is palpably absurd. It seems that they inclined most to the former and if we may trust to Anastasius Sinaita, that was the very construction which Arius himself espoused k. Next let us inquire, whether the modern impugners of Christ's Divinity have succeeded any better, or whether they also have not betrayed the like confusion and distress. I need not say any thing of Socinus's wild and extravagant interpretation, which has long been exploded by his own disciples, and which stands now only as a monument of the wonderful virtue of strong prejudices and self-admiration. Zwicker came after, and he took the surer way, which was to deny the authenticity of the proeme, and to strike it out of the Canon of the New Testament. Artemonius (alias Sam. Crellius) is a later instance, and which comes as fully up to my purpose: he has been moving heaven and earth (as I have before intimated) to persuade us into a different reading of one of the critical words in St. John, on which much depends. He has ransacked all antiquity m for authorities to justify an alteration; and because he could find none, he has made as many as he pleased, by mere dint of wit and fancy. Certainly St. John had some direction extraordinary, or was otherwise a very sagacious person, that, after the utmost improvements made in the art of chicanery, and wire-drawing of words, yet nothing can effectually do the business, even at this day, but altering the text; though, after all, there is no manner of countenance from any copies for doing it. One thing however I may observe of Artemonius, which, as it shows his acuteness, betrays at the same time a consciousness, or a tacit acknowledgment, * Arius's interpretation of the place, according to Anastasius in his Hodegus, runs thus: Καλῶς εἶπεν ὁ Ἰωάννης, ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγος, τοῦτ ̓ ἐστι τὸ ῥῆμα τοῦ Θεοῦ. οὐ γὰρ εἶπεν, ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Υἱὸς, ἀλλ ̓ ὁ Λόγος ὁ προφορικὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ. Anastas. Hodeg. p. 330. 1 See above, p. 211. im Initium Evangelii S. Joannis ex Antiquitate Ecclesiastica restitutum. Per L. M. Artemonium, A. D. 1726. that we are in the right to interpret the word God in the strict sense, as we do. He argues, that it was by no means proper that the Word should be called God, lest that appellation, taken with so many other plausible circumstances, should lead men into a snare, and make them believe Christ to be God most high". Now what is this but confessing, that such an inference is natural and obvious, upon the supposition that Christ is called God in Scripture? He saw the force of it, and the inevitable necessity we are under of so interpreting: and that consideration made him take such immense, but fruitless pains, to defeat all those texts where Christ is expressly called God. But if that single consideration struck this gentleman in so sensible a manner, what can we think of all the other texts, which over and above ascribe to Christ divine perfections, and divine worship also? It is plain, that Artemonius could not have been against us, had he not set out at first upon a false principle, that human imagination is the measure of divine truths. II. From John i. I now pass on to Hebr. i. in order to examine whether what we find there be not altogether as definitive as the former. Here the author of Sober and Charitable &c. undertakes to give a fair and impartial account of both parties. Notwithstanding which, in his very first setting out, he represents us as direct and manifest Sabellians, against all reason and justice, and common equity. He puts these words upon us, as expressing our sense: "God may be said to make all things by "his Son, as a man to understand by his reason." This is not our way of speaking or thinking on the subject, (it was Sabellius's, it was Arius's,) and therefore ought not to be reported as ours. For what if we do not call Father and Son two substances, (the union being too close to admit of such expressions,) yet we scruple not to say, Substance of substance, like as God of God. We contrive " Artemonius, par. ii. p. 295. • Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 59. our expressions so as to suit the Scripture idea of a real distinction without division, and of an union also without confusion. We maintain, that there may be a real diversity consistent with real unity, and that what is multiple in one respect, may be one in another. And thus we stand clear, as of Sabellianism on one hand, so likewise of Tritheism on the other P. The author proceeds to set forth 9 a summary of our reasonings upon Hebr. i. And he has indeed brought together a great deal more than can ever be fairly answered. But without replying to what was offered on our side, and without so much as endeavouring to show how the force of those many strong expressions can be evaded, or the words accounted for, he contents himself barely with representing the pleadings on the other side, producing our antagonists not as respondents, but opponents only. But supposing that the adversaries had ever so much to urge in that way, yet unless they could reconcile it with the words of the texts, and give a clear account of the whole, it is doing the work by halves, and can, at most, be esteemed but as a lame defence. However, by this means all our arguments from Hebr. i. are left standing in full force, and it remains only that we remove objections, to clear the whole thing. Two considerations are suggested by this author; first, that the chapter here under inquiry makes the Son another being from God; secondly, it makes him also an inferior being'. Let us now examine how these pretences are supported. 