rily both do and fuffer, not what he himself, but what the determining Caufe has effected in him: But

NOTES.

to their Perfection, yet we have no way of measuring the Perfection of the feveral Substances but by their Qualities, that is by their Appetites, whereby they become fenfible of Good and Evil, and by their Powers, whereby they are able to procure thofe Objects whence they receive that Senfe of things which makes them happy.

'Tis plain therefore that whatever Syftem we fuppofe in Nature, God might have made another equal to it, his infinite Wisdom and Power being able to make other Creatures equal in every respect to any we know, and to give them equal or ftronger Appetites, and as certain or more certain ways of fatisfying them. We fee in many Cafes that very different means will answer the fame End. For Example, a certain Number of regular Pyramids will fill a Space, and yet irregular ones will do it as well, if what we take from the one be added to another; and the fame thing may be done by Bodies of the moft irregular and different Figures in the fame manner and therefore we may very well conceive that the answering of Appetites, which is all the natural Good that is in the World, may as well be obtained in another Syftem as in this, if we do but fuppofe that where their Appetites are chang'd, the Objects are alfo fuited to them, and an equal Agreeableness among the Parts of the whole introduced; and in an infinite Number of poffible Worlds I do not fee why this may not be done in infinite Ways by infinite Power and Wisdom.

If then it be acknowledged that there might have been infinite other Worlds, or even but one, equal to this in all repects as to goodness, there cou'd be no Obligation in Nature, on God to create one rather than the other, and therefore nothing cou'd make one more agreeable to him, that is, better, than another but his Choice. We must either own that there cou'd be no fuch World at all, or that God must for ever deliberate which of the poffible Worlds he should choose; or elfe his Determination must proceed from his own arbitrary choice, and he must be allow'd the Liberty to pleafe himself by choofing.

In fhort, it is eafy to fee that Men who propofe fuch Schemes wou'd drive all Liberty out of the World, and pin down God: in all his Actions to a fatal neceffity. They allow no Caufe but what is neceffarily either Agent or Patient, which if it be to allow a God, 'tis fuch an one as is a mere Machine, and can neither help himself nor his Adorers. 'Tis plain if this were fo there could be no fuch thing as moral Good or Evil in the World, the very Effence and Idea of it is loft, and we fhould

But this Goodness (which is fuppofed to be in things antecedent to the Divine Election, and to determine

NOTES.

fhould be no more obliged to a God that acts neceffarily for the good we receive from him, than we are to the Sun for the benefit of its Light and Heat.

I know 'tis urged that where there is no external motive to determine the Will, there only Chance muft do it, which is to admit an effect without a Caufe. I anfwer, that it is the Nature of a free Agent to be the Caufe of its own Actions, without being impell'd by any thing without itfelf. The choofing a thing gives it the goodness to this Being, and it chooses a thing, not because it was antecedently an Object apt to please it, but because it intends to make it fo. When it is objected that fuch an Agent chooses without reason, I answer, itself is the reafon to itself of its acting; that is, it acts to exercise its Faculties, the exercife of which caufes the Senfe of Pleasure ; and where there are feveral ways of exercising its Faculties and all indifferent, to fhow the Dominion over its own Actions, that is its Liberty, it takes the way it chooses; nor is it reafonable to expect it fhould lie idle till it find a Reason why it fhould act one way rather than another, when in truth there is no fuch Reason, the Objects being to the Agent abfolutely indifferent; and therefore amongft infinite poffible Worlds, there was no Reafon poffible or imaginable to determine God to make this rather than any other, befide his Will; he chofe it, and therefore it pleafes him, and he may deftroy it when he will, and that will likewife please him.

If it be afk'd, is there then nothing Good or Evil in refpect of God? I answer there is, viz. the acts of his own Will; they please him, and whilft that Will continues, every thing which croffes it, or tends that way, is Evil or difpleafing to him. Thus it is his Will that we fhould have Freedom of choice in many things; and he has fet certain limits to our Choice to prevent our hurting ourselves or others by choofing amifs. Therefore it would be contrary to our Nature to take away the use of Free-will from us; and fince it is his will to give us fuch a Nature, 'tis likewife his will to continue the ufe of our Freedom: It would likewise be contrary to the Will of God for us to use our Freedom to mifchieve ourselves or others, and therefore we conceive that every one who thus mifufes his Freedom incurs the difpleasure of God.

But then 'tis plain that in all acts which we conceive to be pleafing or difpleafing to the Deity, we derive the Reason of their being fo from the Confideration of their agreeableness or oppofition to his Will: and we derive the Knowledge of that will from nothing but the Manifestation God has made of it,

determine it) is fomewhat External, with regard to the Will of God; if therefore that be the Caufe which determines the Election, it follows that the act of Election and every thing that depends upon it is neceffary.

caufehe

whole

VII. But if things be good and agreeable to But if God for this only reafon because he has chofen to things are make them fo, he himself will be at liberty, his good bewhole Work will be free. The World will be has chofen made not of neceffity, but choice; nor will it be to make impoffible to be effected, tho' it be in itself un- them, his profitable to the Deity, for he will have a com- Work placency in his own Choice. And from hence it will be fufficiently appears of how great Importance it is, free. that all the Goodness of the Creatures fhould depend on the Divine Election, and not that upon the Goodness of them; for fo we may conceive Fate to be taken away and Liberty establish'd.

in them

felves ab

but he has

a compla

cency in

VIII. Fifthly, If he expected no advantage, External you'll fay, from the Objects of his Choice, why things are fhould he choose them? Is it not more probable that he should do nothing at all, than bufy him- folutely felf in things that are like to be of no benefit? I indifferent anfwer, That it is no more trouble to him to will to God, things than not to will them; and hence it comes to pass that when he wills them, they exist; when he retracts that Will, they drop into nothing. his Which reafon, as it fuppofes an indifference of Choice. things in respect of God, so it afferts his Liberty to produce or not produce them, and proves that that will be agreeable to him which he shall choose. But we have a better yet at hand, viz. that God chose to create external things that there might be fomething for him to delight in without himself. For every one receives Satisfaction from the Ex

NOTES.

either by the Nature that he has been pleased to give the Creatures, or elfe by Revelation. So that after all, we have no measure of Good or Evil, but the Will of God.

