Imatges de pàgina
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Again, many actions are complex in their nature; and this is another source of aberration in our moral judgments of men and actions. No one circumstance is of so much importance, in determining the moral character of an action, as the intention of the author. And how frequently is it, that we pronounce on the moral conduct of a man, when we entirely mistake his motives and intentions, or are at least very imperfectly acquainted with them. Moreover, our moral judgments of men and their conduct will be much affected by early associations, by differences of education, and especially by the light and position from which we view them. In all these cases, mistaken moral judgments must be ascribed to want of full and exact knowledge, and not to any defects of conscience. Conscience in moral transactions, as well as reason in other matters, must have fair opportunities for its exercise, or it cannot be expected to lead us in the right way.

3. We may now understand, how a man may follow the dictates of his conscience, and still fall into iniquity, and incur great guilt. We have seen, that the decisions of conscience may be perverted by prejudice and passion, and by the influence of early associations. We have seen, too, that actions are sometimes complex in their nature, that is, they may be in some respects worthy of approbation, and in others of reprehension, and this is another source of wrong moral decisions. Hence, to decide rightly, we must be free from prejudice and passion; we must, as far as possible, divest ourselves of the bias of early associations, and we must patiently analyze the conduct and transactions upon which we presume to pass judg

ment.

Moreover our consciences must be enlightened by knowledge, and we must bring to their aid, full, calm, and honest inquiry. Except in cases where ignorance is invincible, we are required to have a conscience enlightened by knowledge and reflection. St. Paul considered himself highly guilty in persecuting the church of God, although he verily thought at the time of doing this, that he ought to do many things con

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* 1 Cor. xv. 9; Eph. iii. 8; 1 Tim. i. 13.

trary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth ;* that is, he sincerely thought it his duty to oppose the gospel. The reason why he considered himself guilty, in opposing the gospel and persecuting the church, was, that he acted under the influence of unjust prejudices and violent passions, which prevented him from perceiving the evidence, and acknowledging the claim, of Christianity as a revelation from Heaven. Full evidence of the truth of the gospel had been furnished; but he had closed his eyes to its light, and steeled his heart against all impressions in its favor. "In the instance of St. Paul," says Dr. Macknight, we see how much guilt a man, who is not at pains to inform himself, may, through ignorance, contract, without going contrary to his conscience. At this time Paul was doing things, which, after he became an apostle, made him call himself the chief of sinners; he was touching the law blameless, and thought that, in persecuting the Christians, he was doing God service."†

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On the moral responsibility accompanying wilful ignorance, and the guilt contracted by refusing or neglecting to enlighten the conscience, Dr. Abercrombie says, "Deep guilt may attach to the moral agent, who has been proof against the influence of moral causes. There is guilt in ignorance, when knowledge was within his reach; there is guilt in heedless inattention, when truths and motives of the highest interest claimed his serious consideration; there is guilt in that corruption of his moral feelings which impedes the action of moral causes, because this has originated, in a great measure, in a course of vicious desires and vicious conduct, by which the mind, familiarized with vice, has gradually lost sight of its malignity. During the whole of this course, also, the man felt that he was a free agent; that he had power to pursue the course which he followed, and that he had power to refrain from it. When a particular desire was first present to his mind, he had the power immediately to act, with a view to its accomplishment, or he had the power to abstain from acting, and to direct his attention more fully to the various considerations and motives, which were calculated to guide his determination. In acting as he did, he not only with

* Acts xxvi. 9.

† Comm. on 1 Tim. i. 13.

held his attention from those truths, which were thus calculated to operate upon him as a moral being; but he did still more direct violence to an impulse within, which warned him, that he was wandering from the path of rectitude. The state of moral feeling which gradually results from this habitual violation of the indications of conscience, and this habitual neglect of the serious consideration of moral causes, every individual must feel to be attended with moral guilt. The effect of it is, not only to prevent the operation of moral causes on his future volitions, but even to vitiate and distort the judgment itself, respecting the great principles of moral rectitude. Without attempting any explanation of this remarkable condition of the mental functions, its actual existence must be received as a fact in the constitution of human nature, which cannot be called in question; and it offers one of the most remarkable phenomena that can be presented to him, who turns his attention to the moral economy of man." Another writer well says, "Apart from human judgments, there is an intrinsic moral difference in actions; and hence results the previous obligation of informing the mind, by a diligent attention to the dictates of reason and religion, and of delaying to act until we have sufficient light; but, in entire consistence with this, we affirm, that where there is no hesitation, the criterion of immediate duty is the suggestion of conscience, whatever guilt may have been previously incurred by the neglect of serious and impartial inquiry."†

