depart from it without being self-condemned. And the dictates of this moral faculty, which are by nature a rule to us, are moreover the laws of God, laws in a sense including sanctions."* But, as great as has been the diversity of opinion and definition in regard to the theoretical part of morals, there has been a coincidence of sentiment on the practical part of the subject, as remarkable as it is gratifying. In truth, it may well be doubted, whether, beyond the pale of the exact sciences, there has been on any subject an equal concurrence of sentiment among mankind. “There is no tribe," says the late Sir James Mackintosh, "so rude as to be without a faint perception of a difference between right and wrong; there is no subject on which men of all ages and nations coincide in so many points as in the general rules of conduct, and in the qualities of the human character which deserve esteem. Even the grossest deviations from the general consent," continues he, "will appear on close examination to be, not so much corruptions of moral feelings, as either ignorance of facts, or errors with respect to the consequences of action, or cases in which the dissentient party is inconsistent with other parts of his own principles, which destroys the value of his dissent; or where each dissident is condemned by all the other dissidents, which immeasurably augments the majority against him." Again he says, "If we bear in mind, that the question relates to the coincidence of all men in considering the same qualities as virtues, and not to the preference of one class of virtues by some, and of a different class by others, the exceptions from the agreement of mankind in their system of practical morality will be reduced to absolute insignificance; and we shall learn to view them as no more affecting the harmony of our moral faculties, than the resemblance of the limbs and features is affected by monstrous conformations, or by the unfortunate effects of accident or disease, in a very few individuals." The same distinguished writer says of Grotius, who had cited poets, orators, historians, and philosophers, that "he quotes them as witnesses whose conspiring testimony, mightily strengthened and confirmed by their discordance on almost * Butler's Works, p. 134. London, 1828. every other subject, is a conclusive proof of the unanimity of the whole human race on the great rules of duty and the fundamental principles of morals." * "The object of Grotius," says Chancellor Kent, "was to correct the false theories and pernicious maxims of his time, by showing a community of sentiment among the wise and learned of all nations and ages, in favor of the natural law of morality." Again he says, "Grotius went purposely into the details of history and the usages of nations, and resorted to the testimony of philosophers, historians, orators, poets, civilians, and divines, because they were the materials out of which the science of morality was formed; and when many men, at different times and places, unanimously affirmed the same thing for truth, it ought to be ascribed to some universal cause." "Mr. Hume," says Sir James Mackintosh again, "at the same time that he ingeniously magnifies the moral heresies of two nations so polished as the Athenians and the French, still says, 'In how many circumstances would an Athenian and Frenchman of merit resemble each other? Humanity, fidelity, truth, justice, courage, temperance, constancy, dignity of mind.' Of this conclusion it has been well said, that Mr. Hume has very satisfactorily resolved his own difficulties; and that almost every deviation which he imputes to each nation, is at variance with some of the virtues justly esteemed by both; and that the reciprocal condemnation of each other's errors, which appears in his statement, entitles us, on these points, to strike out the suffrages of both, when collecting the general judgment of mankind."‡ "The sentiments upon which men differ so greatly," says Voltaire, 66 are not necessary to men; it is even impossible that they should be necessary, for this reason alone, that the truth respecting them is hidden from us. It was indispensable, that all fathers and mothers should love their children; therefore they do love them. It was necessary that there should be some general principles of morals, in order that society might subsist; therefore these principles are the same among all civil * Discourse on the Law of Nations, p. 24. London, 1828. ized nations. Whatever is an eternal subject of dispute is always useless."*"We have implanted in us by Providence," says Mr. Burke, "ideas, axioms, rules, of what is pious, just, fair, honest, which no political craft, nor learned sophistry, can entirely expel from our breasts."+ Lord Kames, after an imposing array of exceptions, says; "These facts tend not to disprove the reality of a common sense in morals; they only prove, that the moral sense has not been equally perfect at all times, nor in all countries. A nation, like an individual, ripens gradually, and acquires a refined taste in morals as well as in the fine arts; after which we find great uniformity of opinion about the rules of right and wrong; with few exceptions, but what may proceed from imbecility or corrupted education. There may be found, it is true, even in the most enlightened ages, men who have singular notions in morality, and in many other subjects; which no more affords an argument against a common sense or standard of right and wrong, than a monster doth against the standard that regulates our external form, or than an exception doth against the truth of a general proposition." Again he says, "That there is in mankind a uniformity of opinion with respect to right and wrong, is a matter of fact, of which the only infallible evidence is observation and experience, and to that evidence I appeal. This uniformity of sentiment, which may be termed the common sense of mankind with respect to right and wrong, is essential to social beings. Did the moral sentiments of men differ as much as their faces, they would be unfit for society; discord and controversy would be endless, and the law of the strongest would be the only rule of right and wrong."