and institutions of every country are suited to the wants and the convenience of such country, and, therefore, they are not a just subject either of ridicule or reproach. There may be very good reasons for them, originating in the climate, state of society, or other circumstances which we may not understand. It may be affirmed further, that there are few institutions in any country, which, when the reasons of them are carefully inquired into, and candidly weighed, will not be found to be justified by those reasons. This may be illustrated by adverting to the different forms of government which have prevailed in the world. Government is one of the chief institutions, which men have labored to establish and bring to perfection. No one form is suited to the condition of all nations; every nation is entitled to select its own form; and it may well be presumed, that every nation has in fact selected the form best suited to its wants and circumstances. This is the ground taken by the Divine author of Christianity. Our Saviour rendered to Cæsar the things that belonged to Cæsar,* and both St. Paul and St. Peter inculcate upon all Christians obedience and respect to the governments under which they live.†

Indeed, I believe it will be found upon examination, that our Saviour, his Apostles, and other early preachers of Christianity, uniformly paid respect to the customs and institutions, both of the Jews and heathen, to whom they addressed themselves, except so far as those customs and institutions were inconsistent with the religion which they preached, and the morals which were an essential part of this religion. On these great subjects, indeed, they were inflexible, — on them, they admitted no compromise. No form of idolatry could obtain the slightest indulgence or toleration; and "whatsoever defileth and maketh a lie was unsparingly denounced, and universally and unhesitatingly condemned.

III. We have seen, that Christian charity requires of us, not only a regard to the temporal and spiritual welfare of mankind, but, also, a suitable regard for the characters, feelings, and sensibilities of others, and an eminently peaceable and conciliating

* Mark xii. 17.

+ Romans xiii. 1-7; 1 Peter ii. 13-17.

temper and conduct. We have seen, too, that charity is violated, when we indulge in unjust and unreasonable jealousies and suspicions of the motives and designs of others; when we attribute to unworthy motives and designs, actions and expressions, for which, with entire consistency, we might assign good motives and upright designs; when we lend a willing ear and an easy belief to insinuation and slander in any of its manifold forms; when we willingly give currency to misrepresentation and slander without inquiry into their truth, and without regard to the consequences of our conduct; when we give circulation to truths suited and designed to injure others, from unworthy motives, and without having any good purpose in view; and when we condemn persons whom we do not know, and customs and institutions which we do not understand. As in all other similar cases, however, there are circumstances and considerations by which this duty is limited and qualified, and it only remains to consider what these limitations and qualifications are.

1. Christian charity does not require us to have a good opinion of others, in opposition to evidence well weighed and carefully examined, and comprising a full and fair view of their sentiments and conduct. A full and accurate acquaintance with the characters of those around us is one of the most valuable branches of our knowledge, and is often equally requisite to our safety, and indispensable to the suitable discharge of our duty. To this end, we must observe carefully their sentiments and conduct, and weigh and examine well the evidence to be seen in the incidents and circumstances which present themselves.

The mistake is sometimes made, of supposing that it is the office of charity to look with indulgence, if not with favor, on the faults and offences of mankind. But Christian charity is not a weakness; and any such view of its nature does the utmost injustice to this sublime and exalted virtue. Charity is always sincere and candid, and her best wishes are extended to all. When any one of fair and honest report is accused of any offence, she receives the accusation with reluctance, and ventures to hope that it may prove unfounded. She is cautious in receiving and careful in examining the evidence which may be urged against him; and, "not rejoicing in iniquity, but rejoicing in the

truth," she is gratified when the truth demands his acquittal and the approval of his conduct. At the same time, when the evidence is clear, and the offence is manifest, she yields her conviction, feeling that the opposite course would be to countenance sin and uphold iniquity. Still, while she condemns the sin that has been committed, she does not withdraw her good-will from the sinner, but holds herself ready to do him any service, which propriety admits and his necessities require.

2. Charity does not require us to receive the professions and statements of others without suitable inquiry and examination. We are all familiar with the influence, which prejudice, passion, and interest have over the opinions, sentiments, and conduct of mankind. Even the best men are, in a greater or less degree, swayed by their influence; and, not unfrequently, this is unknown to themselves. Strong passion absorbs, for the time, all the reasoning faculties of the mind, and its blinding effect is as extensive as it is unquestionable. Prejudice imparts its own hue to every object and to every person; and men have always found it most difficult to be convinced, that the way of rectitude can be any other than the way of their own interests. It is, then, no breach of that "charity which thinketh no evil," to receive the professions, opinions, and statements of others with a wise and prudent

caution.

