from the Roman moralist, with very slight changes, and they were no more suited to the state of things at Rome, than they are to this country and to our times.

CHAPTER I.

A REVIEW OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW, INCLUDING A MORAL ESTIMATE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, SO FAR AS IT NATURALLY COMES UNDER THE VIEW OF THE MORAL PHILOSOPHER.

ALL the best authorities insist upon what might he concluded from the nature of the case, that good morals are indispensably requisite to the attainment of the highest order of excellence and success in the study and practice of the law. Sir James Mackintosh says, "Remember this is a maxim, which arises from the very character of the study, that he who is a great lawyer, must be a great and a good man. Again, "There is a dignity of character, which it is of the utmost importance for every one in this profession to support. For it must never be forgotten, that there is no instrument of persuasion more powerful, than an opinion of probity and honor in the person who undertakes to persuade. It is scarcely possible for any hearer to separate altogether the impression made by the character of him who speaks, from the things which he says. However secretly and imperceptibly, it will be always lending its weight to one side or the other; either detracting from, or adding to the authority and influence of his speech. This opinion of honor and probity must, therefore, be carefully preserved, both by some degree of delicacy in the choice of causes, and by the manner of conducting them."† Truth, honor, probity, and integrity are elements of character essential to the great lawyer. The integrity and honor to which I refer, are not confined to that common principle of honesty, by the influence of which, men are prevented from defrauding each other in the general

*

Study and Practice of the Law, p. 19.

+ Blair's Lectures, p. 273.

intercourse of life; they extend to that inward principle of rectitude, which sets a man above those professional misrepresentations, and which leads him to scorn those advantages, which are the choicest aliment of the crafty and the unprincipled. It is in vain to contend, that the nature of the calling demands a resort to artifice and cunning, and that, therefore, no man can succeed without them. If this were true, it ought to deter every man from entering into a profession, the principles of which were so contrary to every dictate of truth and honor. Cunning is the wisdom of the vulgar and the unprincipled; its very essence is made up of meanness, concealment, and disguise.

There is surely nothing in law itself, which naturally leads its professors to substitute cunning for wisdom. Far otherwise. "In contemplating law as a universal principle," says one of our own jurists, "which all beings animate and inanimate obey, the mind is filled with the magnitude of the conception. Not only creatures, but the Creator himself acknowledges a rule of conduct. Those spirits who surround his throne, and are swift to do his will, and all inferior orders of rational beings, whether in society or solitude, recognise the will of their creator as the law of their existence. In the revolution of the heavenly bodies, in the succession of seasons, and indeed throughout the whole course of nature, the footsteps of a Divine Lawgiver, are no less manifest than among the highest intelligent spirits."* Indeed it may be said with the utmost truth, that the general law of this country is a noble superstructure, raised upon the everlasting foundation of truth and reason; calculated by its beauty to excite the admiration, and by its strength to be the defence of the people. Whoever will look with an eye of understanding into our courts of justice, will behold the utmost that the combined labor and wisdom of man can perform; he will find the property of his countrymen, however diversified, arranged into its simple parts, distributed according to its true nature, and secured to its rightful proprietor. He will perceive the anxiety of the ancient British lawgivers, whose labors have descended to us, and of our own legislatures and courts of justice, to adapt the laws to

* The Hon. P. O. Thacher's Address before the Bar of Suffolk, Massachusetts, 1831. p. 16.

every occasion which can arise to human foresight, or from the varying circumstances of human affairs. The aids which are afforded in equity to mitigate the severity, or assist the incompetency, of the common law, the systematic arrangement of the courts, and the liberty given to every man to appeal from the inferior to the superior courts, until at last he reaches the highest standard of authority and law, exhibit striking evidence of the excellence and dignity of our system of jurisprudence, which demand the reverential affection of every good man, and which ignorance and perverseness alone will deny. The natural tendency of the study of the law, therefore, must be to cherish honor, integrity, and elevated moral sentiments and feelings of every kind.

Professional honor and integrity will forbid the advocate to engage in a business of notorious wrong. But here a very nice. and curious distinction arises. Could the term wrong be accurately defined, there would, perhaps, be little difficulty; but such a definition is no easy matter, where our interests or inclinations interfere. Still, two limitations have been laid down by the late Sir James Mackintosh, the propriety of which is very manifest.