‡ All men, then, agree, that there are acts which ought to be done, and acts which ought not to be done; the far greater part of mankind agree in their list of virtues and duties, of vices and crimes; and the whole human race, as it advances in other improvements, is as evidently tending towards the moral system of the most cultivated nations, as children, in their growth, tend to * Lettre à Madame la Marquise du Deffand. ↑ Works, Vol. I. p. 41. Sketches of Man, Vol. IV. pp. 19–21. the opinions as much as to the experience of full-grown men. William Penn, in the council and consultation "which he held with the Indians of his province in 1683, found that these savages believed in a state of future retribution, and that the vices enumerated by them, as those which would consign them to punishment, corresponded remarkably with similar enumerations in the Christian Scriptures. They said that lying, theft, swearing, murder, and the like, would expose them to punishment in a future life; and the New Testament affirms, that those who are guilty of adultery, fornication, lying, theft, murder, &c., shall not inherit the kingdom of God."+ We may conclude, therefore, with Dr. Hartley, that "the rule of life drawn from the practice and opinions of mankind, corrects and improves itself perpetually, till at last it determines entirely for virtue, and excludes all kinds and degrees of vice." But this position admits of still further authoritative confirmation. 66 History," says Sir James Mackintosh, "is now a vast museum, in which specimens of every variety of human nature may be studied. From those great accessions to knowledge, lawgivers and statesmen, but above all, moralists and political philosophers, may reap the most important instruction. They may plainly discover, in all the useful and beautiful variety of governments and institutions, and under all the fantastic multitude of usages and rites which have prevailed among men, the same fundamental, comprehensive truths, the same master principles which are the guardians of human society, recognised and revered (with few and slight exceptions) by every nation upon earth, and uniformly taught (with still fewer exceptions) by a succession of wise men from the first dawn of speculation to the present moment. The exceptions, few as they are, will, on more reflection, be found rather apparent than real. If we could raise ourselves to that height from which we ought to survey so vast a subject, these exceptions would altogether vanish; the brutality of a handful of savages would disappear in the immense prospect of human nature, and the murmurs of * Mackintosh's Progress of Ethical Philosophy, p. 11. + See Dymond's Essays on Morality, pp. 72, 73. Quoted by Sir James Mackintosh in his Progress, &c., p. 11. a few licentious sophists would not ascend to break the general harmony. This consent of mankind in first principles, and this endless variety in their application, which is one among many valuable truths which we may collect from our present extensive acquaintance with the history of man, is itself of vast importance. Dr. Paley has, it is true, presented an imposing array of vices and crimes practised in some age or country, and countenanced by public opinion; but, in doing this, he has most manifestly mistaken the exceptions for the rules which govern human sentiments and conduct. This might be made very clear by a careful analysis of the subject; but it may be still more satisfactory to permit Dr. Paley to destroy his own position, by citing his authority against himself. "The direct object of Christianity," says this valuable writer, "is to supply motives and not rules, sanctions and not precepts. And these," continues he, " were what mankind stood most in need of. The members of civilized society can, in all ordinary cases, judge tolerably well how they ought to act; but, without a future state, or, which is the same thing, without credited evidence of that state, they want a motive to their duty; they want at least strength of motive sufficient to bear up against the force of passion, and the temptation of present advantage." This observation rests entirely on the admission, that men substantially concur in their views of practical morals. Again, he says, still more decisively, "that moralists, from whatever different principles they set out, commonly meet in their conclusions; that is, they enjoin the same conduct, prescribe the same rules of duty, and, with a few exceptions, deliver upon dubious cases the same determinations." Here we have the clear and decisive authority of Dr. Paley himself, in favor of the substantial agreement of mankind in the department of practical morals. This general concurrence of sentiment lays a firm and safe foundation on which to build a superstructure. The practical department of moral philosophy contemplates * Discourse on the Law of Nations, pp. 35, 36. + Evidences of Christianity, p. 224. London, 1825. Moral and Political Philosophy, pp. 34, 35. |