is in some measure the case with the doctrines of the New Testament, but is still more so with respect to its moral principles.

3. Many of the moral precepts of the New Testament are expressed in absolute terms; they require to be qualified and limited, and it is the office of moral philosophy to ascertain these limitations and qualifications. Thus, "Children, obey your parents in all things," "Let wives be subject to their own husbands in every thing," "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man," must all be suitably limited and qualified.

4. Again; some precepts are proverbial, and describe the spirit and temper at which we ought to aim, rather than the particular actions we are to perform. Such are the directions, not to resist evil, to turn the other cheek, to go with him two miles who shall compel you to go one, to give your cloak to him who by process of law has taken your coat, not to lay up treasures on earth; § these and many such like maxims are to be complied with in the spirit which they teach, and not in their literal meaning. Constant exemplifications of these four observations will be seen, as I proceed to collect, define, expand, illustrate, and apply the scriptural system of morals, to the various employments, situations, and circumstances of mankind, and to the various relations in life, which they are accustomed to sustain. 1 Peter, ii. 13. § Matt. v. 39-42.

* Col. iii. 20. + Eph. v. 24.

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

No particular division of a subject is otherwise important than as it is natural, suited to the subject, sufficiently comprehensive, and contributes to perspicuity and order of arrangement. To secure these ends, writers on moral philosophy have used several divisions, suited to the particular views of the science, which they have taken themselves, and have wished to communicate to their readers.

By one ancient division, practical morals were divided into benevolence, prudence, fortitude, and temperance. "Benevolence," says Dr. Paley, "proposes good ends; prudence suggests the best means of attaining them; fortitude enables us to encounter the difficulties, dangers, and discouragements which stand in our way in pursuit of these ends; temperance repels and overcomes the passions that obstruct it. Benevolence, for instance, prompts us to undertake the cause of an oppressed orphan; prudence suggests the best means of doing it; fortitude enables us to confront the danger, and bear up against the loss, disgrace, or repulse that may attend our undertaking; and temperance keeps under the love of money, ease, or amusement, which might divert us from it." *

By another ancient division, virtue was divided into two branches, prudence and benevolence, — prudence consisting in attention to our own interest, benevolence in a regard for the interests of our fellow-men. The ancient moralists regarded prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice, as the cardinal virtues. But they used these terms with a latitude of meaning quite unknown to them at the present time.

By wisdom, among the ancients, was understood universal knowledge of things human and divine ; † while prudence (pgórnois) was said to consist in a knowledge of things proper to be desired, or to be avoided.‡ Prudence, therefore, differed from wisdom, as a part differs from a whole. Prudence, moreover, with them,

* Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 25.

+ Cicero de Officiis, Lib. I. c. 43. ↑ Idem, Lib. I. c. 43; Lib. III. c. 17.

comprised what we call experience and practical skill, more especially the skill and presence of mind requisite to take measures wisely according to circumstances and emergences.* When all the parts of our nature were in perfect concord with one another, when the passions never aimed at any gratification which reason did not approve, and when reason never commanded any thing but what these, of their own accord, were willing to perform; this happy composure, this perfect and complete harmony of soul, constituted that virtue, which in the Latin language is expressed by a term which we usually translate temperance, but which might more properly be translated equanimity, or sobriety and moderation of mind.†

When the high-spirited passions, such as ambition, the love of excellence, the love of honor and the dread of shame, had that degree of strength and firmness, which enabled them, under the direction of reason, to despise all dangers in the pursuit of what was honorable and noble; it constituted the virtue of fortitude.‡ The Stoics defined fortitude to consist in courage (virtus) contending on the side of justice.§ Justice, the last and greatest of the cardinal virtues, was seen, when each of the faculties of the mind confined itself to its proper office, without attempting to encroach upon that of any other; when reason directed and passion obeyed; and when each passion performed its proper office, and exerted itself towards its proper object, easily and without reluctance, and with that degree of force and energy, which was suitable to the value of the object pursued. In this consisted that complete virtue, that perfect propriety of conduct, which Plato, after some of the ancient Pythagoreans, denominated justice.||

In modern times, moral philosophy has usually been divided according to the duties which it enjoins, rather than according to particular virtues; thus, 1. Our duties towards God; as piety, reverence, resignation, &c. 2. Our duties towards other men, that is, our relative duties; as justice, charity, fidelity, &c.

