imposes that neceffity on them, till we arrive at one that is free, where we must stop. Since then the Agent endowed with this power, is determined by himself and no other, and is free in his Operations, we must acquiesce in him as a real Cause, and he ought to be efteemed the Author of whatever he does, well or ill. (O.)

NOTES.

XX.

(0.) Against this 'tis objected that the quite contrary follows. For to hit on a good action by a Motion abfolutely indifferent and not in confequence of fome antecedent Good or Evil Qualities in the Agent is to fall on it blindly, by mere Chance, and fo Fortune not the Agent is to be thanked or blamed. He rather is to be blamed or praised that owes his good or ill Actions to his antecedent good or ill Qualities.

To which I answer, that this is to deny and difpute against the Conclufion, without answering one word of the Premiffes, which are fo plain_and evident that I can't reckon the Argument other than a Demonstration; whereas that which is oppofed to it is against the common Senfe of Mankind.

For thofe good or bad Qualities that oblige him to do a good or bad Action are either from himself, that is his choice; or proceed from outward Agents that produced them in him: if from his own Choice, then it agrees with the Author's Opinion; but if from fome outward Agent, then it is plain the good or Evil is to be imputed to that Agent only. Quod eft caufa Caufa eft etiam Caufa Caufati.

I can't better explain this than by an Example. Suppose I am in distress, and there is one Man that by the Commands of his Prince, by his own Interest, and Politic Confiderations is obliged to relieve me, and is in fuch Circumftances that he cannot poffibly avoid doing it; the other is under no manner of Obligation, may do it or let it alone, yet feeing my Miffortune he chooses and pleases himself in doing me a good Office. Let any one of Senfe judge to which of these I owe the greatest Obligation; or if the World wou'd with Patience hear me excufe my Ingratitude by saying, Sir, there was no Obligation on you to help me, you might have done it, or let it alone, therefore it was mere Chance, that determined you. Would not the Reply be naturally, the lefs Obligation was on him that relieved you, the greater your Obligation is to him for his kindness? If it be faid that the Relief proceeded from Compaffion and good Nature, which were antecedently in the Benefactor, and therefore it was valuable; Suppofe the Perfon that did this Office had always before been remarkable for cruelty and ill nature, ought the obliged Perfon to value the

nefs.

XX. Eleventhly, 'Tis manifeft that fuch an A- Is capable gent as this is capable of Happiness. For that Per- of Happifon must be happy who can always please himfelf, and this Agent can evidently do fo. For fince things are fupposed to please him, not by any neceffity of Nature, but by mere Election, and there is nothing which can compel him to choose this rather than another; 'tis plain that the Agent endowed with this Power may always choose fuch things as it can enjoy, and refuse, i. e. not defire, or not choose those things which are impoffible to be had. And from hence it appears of how great Importance it is, whether that agreeablenefs by which things please the Appetites, be eftablifhed by Nature, or effected by the Agent himfelf. For if Good and Evil proceed from Nature and be inherent in Objects, fo as to render them agreeable or disagreeable, antecedent to the Election, the Happiness of this Agent will alfo depend upon them; and unless the whole Series of things be fo ordered, that nothing can happen contrary to his Appetites, he must fall fhort of Happiness. For his Appetites will be disappointed, which is the very thing we call Unhappiness. But if Objects derive their agreeableness or disagreeableness from the Choice, 'tis clear that he who has his Choice may alway enjoy the thing chofen, (unlefs he choose Impoffibilities, &c.) and never have his Appetite fruftrated, i. e. be always happy. Not that all things are indifferent with refpect to this Power, for it admits of fome Limitations, as was obferved,

NOTES.

Kindness lefs for that? Quite contrary; it was rather a greater Favour to him that it was fingular. But fuppofe it proceeded from a general Compaffion and good Nature, that had nothing of Choice in them, fo that the Perfon cou'd not help doing it; ought I not to thank him for it, and give him the Praises due to the Action? I ought to praise and commend him for his useful Qualities, as I do the Sun: but if I were fure that there was nothing of choice in them, I had no more reason to thank him than the Tyrant whofe impofthume was cured by the Wound defigned to kill him, had reason to thank the Affailant.

Animperfect un

do but

between

obferved, by choofing beyond which it must neceffarily fail of Happiness.

