sent.

sometimes follow from an improper use of the word believe. Were any one to say, he believes there is such a country as France, or such a person as a Pope of Rome, he would presently be asked, why? can he doubt of it? That expression of believing commonly carries in it an idea of doubtfulness, and is used to denote a diffident asBut when we would express any fact of which we have no doubt, we say we know it, or are certain of it. So here again there appears to be a difference between the language of the literati, and common speech, while the same ideas are not affixed to the same words, here and there. However, this latter case will not be apt to breed so much confusion as the former, though it may create some which might perhaps be prevented by the addition of an adverb, when we are speaking of matters of faith, saying we assuredly believe, or undoubtedly believe thus and thus.

Now to return to the author of Sober and Charitable Disquisition 9. He objects to us, that we have not a proper certainty of what we believe, like as we have of what we know, as that two and two are four. It is granted, we have not. Belief is not strictly science, nor faith vision: what then? In his sense of proper certainty, there is no certainty that the sun shines when we see it, nor that fire warms when we feel it, nor that there is any such thing as the sun in the firmament, nor indeed any material world: for, I apprehend, philosophers are agreed, that there is no strict demonstration of these things. Have these things therefore no proper certainty? Yes, they have, and such as ordinarily makes stronger impressions than abstract reasonings, or ideal speculations, and are more out of the reach of all doubt to the bulk of mankind. So say I likewise of matters of faith; they have a proper certainty, such as things of that kind admit of, such as is fitted to common capacities, such as the world

9 Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 37.

See Clarke's Notes upon Rohault, part i. c. 2.

133 is governed by, such as passes for undoubted certainty in common language and common estimation, such as God has ordained for our use, and has obliged us to follow, and such as both our present interests and our eternal happiness are made to depend upon. So much for the certainty of matters of faith, considered in the general.

As to the particular point now before us, the certainty of it stands thus: we are morally and indubitably certain of the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity. And though we presume not to say, or to think, that we may not or cannot misconstrue Scripture, yet we have many and strong reasons to persuade us that in this instance we do not: and therefore it is infallibly certain, (as Mr. Chillingworth well argues with respect to Christianity in general,) that we ought firmly to believe it; because wisdom and reason require, that we should believe those things which are by many degrees more credible and probable than the contrary. Thus have we sure and safe grounds to go upons. And as we are in strict duty bound to re

⚫ I may here observe something of Mr. Bayle. In his Philosophical Commentary, (part i. p. 337, &c.) after taking notice, that the Romanists have perpetually reproached the Protestants as destitute of any well-grounded certainty, and that the Protestants had answered the objection a thousand times over; he adds, that it never was fully answered, never can be, in the common way, only it may be irresistibly retorted upon Papists: and the conclusion he at length rests in is, that God requires no more than a sincere and diligent search after truth. Mr. Bayle is so far right; but he forgot to tell us, how we may arrive at a well-grounded certainty of that fact, that we have made a sincere and diligent search, without prejudice or bias, without any culpable sloth and negligence in inquiring, or precipitancy in judging. There is no muthematical or metaphysical certainty as to this fact, which by him is made the main thing. Moral certainty is the utmost that any one can here pretend to, and that not so great as we can have of matters of faith; neither can our sincerity be any way so certainly proved, as by the evidence we produce for the doctrines we maintain. Therefore Mr. Bayle commits a fallacy, or is guilty of great forgetfulness, in making a well-grounded certainty of our sincerity the last resource, rather than the other; for generally speaking, it is not so sure or so firm a ground to rest on, as the reasons of things, or the merits of a cause. For considering how obscure the search is into the inmost springs of action, or persuasion, which are very involved and intricate, how careless men are apt to be in the examination, and how liable also to be imposed upon by self-flattery; I

ceive it as a revealed truth, so because it is a very important one, an article of the foundation, we are as strictly bound to preserve it, and earnestly to contend for it: and because one very proper means of preserving it, as well as of keeping ourselves pure, is to refuse communion (according to the general direction of Scripture in such cases) with those that openly impugn it, therefore a necessity is laid upon us so to act, and woe is unto us, if we act otherwise. But we do not therefore say, as is unkindly insinuated, that there is not room left for mutual charity: for we verily are persuaded, yea, and assuredly know, that our so acting is charity both to the faithful and unfaithful, and towards all mankind; and that the charging it as a breach of charity is hard and uncharitable censure, is judging according to appearance only, not according to truth.