* Cicero de Officiis, Lib. I. c. 5; Lib. II. c. 9. Smith's Moral Sentiments, Vol. II. p. 68.

† See Euripides' Medea, 635, 636. Smith's Moral Sentiments, Vol. II. p. 68.

Idem, Vol. II. pp. 67,

68.

§ Cicero de Officiis, Lib. I. c. 19.

|| Smith's Moral Sentiments, Vol. II. p. 68.

3. Duties towards ourselves; as the preservation of life, care of health, chastity, sobriety, temperance, &c. This division has been retained by Dr. Paley, but still he does not seem to be satisfied with it.*

There are duties public and private, personal, domestic, social, and official. There are duties of peace and of war. There are duties appropriate to youth, to middle age, and to advanced life; duties of sex, of condition, of time, of place, and of circumstance. There are duties of patriotism and of good neighbourhood; duties of health and of sickness. The great and permanent relations of husband and wife, of parents and children, of master and servant, all bring their duties with them. Wealth brings its duties, influence its duties, knowledge its duties, talents their duties, rank its duties, and all the professions and employments of life their corresponding duties. It has not been easy to fix on a division which shall comprise all these particulars, and which shall, at the same time, be natural and perspicuous. After much reflection, I have concluded to use the following;

PART I. Our relation to God, and the moral duties thence arising.

PART II. Our relation to our country, and the moral duties thence arising; that is, the duties of patriotism.

PART III. The chief relations of mankind to one another, and the duties thence arising; that is, the duties which men reciprocally owe to each other.

PART IV. Personal duties, or the duties of men to themselves.

PART V. A review of the chief professions and employments of life, so far as regards the moral duties which they involve, their moral principles, practices, influences, tendencies, &c.

PART VI. A special consideration of certain duties and virtues, of a character peculiarly Christian; and a similar considertion of certain vices and evils.

The conclusion of the treatise embraces a review of the chief means on which we are to rely, for improving the moral condition of mankind, and for advancing human happiness.

* Moral and Political Philosophy, Book IV. p. 215.

PART FIRST.

OUR RELATION TO GOD, AND THE MORAL DUTIES THENCE ARISING.

CHAPTER I.

ELUCIDATION OF THIS HIGHEST OF OUR RELATIONS, AND OF THE MORAL INFLUENCE OF A BELIEF IN A SUPREME BEING.

THAT high and supreme relation, which connects man with his Maker, cannot fail, if our minds have not been debased by sin, or perverted by sophistry, to be considered by us, as of all, the most sublime and interesting. Our Maker is not only the supreme and ultimate cause of our existence, but our kind and unceasing Benefactor. As he has existed from everlasting, so he will continue to exist to everlasting. The heavens which cover

us,

and the earth which lies beneath our feet, as well as ourselves, are the workmanship of his hands. His power is infinite, his wisdom is unerring, his benevolence is perfect. Besides conferring upon us an immortal existence, all our hopes and prospects for time and eternity depend on our securing his favor and averting his displeasure.

Human excellence, even when most conspicuous, is blended with many imperfections, and seen amidst many defects. It is beheld only in detached and separate fragments, nor ever appears, in any one character, perfect and entire. So that when, in imitation of the Stoics, we wish to form out of these fragments the image of a perfectly wise and good man, we are sensible, that it is a mere fiction of the mind, without any real being in whom it is embodied and realized. In the belief of a Deity, however, these conceptions are reduced to reality; the scattered rays of an ideal excellence are concentrated, and become the real attributes of that Being with whom we stand in