I would not thwart or disturb him in it. It is enough for me, that the objection overshoots the mark, and is as forcible against moral, as against positive duties. Let but obedience in positive instances be as truly virtue as obedience in moral, and I ask no more; neither am I concerned to dispute with those that deny it of both.

However, I cannot but observe with some satisfaction, that this writer does not long continue contradicting me in this article, but comes entirely into my sentiments in another place, unawares. He asks, "What is the diffe"rence between continuance in well-doing, and virtue? "betwixt good works, and moral goodness?" Intimating, that there is no difference at all. Well-doing therefore is more than proving; and good works more than proofs. They are virtue, and moral goodness, by his own confession : : so hard is it for a man not to forget himself sometimes, when he is labouring to overthrow the truth. To conclude this point, I can easily prove that obeying God in positive instances is well-doing, and that such performances (as in Abraham for instance) are good works. Therefore, &c.

VIII.

The Defence pretends, "that the breach of a positive "law, when it is no breach of a moral law, may be va"lued at a certain price here, and the man that suffers "the penalty of it may be in danger of nothing future "." This I take to be new doctrine, and of pernicious tendency. I have seen something of it before, in a late writer; who proposes it, however, very modestly, in the way of conjecture, as a matter that may require second thoughts; as indeed it does. The doctrine, I think, amounts to this; either that it is no sin to violate positive institutions, or that it is venial, though ever so wilful. I am afraid this will be bringing in again the Popish doc

Colliber, on Natural and Revealed Religion, p. 151, &c.

trine of mortal and venial sins, at a back-door. For, to use this gentleman's phrase, upon another occasion, "One 66 egg is not liker to another," than this doctrine, of some sins being so slight as to deserve only temporal punishment, is to the Romish doctrine of venial sins. This is the second time I have observed him running (unawares) into Popish tenets, or very nearly such. The first was, in his asserting the absolute perfection of good works, which I before took notice ofy: and now this next is, his maintaining the doctrine of venial sins; for such it plainly is. Against all such pretences, I may here take leave to use the words of Bishop Burnetz: "The Scripture no"where teaches us to think so slightly of the majesty of "God, or of his law. There is a curse upon every one "that continueth not in all things which are written in that "book of the law to do thema. And the same curse must "have been on us all, if Christ had not redeemed us from "it: The wages of sin is death. And St. James asserts, "that there is such a complication of all the precepts of "the law of God, both with one another, and with the

authority of the Lawgiver, that he who offends in one "point is guilty of all. So since God has in his word "given us such dreadful apprehensions of his wrath, and "of the guilt of sin, we dare not soften these to a degree "below the majesty of the eternal God, and the dignity "of his most holy laws." Thus far he. And I presume, the settled standing doctrine of all sober and Protestant Divines is, that the wilful violating the Divine law, even in a small matter, is no small thing. Sins of ignorance and infirmity are the only slight sins: all wilful sins are deadly and damning. The rule then is, to make the estimate not barely by the matter of the offence, (for then Adam's offence would have been a slight thing,) but by the stress that God has laid upon his commandments, and

y See Nature and Obligation, &c. p. 57. 'Burnet's Articl. xvi. p. 140.

b James ii. 10, 11.

Gal. iii. 10.

the degree of wilfulness that goes along with the transgression of them. This is old and true doctrine. But let the serious and devout Christian observe and consider, what these novel notions about positive duties are like to end in: namely, in this; that it is no sin to offend against them, or none that affects the conscience. Nevertheless, I am persuaded, that the same persons who speak thus slightly of obeying God in matters positive, will look upon it as a grievous sin for servants, children, and subjects, to disobey their masters, parents, governors, in any lawful or indifferent commands. Or if they will not allow that, what will then this contempt of positive duties at length bring us to?

IX.

Another particularity of the Defence is, that outward hypocritical performances in moral duties cannot justly be called moral performances; for this wise reason, because they are immorals. And then he goes on, pleasantly, to talk against playing upon the word moral, at the very instant that he is doing it. For what does his argument here amount to, but playing upon a word? The Divine precepts are distinguished into moral and not moral, and not into moral and immoral. So that moral in the phrase moral performances, is not opposed to immoral, but to positive, or not moral. Actions therefore, or performances, may in this sense be moral, on account of their matter, (which is moral, not positive,) and be immoral too, on account of their obliquity. Did he never hear of moral evil? For, strange as it may seem, it is most certainly true, that moral evil is a thing immoral.

X.

The Defence denies, or at least scruples to own, that any supernatural sanctifying graces go along with the "worthy reception of the holy Communion d." I will

not here be at the pains to prove (for the satisfaction only of an humorous gentleman, who may read if he pleases) the known and approved doctrines of our Church, and of all Christian churches. I referred him before to Vossius, and now refer him thither again, and to Gerhard, and Hooker, to say nothing of many more, who have proved the thing to our hands. It is sufficient now to take notice, that Dr. Clarke himself owns the doctrine, in his posthumous Sermons, though he had omitted it in his Catechism. He owns that such graces, "through the assist"ance of the Spirit of God, are annexed to the ordinance "partaken of by truly devout and well-disposed minds." At length then it appears, that the Doctor has talked enthusiastically, just as I would have had him do: so that the best apology for Dr. Clarke would have been to say, that he had omitted the doctrine accidentally, and not denied it; which now appears to be fact. But his apologist was too well pleased with the omission; and judging of the Doctor by himself, thought he had left it out as enthusiastical; though it is the plain certain doctrine of all Christian churches, upon the foot of Scripture and antiquity.

XI.

Another singularity of this writer is, that he does not allow the exercise of the love of God, and of faith, hope, charity, and humility, to be essentially requisite to the worthy reception of the holy Communion. He admits that they may be exerted upon that occasion: but he says, "the institution or command cannot be said to re

quire the exercise of those extrinsic virtues 8." So it seems, those virtues are extrinsic, that is, foreign to the worthy reception of the holy Communion. He desires a text of Scripture to prove that those virtues are required h.

• Clarke's Posth. Serm. vol. iv. p. 131, 186, 187.

f See the Answer to the Remarks, p. 76.

I believe I could cite some. But it is needless, because the very nature and end of the Sacrament requires the exercise of those virtues, as it is covenanting with God, expressing our firm reliance upon the sole merits of Christ for our salvation, and maintaining communion both with God and man. All this might be easily made appear from Scripture. And I must insist upon it, that whatsoever Scripture by plain and good consequence teaches, Scripture teaches. In this point also, I conceive, I have Dr. Clarke fully and clearly on my side.

XII.

The Defence still pleads k, that "moral virtues are an "exact imitation of God himself," as he had before pleaded in the Answer!. I reminded him in returnm that human virtues could by no means justly pretend to any such high claim: and human virtues were undoubtedly the subject of dispute, and of which I had affirmed in my Remarks, that they wanted the relief and additional improvements of the two Sacraments.

He is now pleased to intimate, and another gentleman " has more plainly said it, that he meant not human virtues, but moral virtues in the abstract. Now indeed, if the question had been whether abstract ideas wanted the benefit of the Sacraments, this answer had been pertinent: but as it was only about men, and about virtues considered as in man, the Answer perhaps is such as any other person of plain good sense would not readily have thought of.

XIII.

Another peculiarity in this writer is, that our moral virtues, or our virtuous practices, need no expiation. I had

iSee Clarke's Posth. Sermons, vol. iv. Serm. 6, 7. per tot.

Defence, p. 67.

1 Answer to the Remarks, p. 72.

Nature and Oblig. p. 57. "Chilton's Positive Institutions, &c. p. 47.