XXI. Twelfthly, It is to be observed that Agents, whofe Felicity depends upon the agreement derland of external Objects to their Appetites, ftand in ing is fufficient for need of a perfect and almoft infinite Knowledge his happi- to comprehend diftinctly all the relations, habitudes, nefs, if he natures and confequences of things; if they come fhort of it, it is impoffible but that they must often diftinguish fall into pernicious Errors, and be disappointed of poffibili their Defires, that is, be often miferable: Hence ties, and anxiety and difquiet of Mind must neceffarily arise, impoffibi and they would be agitated with continual doubts and uncertainty, left what they choose should not agreeable prove the beft. Thefe Agents then were either to be and difa created without a profpect of Futurity, or to be engreeable dowed with a perfect Understanding; if neither were done, they must of neceffity be very miferable; for we can scarce conceive a greater Mifery than to be held in fufpenfe about Happiness, and compelled to Abilities. choose among Objects not fufficiently known, in

lities,

things

to the

fenfes, and confult his

which nevertheless a Mistake would be attended with unavoidable Mifery. There's none but is fufficiently apprehenfive how anxious, now folicitous, how miferable it must be to hang in fuch a doubt as this; but if the agreeableness of things be fuppofed to depend upon Election, a very imperfect understanding will ferve to direct this Agent, nor need he to comprehend all the natures and habitudes of things: for if he do but diftinguifh poffible things from impoffible, thofe things which are pleasant to the Senfes from them that are unpleasant, that which is agreeable to the Faculties, from what is difagreeable, and confult his own Abilities, viz. how far his Power reaches; (all which are easily discovered) he will know enough to make him happy. Nor is there need of long deliberation, whether any thing to be done be the very beft; for if the Election be but made within these bounds, that will become best which is chofen.

2

XXII,

Liberty

would

it is a fure

XXII. He that enjoys the Principle of pleafing Though himfelf in his Choice cannot reasonably complain be of Nature, though he have but a very imperfect a prejuUnderstanding; for there will always be Objects dice to enough ready to offer themselves within thefe other Abounds, upon which he may exercife his choice, gents, yet and please himself: that is, he may always enjoy foundati Happiness. Though Free-will then be of no ufe, as on of was faid before, to an Agent capable of being de- Happitermined only by the convenience of external things, this, whofe nay, though it be pernicious, as only tending to per- convenivert Reason and produce Sin; yet to an Agent whofe ence deconvenience does not depend upon the things, but pends not the choice, it is of the greateft Importance, and on Obas we have seen, the fure and only Foundation of Felicity. And from hence it appears how valuable and how desirable fuch an active Principle as this would be.

nefs to

Election.

clear

XXIII. All this feems to be coherent enough, Thefe clear enough, and eafy to be understood, tho' fome things are may look upon it as a little too fubtle. It remains enough, that we enquire whether this be a mere Hypothefis though without any Foundation in fact, or there is really they may fuch a Principle to be found in Nature. (51.)

NOTES.

(51.) For an Explanation of our Author's Principle of Indifference, above what has been faid in Note 49. and will be enlarged on in Note 58. we fhall only observe here, that most of the objections brought by the Author of the Philofophical Enquiry, p. 69, &c. are built upon the old blunder of confounding this Indifference as applyed to the Mind, in respect of its Self-determining Powers of willing or acting, with another, which is falfly referred to the paffive Powers of Perception and Judgment. With refpect to the former Faculties all things are phyfically indifferent or alike, that is, no one can properly affect, incline or move them more than another; with regard to the latter, moft things are not indifferent, but neceffarily produce Pleasure or Pain, are agreeable or disagreeable, whether we choose them or not: Our Author is to be understood only in relation to the former, in this and the following Sections, though he often uses general terms.

SUB

appear to

be a little

too fubtle.

God is

fuch an Agent as this.

either good or bad to him before Election.

SUBSECT. IV.

That there is an Agent who is pleas'd with Ob¬ jects only because he chooses them.

W

E have seen in the former Subfection, that fome things are adapted to the Appetites by the conftitution of Nature itself, and on that account are good and agreeable to them; but that we may conceive a Power which can produce Goodness or Agreeablenefs in the things, by conforming itself to them, or adapting them to it a hence things please this Agent, not because they are good in themfelves, but become good because they are chofen. We have demonftrated before, how great a perfection, and of what ufe fuch a Power would be, and that there is such a Power in Nature appears from hence, viz. we must neceffarily believe that God is invefted with it.

Because II. For in the first place, nothing in the Creanothing tion is either Good or Bad to him before his Elecexternal is tion, he has no Appetite to gratify with the Enjoyment of things without him. He is therefore abfolutely indifferent to all external things, and can neither receive benefit nor harm from any of them. What then fhould determine his Will to act? Certainly nothing without him; therefore he determines himself, and creates to himself a kind of Appetite by choofing. For when the Choice is made, he will have as great attention and regard to the effectual procuring of that which he has chofen, as if he were excited to this Endeavour by a natural and neceffary Appetite, And he will efteem fuch things as tend to accomplish these Elections, Good; such as obstruct them, Evil.

Because his own

Will is

III. Secondly, the Divine Will is the Caufe of Good in the Creatures, and upon it they depend, as almost every one acknowledges. For created