or that a charge of horrid impiety, blasphemy, pest, poison, and heresy, is justifiable in one case, and not in the other : so that upon the whole, it might be very easy to retort upon the Remonstrants their own tragical exclamations against denouncing an anathema: for let them but have the direction of it, and they discover no great aversion to it upon weighty occasions, as to them appear; and in doctrines which they judge to be of great importance, they could be very smart and severe in their censures.

3. But the most material thing of all is, to examine Episcopius's rule for determining necessaries, which seems to be very fallacious. He would have a thing declared necessary in Scripture, either expressly, or by plain consequence. Here I know not what he would call a plain consequence otherwise indeed, the rule may be very just. I take it, if the truth of a doctrine be fully and plainly taught in Scripture, and it appears from the nature and quality of the doctrine itself, that it is important, and that much depends upon it, that then Scripture has by plain consequence declared the necessity of believing such doctrine, by declaring its truth. If the rule be thus interpreted, then by the same rule the doctrine of the Trinity is important in a Scripture view, and ought to be reckoned among the necessaries. By Episcopius's own account of it, (as before observed,) it is true, it is certain, it is clear, as proved from Scripture; and by many arguments recounted in the last chapter, it has been shown that it influences our worship, and bears a considerable part in what concerns the Christian life: therefore Scripture, in making known this doctrine, has by plain consequence taught us the necessity of believing it, and the danger of rejecting it. If men have the use of their rational faculties, and are able to argue and infer, they need not be expressly told that such a doctrine as that is, is important and weighty, and worth the contending for: let but Scripture once ascertain its truth, and every man's common sense will supply the rest.

When St. Paul was minded to convince the Corinthians

of the necessity of believing the resurrection of the dead, he thought it sufficient to show the connection which that doctrine had with Christianity itself; to intimate, that their other faith was vain without that, and all preaching vaina; and that the denying that doctrine was, in effect, denying the whole Christian religion. Therefore that doctrine was necessary in the highest degree, as common sense must conclude: the very nature of the doctrine, and its connection with the whole frame and body of revealed religion declared it. The like I say of the doctrine of the Trinity; not that it is necessary in the same degree with the doctrine of the resurrection, but in proportion, while much depends upon it, though not so much as does upon the other. Indeed neither of them are so necessary but that natural religion might subsist without them, upon a belief of the immortality of the soulb: but both are very highly necessary in a Christian light, and in a Scripture view, as both, in their several ways and degrees, support the fabric of Christianity, and the body of revealed religion. If a right knowledge of God, if dispositions suitable to the heavenly state we expect, if the regulation and specification of our worship, if the due and proper force of Gospel motives, if just ideas of the economy of man's redemption and salvation, and of the doctrine of grace; if these and other the like momentous concerns hang upon the true notion of the ever blessed Trinity, can we after that want any particular text or texts, to

a 1 Cor. xv. 14, 17.

Some very learned men have been of opinion that the same persons who in that time denied the resurrection, denied also any future state; which they infer from some reasonings which St. Paul made use of against them. (Vitringa. Observ. Sacr. lib. iv. c. ix. p. 924. Buddeus, Eccl. Apostol. p. 299.) But I much question whether they argue justly on that head, or whether St. Paul reasoned upon their hypothesis, or upon some other principles. It seems to me, that all St. Paul's reasonings in that chapter may be accounted for upon this postulatum, that if there be no resurrection, the separate soul, being under the sentence and dominion of death, cannot emerge and rise up to life and happiness, but must inevitably perish under such state of punishment, having no deliverer. But I offer this only as a conjecture, appearing to me not improbable.

declare to us the necessity of our believing it? Not but that particular texts may be found which are explicit enough upon that head, as I may show hereafter: but in the mean while, I observe, that our cause does not need that additional strength, does not depend upon it.

Besides, I would remark by the way, that a distinction might be properly enough made between a necessity of believing a Scripture doctrine, and a necessity of not denying, or not opposing it: for certainly, a man may be under a stricter obligation not to deny or oppose a Scripture verity, than positively to believe it; and it is a greater sin, publicly to deny and oppose a sacred truth, than it is merely not to admit it. Yet the Socinians, whom Episcopius was inclined to screen, did not only forbear giving assent to the doctrine, but they dissented, and publicly opposed it with all possible vigour; nay, and with more wiles and artifices than became plain honest men. Now I take it, that though an explicit knowledge or belief of many inferior Scripture truths is not ordinarily required, yet it may be required, and strictly too, not to deny or oppose even them, supposing them plain; because it is, in effect, denying the veracity of God, or the inspiration of Scripture. I know of no dispensation there is for denying and opposing any one plain Scripture truth, contriving artificial elusions for it, any more than there is for disobeying a plain precept, in like manner eluding it; nor how a partial faith, in such a case, is at all more justifiable than a partial obedience: for indeed disbelief is disobedience, as I observed above. But the observation is much stronger when we find that the truth denied and opposed is a very material truth, one that has much depending upon it, one that lies near the foundation. How Episcopius could own it to be a truth, and yet think it no crime, or none deserving a public censure, to deny and oppose it, is unaccountable. We do not want to have it said in Scripture, that it was necessary in particular, explicitly to know and believe it: but certainly, if it be a truth revealed by God, as he allows, and not of the