Exercife of his Powers and Faculties. (52.) Now God is invested with infinite Power, which he can

NOTES.

exercise

(52.) This reafon is very confiftent with what our Author had delivered in C. 1. §3. par. 9, 10. where he afferted that the end and intent of God in creating the World, was to exercife his feveral Attributes, or (which is the fame thing) to communicate his Perfections to fome other Beings: which Exercife or Communication could proceed from no other Caufe befide his own free Choice; and therefore he must be absolutely and phyfically indifferent to it, in the fame refpect as Man was fhewn to be indifferent towards any Action * only with this disparity, that Man, as a weak imperfect Agent, may eafily be imagined to will abfurdities or contradictions, but God cannot be fuppofed to will or act either inconfiftently with his Nature and Perfections, or with any former Volition (as our Author observes in the 12th and following Paragraphs) and confequently cannot be said to be indifferent to fuch things (as fome have mifunderfood our Author) any more than he is indifferent towards being what he is. Leibnitz urges farther † that it could not be in any fenfe indifferent to God whether he created external things or not, fince his Goodness was the Cause (according to our Author himself in the place above cited) which determined him to the Creation. But what do we mean by his Goodness here? Is it any thing more than an intent to exercise his Attributes, or an Inclination to communicate his Happiness or Perfection? And is not this the very Determination or Election we are fpeaking of? To fay then that God is determined by his Goodness, is faying that he determines himfelf; that he does a thing because he is inclined to do it; 'tis affigning his bare Will and Inclination for a Cause of his Action; which is no more than we contend for. Whereas they that would oppofe us fhould affign a Caufe for that Will or Inclination itself, and fhew a natural neceffity for the operation of the Divine Attributes (for a moral one is nothing to the prefent Queftion) a ftrict phyfical connection between the Existence of certain natural Perfections in the Deity and their Exercife on outward Objects. But if God had no other reafon for the creation of any thing befide his own Goodness, he was perfectly free and naturally indifferent, to create or not create that thing; and if he will'd, or was inclined to exert his Perfections thus freely, he must be as free and indifferent ftill in the actual Exercise of them. Nor will it from hence follow (as Leibnitz objects) that there is fuch an abfolute Indifference in the Deity as must make him regardless whether the World were well

*See Note 45, and 49. and Ode. Theol. Nat. p. 246. + Remarques, p. 473.

exercife innumerable Ways; not all at once indeed, (for all are not confiftent with each other) but fuch

NOTES.

well or ill made; Mankind happy or miferable, Er. For if the Communication of Happiness be the fole end of his acting, whenever he does act he must propofe that end, and the Exercife of his feveral Attributes will lead directly to it. Know ledge, Power and Freedom are Perfections, i.e. the Foundation of Happiness to the Being poffeffed of them, and therefore when communicated to other Beings they muft produce that Happiness, which is founded in and naturally results from them: to fuppofe the contrary, is the fame abfurdity as to fuppofe_that Knowledge may produce Ignorance, Power Weaknefs, or Freedom Neceffity. The Communication of these Attributes then, or the Exercise of these Perfections united, will constitute a wise, good and holy Providence pursuing a good end by fit and proper Means. All which is included (as our Author fays) in the very firft Act of the Deity, or rather in his Will to act at all; and to fuppofe him to will or act in any refpect contrary to this, is fuppofing him to will and act against his own Nature, and in contradiction to himself; or, which is the fame, imagining an Effect to be quite different from, or contrary to its Caufe. The Moral Perfections of the Deity are therefore immediate confequences, or rather the genuine Exercife, of his natural ones. And thus, I think, it may be fhewn how all the actions of the Deity muft certainly be Good, Wife, &c. without recurring to any fuch Fitnesses or Relations of things as are by some unaccountably fuppofed to be antecedent and abfolutely necessary to the determination of the Will of God himself.

But don't we, when we fpeak of God's choofing fit and proper means, evidently fuppofe that fome things are in themfelves good and eligible, and vice verfa, even before any determination of the Deity about them? Where is the room for Wisdom and Preference in God, if all things be alike and indifferent to him? I anfwer, first, If by things being in themfelves Evil, &c. be only meant, that fome particular ways of acting may be conceived, which would, if the Deity could be fuppofed to will them, be neceffarily and effentially oppofite, and have a tendency directly contrary, to his prefent method of acting; we grant that fome fuch things may be imagined: but then it will be an abfurd and impoflible fuppofition that God fhould ever will them, as he has already willed the contrary; and therefore, in regard to him, they must still be only imaginary. Nay, they would be fo far from being independent of, or antecedent to the Will of God in any fenfe, that the very Effence and Idea of them would proceed entirely from, and pre-fuppofe its Determination; fince we can only

3

conceive