All depends upon this, that men take care, in every thing of moment, to go upon sure grounds, to know what they do. That is the very thing which chiefly distinguishes resolution from obstinacy, orthodoxy from heresy, wisdom from rashness, and righteousness from iniquity. God has given us rational faculties to discern truth from error, and right from wrong: and we ought to be well assured, in whatsoever we teach, as of moment, that we have made that use of our faculties which we ought to have done, to discern between good and evil. It is not our persuasion that can justify us; there are many fond persuasions; and we are not commanded merely to obey our persuasions, (though we ought not to go against them,) but to obey the truth. It is not merely our sincerity that can support us, for of that we know nothing,

say, these things considered, it is much safer to rely upon the moral certainty appearing in things, than upon any pretended certainty we may conceive of our own sincerity. I believe, the fallacy in this case has been chiefly owing to the equivocal meaning of the word sincerity: for because in one sense, as opposed to hypocrisy, a man may easily know he is sincere when he is so; it has been too hastily concluded, that he may as easily know it in the other sense of the word, as opposed to prejudice or partiality.

in any just and proper sense, but by the right and reason of the cause; and we are not commanded to hold fast our sincere errors, but to hold fast that which is good.

But what, will some ask, do we then pretend to know that our doctrine is true? Is faith advanced into knowledge? To this I answer, that we know, not scientifically, but with moral certainty, which is knowing according to use of common speech; and though we do not strictly know what we merely believe, yet we know that we have such moral evidence for what we believe, as binds us to the belief of it. In this sense, we know what we do, and we have a well-grounded assurance that what we do is right, which is our justification. And this is what we ought always to have (I speak more particularly of guides and teachers) in points of importance, and where it is not allowed to suspend. Cannot we know, for instance, that a Deist is rash in rejecting all revealed religion? Yes, we know it as certainly, as that it would be rash to deny, that there is any such city as Rome or Constantinople; or that there ever were such men as Virgil, Horace, or Cicero. Cannot we know that a Jew is much in the wrong to deny that the Messias is come? Yes, we know it as assuredly, as that a man would be in the wrong to deny that the twelve Cæsars lived some centuries ago. Cannot we know that the Popish doctrines of transubstantiation, image-worship, service in an unknown tongue, and the like, are not primitive Christianity? Yea, we know it as evidently, as that modern Rome is not ancient Rome, or that London is not Canterbury. Cannot one know that the Socinian interpretation of John i. 1. or of Hebr. i. 10. or of the texts relating to Christ's preexistence, is not the mind of Scripture? Yea, one may know it as certainly, as that a counter is not the King's coin, or that a monster is not a man. I give these instances to show, that it is not merely persuasion or sincerity, that we have to plead for our faith, but certainty and well-grounded assurance; such as is judged sufficient for wise and considerate men to go upon, and conduct themselves by, in se

cular affairs of greatest consequence. We have no occasion for infallibility to support us in such a claim: common reason suffices, taking in the proper helps, and making the due use of them with humility and care, with sobriety and godly fear". Having gone through the most material objections I had met with, I may now proceed to the slighter and less considerable, but dispatching them in fewer words.

V. It has been sometimes invidiously suggested, that our zeal and constancy in contending so earnestly for what we call faith, is bearing hard upon our Christian brethren of an opposite persuasion, is afflicting and oppressing them, and, in short, is persecution and Popery. It can scarcely be conceived, that any sensible men should seriously advance such odd fancies, or that they mean any thing more by them than rhetorication and flourish. Yet certain it is, that such things have been offered with a serious air, and by men of no mean parts: I shall give some examples. One writes thus: "The humour of creed "making and creed imposing is one of the most grievous "instances of persecution, and the grand source of every "other kind of it. If it be only their good opinion of us, "that our fellow Christians suspend upon our non-assent

" But here again it may be asked, may not a Jew, a Deist, a Papist, a Socinian, or an Arian, with equal confidence say, that he knows he is in the right? He may so, and probably will. Yet truth and falsehood have a real distinction in nature, and depend not on fond conceits, or strength of persuasion. If any man presumes to say, he knows, when he does not know, he deceives himself, and is guilty before God; unless some unavoidable incapacity, or unconquerable prejudice, which God only is judge of, makes him innocent. And in that case it is not because he delivers his real persuasion, (for it may be impious as to the matter of it,) not because it is well-grounded, for he only thinks it is; but it is because of his infirmity, which himself neither sees nor knows, (if he did, he would correct it,) that God acquits him. How much any of us may stand in need of such merciful allowances, we cannot say but in the mean while, all we have to look to, or to trust to, is to be as watchful and careful, that we go upon sure grounds, as if no such allowances might be made us. Such wary conduct is well enough understood and practised in temporal affairs, where any thing considerable is depending: the like we are to observe in spiritual.