1. "That is a notorious wrong, when one man seeks, by a wresting of the law to his own purposes, to despoil another of his rightful property, or to obstruct his obtaining the possession of it; and he who assists in the execution of any such plan, no matter under what pretence, incurs, if not an equal, at least some share of guilt with the original instigator of the wrong. This being the truth, the question next arises, What ought to be considered as despoiling, and what assisting? With respect to the first, this rule may be laid down as worthy of particular observance, to wit, that, where it becomes necessary to pervert not the spirit only, but the terms of a written law, in order to support a cause, no lawyer of integrity will engage in such a business. This is a very plain case. As to the second part of the question, what may be called assisting; I observe, that whoever is the voluntary instrument, by speaking or writing, of turning a law calculated to produce protection and benefit, to oppression and wrong, must clearly be an accessory; nor will

the plea of professional necessity avail him, since that necessity cannot exist in an honorable profession."

2. "Again, that is a notorious wrong whereby a law, clear and express in its correction of a public grievance, is sought to be weakened or evaded. If an offence against such a law be plain to the conscience and understanding of the advocate, can he, consistently with the dictates of integrity, rise up in court to defend the culprit? There are few cases free from doubt; and it may be readily conceded, that many causes are defended in a public court of justice, and necessarily so, by the advocate, (as for instance when he is assigned the counsel for a party by the court,) which would be given up in the closet by the man. this all men must have been long since well convinced; and they have agreed to justify it, and it may be justified upon these grounds, independently of the authority of the court, and of the nature of the lawyer's public engagements; to wit, that there is right somewhere, and that there is, also, a greater or less probability of its being on our side. But, in the case I have proposed, there can be no right existing, and integrity must, therefore, be violated by an attempt at defence."

Of

"It will be no good plea for the lawyer to urge," continues he, "that if he does not undertake a particular matter of business, another will; for thus are the boldest transgressions, not only against conscience, but against the laws themselves, excused. It will be more rational for him to call to mind, that not only his own honor, not only the feelings and property of others, but the laws and the community, may be affected. Nor am I laying down nice rules of a novel or abstract morality. Were I inclined to do this, my observations might be carried much further; but they have been confined within a narrow compass, and to very plain cases. Whatever has regard to the spirit of the laws, I have entirely and purposely omitted, because that can be ascertained and settled only in those august tribunals, that are appointed by the law. My wish is to impress upon the minds of my readers, a sense of the integrity and honor that do not consist in visionary speculation, but that are suited to the useful and important purposes of practical life." *

Many qualities are requisite to success in the lawyer; but no one is more so, than the spirit of honor and integrity on which I have insisted. All the knowledge of legal doctrines, whether theoretical or practical, all the habits of study, all the strength of a deep and penetrating judgment, must be blended with a mellowness of manners, to be acquired only in the school of life, and with a fertility of genius, which is the gift of nature alone. He must be able at once to influence the passions of a jury, and to convince the understanding of the judge; he must appear in all the varied characters of the abstract reasoner and the lively wit, the accurate definer and the polished rhetorician. The dignity of wisdom and the facility of business, the nervousness of eloquence and the easy familiarity of colloquy, must take their turns in the varieties of his practice. All that is excellent in general knowledge, and refined in legal intelligence, must be called in to complete the character of the finished advocate in our courts.

The lawyer, then, to gain the summit of legal excellence, must unite the most opposite qualities, and be capable of exercising them; he must have a quick discernment, and yet a solid understanding; he must not be destitute of imagination, yet he must possess a sound judgment; he must know books, yet be well learned in mankind; the subtile technicalities of law, and the enlarged beauties of classical learning; the solitary habits of study and the easy refinements of active life, must equally distinguish him. In fine, he must unite in himself all those noble and useful qualities, by which he may at once command the attention of the acute and the learned, and render himself intelligible to the most ordinary capacity. In the accomplished lawyer, this combination of rare qualities, must be crowned with a corresponding sense of honor, probity, and integrity.

A rare combination of qualities, then, physical, moral, social, and intellectual, is requisite to the accomplished lawyer, the spirit of the law when unsophisticated, and its main tendency when unperverted, are, to elevate the moral character ; — still there are other tendencies, which, unless they are known and guarded against, will degrade the personal and professional character of the lawyer. All lawyers are not men of elevated moral sentiments and feelings. Some lawyers may understand the prin