3. Christian charity does not require us, when wrongs are practised on us, to submit to them without resistance, made at a suitable time, and in a suitable manner and spirit. Living amidst collisions of opinion and prejudice, passion and interest, it is inevitable, that we should sometimes suffer wrong. And it has sometimes been supposed to be the duty of Christians to make no resistance to wrong under any circumstances. When injuries are slight, it is our duty to pass them by with slight notice, or without any notice at all. When they are of serious magnitude, this course often becomes impossible. St. Paul's injunction, "If it be possible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men," contains an indirect admission, that this is not always possible. The precepts contained in St.

* Romans xii. 18.

*

Matthew's Gospel, to turn the other cheek when one has been smitten, to go the second mile with him who has compelled you to go one, to give to him that asketh, to lend to him that would borrow of you, and to give your cloak to him who by process of law has taken your coat, are to be understood as proverbial sayings, describing the general duties of benevolence and forgiveness, and the temper which we ought to aim at acquiring, rather than as rules for the literal direction of our conduct. They are extremely valuable for the disposition which they inculcate; but a specific compliance with them could not be impor tant, and would be impossible. When, for instance, upon being struck on the one cheek, we are directed to turn the other, it cannot have been the meaning of our Saviour, that we should literally invite another blow; for, when struck himself by an officer, in the palace of the high priest, we find that he rebuked him with becoming spirit, saying, "If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil; but, if well, why smitest thou me ? "+

The rule of non-resistance under any circumstances, would subject the mild, the patient, and the peaceable to the will and caprice of the strong, the rapacious, and the overbearing. So those passages, which seem arrayed against lawsuits, must be understood as directed against a litigious spirit, and as enjoining that forbearance which will consent to be wronged in a supportable degree, rather than engage in strife and contention. St. Paul resorted to the laws of his country, and took refuge in his privileges as a Roman citizen, against a conspiracy of the Jews, and against the violence of the chief captain of the Roman soldiers. When, however, we make resistance to wrong, of whatever kind or degree, our religion requires us most carefully to guard against permitting ourselves to be influenced by angry and vindictive motives. §

I have thus treated the forgiveness of injuries and Christian charity at considerable length; 1. Because they are not only the chief duties of the Christian, so far as his neighbour is concerned, comprising, in a certain sense and measure, every other

*Matt. v. 38-42. t John xviii. 15 -- 23.

Acts xxii. 25; xxv. 11.

§ Seed's Sermon before the University of Oxford, 1733; p. 7. — Sermon on Christian Forbearance, by Dr. Griffin.

Christian duty and virtue ;* but they strike at the root of almost all, if not quite all, the vices and evils enumerated at the beginning of this Part. † 2. Because, where it was impossible, as it is in an elementary treatise of Moral Philosophy, to treat all the Christian virtues separately, I have still thought it well to analyze, expand, and illustrate, as I might, and as a specimen, two, and these the most fundamental, of the Christian virtues.

CHAPTER III.

INTEMPERANCE IN DRINKING.

I USE this phrase in preference to drunkenness, as being more comprehensive, and otherwise more suited to the purpose which I have in view. I shall treat the subject under four divisions. I. The nature and occasions of intemperance. II. The signs. III. The evils. IV. The remedy.

I. The more common apprehension is, that nothing is intemperance, which does not supersede the regular operations of the mental faculties and the bodily organs. However much of spirituous liquors a man may consume, if he can command his understanding, his utterance, and his bodily members, he is not usually reputed intemperate. And yet, drinking within these limits, he may be intemperate in respect to inordinate desire, the quantity consumed, the expense incurred, the present effect on his health, his temper, and his moral sensibilities; and, what is more, in respect to the ultimate and almost inevitable results of bodily and mental imbecility, or habitual drunkenness.

A multitude of persons, who are not accounted drunkards, create disease and shorten their days, by what they call a "prudent use of spirituous liquors." Let it, therefore, be engraven upon the heart of every man, that the daily use of spirituous liquors, in any form, or in any degree, is intemperance. Its effects are certain and deeply injurious, though its results may

* Matt. xxii. 39, 40; 2 Peter i. 7; Coloss. iii. 14. See above, p. 370.