creeping in. Both tend to facilitate the study of the tongue to strangers, and to render natives more perfect in the knowledge of it; to advance general use into universal; and to give a greater stability, at least, if not permanency, to custom, the most mutable thing in nature. These are advantages which, with a moderate share of attention, may be discovered, from what has been already said on the subject: but they are not the only advantages. From what I shall have occasion to observe afterward, it will probably appear, that these arts, by assisting to suppress every unlicensed term, and to stigmatize every improper idiom, tend to give greater precision, and consequently more perspicuity and beauty, to our style.

The observations made in the preceding chapter, might easily be converted into so many canons of criticism; by which, whatever is repugnant to reputable, to national, or to present use, in the sense wherein these epithets have been explained, would be condemned as a transgression of the radical laws of the language. But on this subject of use, there arise two eminent questions, the determination of which may lead to the establishment of other canons not less important. The first question is this; Is reputable, national, and present use, which, for brevity's sake, I shall hereafter simply denominate good use, always uniform in her decisions? The second is; As no term, idiom, or application, that is totally unsupported by her, can be admitted to be good, is every term, idiom, and application, that is countenanced by her to be esteemed good, and therefore worthy to be retained?

SECTION I.

Good use not always uniform in her decisions.

In answer to the former of these questions, I acknowledge, that, in every case, there is not a perfect uniformity in the de

terminations, even of such use as may justly be denominated good. Wherever a considerable number of authorities can be produced, in support of two different, though resembling modes of expression for the same thing, there is always a divided use, and one cannot be said to speak barbarously, or to oppose the usage of the language, who conforms to either side. This divided use has place sometimes in construction, and sometimes in arrangement. In all such cases there is scope for choice; and it belongs, without question, to the critical art, to lay down the principles, by which. in doubtful cases, our choice should be directed. The following canons are humbly proposed, in order to assist us in assigning the preference. Let it, in the meantime, be remembered, as a point always presupposed, that the authorities on the opposite sides, are equal, or nearly so. When those of one side greatly preponderate, it is in vain to oppose the prevailing usage. Custom, when wavering, may be swayed, but, when reluctant, will not be forced. And in this department a person never effects so little, as when he attempts too much.

Canon the first.

When use is divided as to any particular words or phrases, and when one of the expressions is susceptible of a different signification, whilst the other never admits but one sense; both perspicuity and variety require, that the form of expression, which is, in every instance, strictly univocal, should be preferred.

For this reason aught, signifying any thing, is preferable to ought, which is one of our defective verbs. In the preposition. toward, and towards, and the adverbs forward and forwards, scarce and scarcely, backward and backwards, the two forms are used indiscriminately. But as the first form in all these is also an adjective, it is better to confine the particles to the second.

The following pertinent illustrations of the first canon, are taken from Dr. Crombie. To purpose, for "to intend," is better than to propose, which signifies also "to lay before," or "submit to consideration:" and proposal, for "a thing offered or proposed," is better than "proposition," which denotes also "a position," or "the affirmation of any principle or maxim." Thus we say, "He demonstrated Euclid's proposition:" and, "He rejected the proposal of his friend.". "I am mistaken," is frequently used to denote, "I misunder