nefs in the 253 Beings have all that they have from the Will of the Caufe God; nor can they be any thing elfe than what of Goodhe willed. 'Tis plain then that all these agree and Creatures. are conformable to his Will, either efficient or permiffive, and that their original Goodnefs is founded in this Conformity. And fince all things proceed from one and the fame Will, which cannot be contrary to itself, as it is reftrain'd within its proper bounds by infinite Wisdom, 'tis also certain that all things are confiftent with each other, that every thing contributes as much as poffible to the preservation of itself and the whole System; which we must reckon their fecondary Goodnefs. All the Goodness then of the Creatures is owing to the Divine Will, and dependent on it; for we cannot apprehend how they could be either Good or Evil in themselves, fince they were nothing at all antecedent to the act of the Divine Will and they were as far from being good with regard to God himself, till upon willing their Exiftence he by that act of Election both constituted them Good in relation to him; and by an unity of Will made them agreeable to one another. 'Tis evident that the Divine Will was accompanied in this, as in all other Cafes, by his Goodness and Wisdom; but it proceeds immediately from his Will that things please God, i. e. are Good. For many things are not agreeable to his Goodness and Wisdom purely because he did not will them, and while he does not will any thing it cannot be good. From whence it appears undeniably that his Will could not be determin'd to Election by any Goodness in the Creatures. For before that Election, which is declared to be the Caufe of Goodnefs in created Beings, nothing could be either Good or Bad; but when the Election is made, that only is Evil which obftructs the execution of it, and that Good which promotes it. The Goodness of things is therefore to be determin'd by their agreeableness to the Divine Will, and not that by the agreeableness or goodness of things. (P.) NOTES. IV. (P) The Objections here are ift, that if this be true, before God determin'd to create the World he cou'd see nothing better in Virtue than in Vice. It were a fufficient answer to this objection to fay there is no harm in it, if it were true; for we múlt confider that God from all Eternity determin'd to create the World, and therefore there neither was any thing, nor can any thing be conceived before that Determination; and therefore he might always fee fomething better in Virtue than Vice. But 2dly, We ought to remember that Virtue and Vice arife from the Congruity of Things created by God; what is agreeable to a reafonable Nature is Virtue, what is contrary Vice, and that there is no other Cause why one Nature is reafonable and another without Reason, but the Will of God, and therefore Vice and Virtue must entirely depend on that Will. The plain Reason of Mens mistake in the Cafe is this: They firft fuppofe God has willed that a Nature fhould be reasonable and then forgetting that this depends entirely on his Will, they fuppofe this Nature to be of itself, and then argue that the Congruity or Incongruity of things to it, cannot depend on the Will of God, because he can't make what is congruous to it incongruous; that is in reality his Will can't be contrary to itself. But 2dly, "Tis objected, that this Opinion leaves no difference between natural and pofitive Laws for a positive Law is what depends on the Will of God; and according to this pofition Natural Laws depend on the fame, and so the diftinction between them is taken away. But the answer to this is fo eafy, that 'tis a wonder any shou'd ftumble at it. For it is plain that the Natures of things have their Being from the Will of God, and whilft that Will continues none can destroy them, and the Congruity of things to these Natures results from the Natures themselves, and is included in the fame act of Will, that gave the things a Being: fo that as long as it pleases God to continue their Beings fuch as he has made them, the Congruity and Incongruity of things neceffarily remain and refult from that act of Will, which made them what they are; infomuch that the Divine Will must be contrary to itfelf, if it went about to feparate them (i, e. the Nature from the Congruity) and therefore these are join'd together by a Natural Law. But when God by a new act of Will fubfequent to the Being of any thing requires fomething to be done by it which was not included in that first act of Will IV. Thirdly, We must not therefore attend to fuch as declare that God chooses things becaufe they NOTES. Will which gave it a Being, then that is faid to be enjoin'd by a pofitive Law; and as this was requir'd by an act fubfequent to the Being, fo it may be again removed by another without deftroying the Being itfelf on which it is impofed, or without any contrariety in God's Will. Hence Natural Laws are indifpenfable, and can't be abrogated, whilft the Natures to which they belong continue; whereas the pofitive Laws are difpenfable and may be repealed. But 3dly, 'Tis urg'd that this opinion leads us ftraight to Pyrrhonifm, and makes God not only free as to Virtue, fo that he may make it either good or bad; but likewise to the truth or falfhood of Things, fo that he may change their Nature and make three and three not to be fix. 