slightest kind neither, it was necessary not to deny or oppose it, and the man would deserve the public censure of the Church, that should presume so to do. Therefore the learned Episcopius has, in this instance, imposed a false rule of judging upon us, and such as he himself did not allow of in other cases. For how could he attempt to charge impiety, blasphemy, and the worst of heresies (as he pretends) upon the Calvinists? Was it by citing any Scripture texts which declare the necessity of believing the distinguishing doctrines on his side? No; but he endeavoured to show that the Calvinian doctrine remotely concluded in impiety, blasphemy, heresy; and that consideration he supposed sufficient to found his severe charge against the Calvinists upon; though in points more perplexed and obscure, and less agreed in among Christians ancient and modern, than the doctrine of the Trinity. So natural is it for men of the greatest pretended moderation to confine it chiefly to their own friends, or party, and to exclude their adversaries from the benefit. of it. Faults of this kind will often happen on both sides, while men are men and the foundation of all is, that men will not agree about necessaries, while they agree that there ought to be unity so far, and no farther. Many reconcilers have thought of various expedients, and different degrees of latitude: the worst that could be invented is indifference to all religions; which is like giving up an inheritance and consenting to starve, for the saving of trouble and contest about it. But I pass on.

4. A further fault I observed in the learned Episcopius was, that he extended the same fallacious rule to other doctrines of moment, beside this of the Trinity; and, as it seems, in order to contrive a shelter for his favourite Socinians. He denied the necessity of believing the divine prescience, as to future contingents, though at the same

c Superest ut inquiramus, an ad salutem æternam consequendam, scitu credituque necessarium sit Deo præscientiam talem competere, adeo ut qui Deo eam competere aut negat, aut affirmare non audet, salute æterna propterea excidat? In genere, nos id ad salutem scitu credituque necessarium esse VOL. V.

F

time he admitted the truth of the doctrine, in consideration of the Scripture prophecies. Indeed, as to the question taken in the precise terms as he has stated it, "whether it be strictly necessary to salvation to know "and believe it," and "whether a man shall forfeit his "salvation for not believing, or not knowing it;" I say, in this precise view, it is hard to know how to answer, since it seems to proceed upon a wrong supposition of a certain quantity of faith, or of explicit knowledge, as necessary to the salvation of every person; about which we can determine nothing. But put the question, whether the doctrine be not highly important, and richly worth contending for, or whether the impugners of it be not very much to blame, deserving public censure here, and punishment hereafter, for such pernicious doctrine; and then the answer is easy and certain: it is a very important doctrine, and the denial of it, especially if open and obstinate, highly criminal. Episcopius himself allows, that it is necessary to salvation to believe and know that God foresees whatever he has determined to bring to pass; because God himself strongly insists upon it, as a mark of distinction, whereby he will be proved to be the true God, in opposition to all rival deities. But, with submission, may there not be thousands of illiterate Christians, who have not the explicit knowledge of that matter, or may never consider it? Why then is this more necessary to salvation (in that strict sense of the phrase) than the other? In

negamus. 1. Quia nullum necessitatis indicium, aut vestigium ejus in Scriptura reperire est, sive indicium illud dicatur esse clarus textus, sive consequentia per se evidens.- Qui contra affirmat, ei incumbit probatio. Episcop. Institut. lib. iv. c. 18. p. 302.

d Episcop. ibid. c. 17. p. 299, &c.

Quænam ista sint quæ de divina scientia, omnibus ac singulis scitu credituque sunt necessaria? Tenemur scire ac credere, Deum scire ea omnia quæ a divino aliquo decreto suo dependent.Ratio est, quia hanc scientiæ perfectionem Deus sibi tanto cum zelo adtribuit, et adtribui vult, ut per eam, et propter eam, se discernut, discernique velit, ab omnibus dæmonibus, gentiumque Diis atque idolis, tanquam verum unicumque Deum, qui solus iðcirco summo honore, cultu, et obsequio dignus sit, uti videre est ex Isa. xli. 23. Episcop. Institut. lib. iv. e. 18. p. 303.