1. As to the first suggestion, it is to be observed, that it amounts only to a metaphysical subtilty about being and person, as if the words were convertible terms; which though it has been tried a thousand times over, could never yet be made out. But here we may perceive, who they are that run into metaphysical and logical niceties, P See my First Defence, vol. i. Query xxii. p. 233, &c. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 421, &c. Farther Vindication, vol. iv. p. 51-54. Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 59-65. ▾ Ibid. p. 66. to evade plain words of Scriptures, instead of keeping close to sacred Writ, and what it teaches in full and express terms. But I would further remark, though I have occasionally hinted it before, that all this discourse about being and person is foreign, and not pertinent; because if both these terms were thrown out, our doctrine would stand just as before, independent of them, and very intelligible without them. So it stood for above one hundred and fifty years, before person was heard of in it: and it was later before being was mentioned. Therefore, if all the objection be against those, however innocent, expressions, let the objectors drop the names, and accept the thing. They may express the doctrine thus, if they please; that the Father is God, the Son God, the Holy Ghost God, and all one God; and yet the Father is not the Son, nor Holy Ghost, nor either of them the Father: this is plainly the doctrine of Scripture, let them express it in what terms they please. Each is Jehovah, and yet they are not three Jehovahs: this is truth, (if Scripture can prove a truth,) and we need no more. But if any one has a mind to express this doctrine in such words as Justin Martyr, and Athenagoras, and Irenæus, and Theophilus, and Clemens Alexandrinus expressed it in, (before person or being was heard of,) he is at liberty as to words, while he admits the sense: for we are not bound down to names, but to things. These considerations premised, I now proceed with our author. He objects, that the "Son is distinguished from God"." From God the Father, he means: and so he should be, because God the Son is not God the Father. He adds, if "God means God the Father, he only must be God, for "he says of himself, he is GOD ALONE." Here I might run out into a particular explication of what concerns ex "How common and constant the practice is, I have often observed elsewhere. First Defence, vol. i. Query xxii. p. 214, 231, 340. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 4, 64, 109, 143, 212, 311, 396, 404, 447, 472, 474, 479. See my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 412. "Sober and Charitable &c. p. 66. clusive terms: but because I have often done it before, I choose to refer *. But in the mean while, if the exclusive terms are so strict, how come the Arians off with their doctrine of two Gods? We can give a good reason why the exclusive terms should yet tacitly suppose and include what so intimately belongs to God: but certainly all creatures are for ever excluded. The author goes on to observe, that Father and Son must be two thingsy. One would hope, he does not mean two Gods, equal or unequal: as to any thing else, we are unconcerned; we allow that the Father is not the Son, and so vice versa. He says further, the Son is "not the "self-same individual substancez." Here again the reader may observe, what kind of arguments we are attacked with no regard to the proper, obvious, natural sense of the texts, but all the dispute is made to turn upon logical niceties, or metaphysical subtilties about the nature of things confessedly mysterious, or rather upon the meaning of technical terms and names, such as individuala, &c. It is sufficient again to say, that the Son is not the Father, and yet each is Jehovah, and Jehovah is one. Either deny this to be Scripture, or say, that no Scripture can prove the point and then what signifies arguing from John i. or from Hebr. i. it is all but empty amusement. It is asked, can a person begotten be the express image of a person unbegotten, when the properties are so unlike? That our Scripture has so taught, is as plain as the sun therefore the question should have been put, whether the texts shall be allowed, or shall be struck out of the Canon? As to begotten and unbegotten, they are relations only; and (to compare small things with great) * Vol. ii. Sermon iv. per tot. Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 30, 53, 54, 79, 92, 183, 356. Third Defence, or Farther Vindication, vol. iv. p. 32. Sober and Charitable &c. p. 67. z Ibid. p. 68. • See my Second Defence, vol. iii. Query ix. p. 300. Query xxiii. p. 412. Sober and Charitable &c. p. 68. Col. i. 15. Hebr. i. 3. |