'Twere a fufficient anfwer to this, to fay the Cafe is not parallel; for the Goodness of Things is fuppofed to arife from the Will of God, which is free; but the truth of them from his Intellect, which is a neceffary Faculty; and therefore tho' the one might be arbitrary, yet the other cannot. But the Truth is, Goodnefs is a conformity to the Will of God, and the reafon that God can't will Evil is because it is always contrary to fome other act of his Will, and his Will can't be contrary to itfelf: and at the fame rate, Truth is a conformity to his Intellect, and the Reafon that a Propofition is true, is because it is fo conformable; and fince it is fo, to fuppofe it not conformable is to fuppofe a contradiction. God in making or conceiving fix, made and conceived three and three; and therefore to fuppofe that three and three do not make fix, is to fuppofe a Contradiction. In effect it is to fay God conceives it wrong; and to fay that his Power can make it otherwife, is to fay that his Power can falsfy his Understanding. Thefe things are fo eafy that there can be no doubt about them, if Men will not be perverfe. But 4thly, Is not this to make the Essence of things arbitrary, and fo fall in with fome Cartefians? I answer the Author is not concern'd with the opinions of Cartefians, or any other, farther than he thinks them true. If by making the Effence of things arbitrary, be meant that God inftead of making a Man, might have made a Stone, or planted the world with Mufhrooms instead of Herbs and Trees; he verily believes he might. If you mean that when God has made a Man and planted the World with variety of vegetables, that the man continuing what he is fhou'd yet be a Stone, or the feveral Plants continuing in their variety fhou'd all be Mushrooms, this he thinks impoffible. For a Man is a Creature that is not a Stone, and R 2 there they are Good, as if Goodness and the greater Good which he perceives in Objects, could deter NOTES. mine therefore to say he is a Stone, or to make him one, is to make him no Man. Six is a Number confifting of three and three, and to say that a Number doth not confist of three and three is to fay that it is not fix. Man is a Creature obliged to be just &c by the very Constitution of his Nature, and to say that he is not obliged to be fo, is to say that he is not a Man. If it be afk'd, can't God will him to do fuch things as we reckon unjust &c? I anfwer he may, but it must be by making him fomething else, by caufing him to cease to be a Man; in fhort by taking away his Nature from him, and then neither the notion of Manhood, nor Injustice will belong to him. The material acts that we call unjuft might still be perform'd by him, but the formal Reafon of injuftice would cease, because that arises from the acts, not as confider'd in themselves, but as they proceed from a Nature to which they are unsuitable. Thus a Man that owes me no Money may give me 1000l. but can't be faid to pay me a Debt, because the paying a Debt supposes that he owes it; and therefore tho' a Debtor, and one that owes nothing may each give me 1000l. yet they differ in this, that the one is Payment of a Debt, the other a free Gift. And fo it is in all thofe Actions that we call unjuft, &c. when they are done by a Man, they are Crimes, because against his Nature; but when another Creature that has not Reason does them, they can't be call'd unjuft, &c. For Example, if a Man kills one that no ways injures him, and rofts and eats him, he commits Murder, and is guilty of an horrid Immorality; but if a Lyon unprovoked kill and eat a Man it is no Crime or Wickednefs in him. But in as much as Men in their way of thinking represent to themselves a Nature with all its Parts and Pro. perties, and find that they can't remove any of them from that Nature, they conclude that the Natures of created Beings are what they are independently on the Will of God; forgetting in the mean time that it is only the Divine Will that gave or can give a Being to any Creature with certain Parts and Properties, and that instead of that Creature he cou'd make another without them all, that should have quite different parts and attributes. 'Tis therefore merely from his Will that Creatures are what they are; but that Will having given them a Being, or being conceived to have given it, no part or property belonging to them can even in thought be taken from them and this feems to me a full account of the certainty of those things we call Eternal Truths †. + See the Impartial Enquiry, p. 50, 51. : I mine his Will*. If. the Matter had ftood thus, it does not seem poffible for the World to have been NOTES. I have infifted the longer on this Point because I see fome indifferent Perfons as to the main Difpute have thought the Author mistaken in his afferting the Goodnefs of Things to depend immediately on the Will of God. Let me add farther, that the Author does not fay that the Goodnefs of Things depends folely on God's Will; but that his Wifdom and Power are likewife concern'd in them: we must not feparate God's Will from these attributes; on the contrary his Will is limited by the one and executed by the other. But laftly it is urged that according to thefe Principles Virtues are not good antecedently to God's Choice, and would not be good if God did not choose them, nay if he chofe Vices in their ftead, they would be good both morally and phyfically. For Obedience to God is Good, and if God had commanded Vice it would have been Man's Duty to obey him; and perhaps Goodnefs might this way have been as effectually brought into the World, as by thofe Virtues that arife from the exigence of our Nature, as God has now framed it. And from hence they infer that God is as free to make his fecond Choice, as we conceive him to be in making his first. But to all this I answer, 1ft, I acknowledge that antecedently to God's Choice there can be nothing good or bad, because there can't be any thing at all: the very moment we conceive a thing to be, we muft conceive and fuppofe that God wills it to be what it is, and that he wills it fhould by its Nature and Conftitution have certain parts and properties, and that as long as the thing continues what it is, God's Will continues alfo to preferve it fo: to fuppofe therefore that he Wills at the fame time it fhou'd be without thofe parts and properties, is plainly to fuppofe two contradictory Wills in God. Now an Obligation to Virtue is a Property neceffarily refulting from the Nature of Man, and therefore to fuppofe God to command him not to be virtuous when he has given him fuch a Nature, is a Contradiction. If any would in earnest fhew that the Goodness of Things doth not depend upon the Will of God, the true way of doing it is to give an inftance of fomething that is good, which doth This Notion is advanc'd by Dr. Clarke in his Demonfiration of the Divine Attributes, Prop. 12. and afterwards explained, as far as it feems capable of Explanation, in his Evidences of Natural and Reveal d'Religion, Prop. 1. The fame is infifted on by Leibnitz, Grotius, Ruft, Mr. Chubb, and many others. We have enquired a little into it already in R i. See more in Note 52. R 3 |