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THE CONSCIENCE, THEREFORE, OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL IS TO HIM THE SUPREME AND ULTIMATE RULE OF DUTY; BUT, TO INSURE SAFE DECISIONS, THE MIND MUST BE KEPT FREE FROM PREJUDICE AND PASSION, AND, ABOVE ALL, THE CONSCIENCE MUST BE Guided, regULATED, AND ENLIGHT

ENED. In truth all the powers of the mind require cultivation for their due exercise. The reason is necessary to confine the imagination within sober limits; the memory furnishes the reason with the materials of which it is to make use; and both the reason and the conscience impose restraints on the appetites, the passions, and the will. All the other faculties have, in like manner,

*

Inquiries concerning the Intellectual Powers, p. 169.

Rev. Robert Hall's Works, Vol. I. p. 342. New York. 1832.

important relations with the conscience, by the exercise and aid of which, it may be so regulated and enlightened, and otherwise cultivated, as to be qualified to perform its high office of deciding on the moral feelings, sentiments, and conduct. I proceed to review the chief sources by the aid of which the conscience may be regulated and enlightened.

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I. The Scriptures fully recognise civil government as binding on the conscience; and, therefore, the enactments of the government under which we live, or, in other terms, the law of the land, is one of the rules by which the consciences of individuals are to be regulated.

The law of a country is the combined reason, sentiment, and wisdom of the citizens of such country, so far as relates to the subjects embraced by the law, and therefore, aside from its binding character as law, is entitled to the respect of the citizens. It is chiefly occupied in devising the means of protecting the persons, liberties, reputation, and estates of the citizens; in settling the rules of evidence, and the forms of proceedings; in prescribing rules and ordinances in the numerous cases, in which natural equity only ordains that there shall be a rule, but does not prescribe what the rule shall be; in adjusting private rights in their endless and perplexing diversity, and in guarding against fraud in all its devious ways. The practical administration of the law consists, for the most part, in ascertaining the facts, which enter into controversies, and on which their rightful decision depends; in inquiring into the extent of injury inflicted, and the corresponding amount of damages which ought to be rendered; in settling the construction of statutes; in applying the law to various facts and unforeseen contingences, which daily happen in the affairs of men ; and in looking beyond the present case, to see, on the one hand, how the decision of to-day agrees with preceding decisions, and, on the other hand, how it will

* Rom. xiii. 1-7; 1 Peter, ii. 13-16.

+ Thuanus (De Thou) says, "The life, and soul, and judgment, and understanding of the country, centre in the laws. A state without law, like a body deprived of its animating principle, is defunct and lifeless in its blood and members. Magistrates and judges are but ministers and interpreters of the laws, and in fine, we are all servants of the laws, that we may be free." - Præfatio Thuani ad Henricum IV.

affect the rights and happiness of the community in years to

come.

Still, viewed as a guide, the law of the land is far from being designed by the legislature itself to be full and complete. It is imperfect in various respects; the number of moral points, on which the most voluminous body of laws touches, being comparatively very few. Writers on jurisprudence consider only. what the person, to whom the obligation is due, ought to think himself entitled to exact by force; what every impartial spectator would approve of him for exacting, or what a judge or arbiter, to whom he had submitted his case, and who had undertaken to do him justice, ought to oblige the other person to suffer or to perform. Moralists, on the other hand, do not so much examine what it is that might properly be exacted by force, as what it is that the person who owes the obligation ought to think himself bound to perform, from the most sacred and scrupulous regard to the general rules of justice, and from the most conscientious dread, either of wronging his neighbour, or of violating the integrity of his own character. It is the end of jurisprudence to prescribe rules for the decisions of judges and arbiters. It is the end of morals to prescribe rules for the conduct of a good man. By observing all the rules of jurisprudence, supposing them ever so perfect, we should deserve nothing but to be free from external punishment. By observing moral rules, supposing them such as they ought to be, we should be entitled to considerable praise, by the exact and scrupulous correctness of our behaviour. It may frequently happen, that a good man will think himself bound, from a sacred and conscientious regard to the general rules of justice, to perform many things, which it would be the highest injustice to extort from him, or for any judge or arbiter to impose upon him by force. And the science of morality is to be considered as furnishing direction to persons who are conscious of their own thoughts, motives, and designs; rather than as a guide to the judge, or to any third person, whose arbitration must proceed upon rules of evidence and maxims of credibility with which the moralist has no concern.

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* See Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 361. — Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, Vol. II. p. 119.

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