the one may always be done, the other is often impoffible: this therefore, or none, is the Way to arrive at Happiness. 'Tis hard to comprehend how he can fail of Happiness who has it in his Power to please himself. This feems to have been the Opinion of the ancient Stoics, who had the fame thoughts of Liberty with thofe laid down above, but did not explain them distinctly, nor comprehend the whole Series of the Matter. However, 'tis very plain that they placed Happiness in the Use and Election of fuch things as are in our own Power; which yet would be impoffible, if we were not able to please ourselves in Election. (59.) NOTES. (59.) Our Author's mentioning the Stoics here, might probably give Leibnitz his reafon to fufpect him of maintaining all the abfurd Confequences which that Sect are faid to have drawn from the above mentioned Principle. They indeed (if they be not greatly misreprefented) urged it fo far as to affert, that nothing external could hurt or incommode us except we pleafed that all Good and Evil was entirely in our Power and of our making; and confequently that all outward things were indifferent and alike to us, antecedent to our own Choice. Which Notions, being contrary to every Day's Experience in Pleasure and Pain, led them on to deny that the latter was properly an Evil, or rather that there was any difference at all between them. This Doctrine is indeed liable to Leibnitz's Objections of confounding all the distinctions of things, of contradicting the natural Appetites, making Reafon and Underftanding ufelefs, and fubverting all the other Faculties of the Mind. Thefe and the like Reflections, I fay, are justly made upon the Doctrine of the Stoics, as they have generally exprefs'd themselves; and overthrow a total, abfolute Indifference of the Mind to will in all Cafes ; but are nothing at all to our Author, who never contended for it; but on the contrary, infifts upon a neceffary, fixed, and unalterable difference in the Natures of things, according to the present Syftem; and has allowed their full force to both Reafon and the natural Appetites, all over the laft Section, as well as in the foregoing Chapters of this Book. But this has been explain'd in the Notes above. For an application of this Section. See § 5. Subsect. 2. and the Notes to 5. Subfect. 3. SECT. SECT. III. Concerning undue Elections. I. ROM hence it is fufficiently evident what To fall kind of Elections are to be called undue ones: short of 1FR choose is therefore when we This is For it appears that God has given us this Faculty what we of choofing, that we may please ourselves in the ufe Mifery; of it, and be happy in the fruition of thofe Objects we choose which we choose. For it is a Happiness to obtain amifs the things chofen, and Mifery to be fruftrated and fall fhort of them. Whenfoever therefore we know- choofe ingly make fuch a Choice, as not to be able to en- what canjoy the things chofen, it is plain that we choose not be enfoolishly and unduely: for we bring upon ourselves joy'd: unneceffary Mifery, fince we could have chofen done ift. otherwise with equal Pleasure. Whoever then chooses when fuch knowingly what he cannot obtain, or what may things are produce unneceffary trouble to himself or others, are impofhe must be esteemed to choose unduely. And this fible. may be done, firft, If any one choose Impoffibilities. It may feem ftrange that any Perfon fhould choose a thing which is impoffible, knowing it to be fo; but 'tis very probable that this has happened fometimes, as was faid before.* chofen as When II. Secondly, If he choose fuch things as are in- Secondly, confiftent with each other: he that does this contra- thofe dicts himself, and evidently cuts off all hopes of things are Enjoyment. When we will any thing, we must chofen take all its neceffary confequences together with it. which are But all things here are of a mix'd kind, and nothing inconfiftent is pure from all degrees of Bitterness: we often other. therefore will that part in a certain thing which is agreeable to the Appetites, and refuse the reft: but this is in vain, fince the agreeable Parts cannot be separated from the disagreeable ones: we muft there Sec. 1. Subfect. 5. par. to, 11, 12. fore with each Thirdly, If the things chofen be not in the power of the Elec tor. Fourthly, fore either choofe or reject the whole. He that does otherwife cannot poffibly fatisfy himself, fince he must bear with what he would not: He is there'fore voluntarily unhappy by an undue Election. ; III. Thirdly, he must be esteemed to choose unduely, who aims at fuch things as he knows are not in his Power. For it is a hazard whether he enjoys those things that are not in his Power; and it is foolish to commit our Happiness to Chance while therefore it is in our Power to choose only fuch things as we are certain of obtaining, we risk our Happiness, or throw it away when we pursue Uncertainties: Now we owe as much Happiness to ourselves as is in our Power, and ought to use our utmost Endeavours to attain it; but we lose this by undue Election when we defire those things which we know to be out of our Power. IV. Fourthly, That alfo is an undue Election, If any which obliges us to feize those things that are lawchoofe thatwhich fully occupy'd by the Elections of other Men. To is pre-oc- be disappointed of an Election is Mifery, as we faid cupied by before; to enjoy it, Happiness. Every one therethe lawful fore that is endowed with a Power of choofing, has Choice of others. a right to the enjoyment of the thing chofen, fo far as is neceffary to the Exercise of his own Faculties, and is no impediment to the Good of others. But he must be esteemed an impediment to the Good of others, who will appropriate to himself what is common, or affume more and greater Advantages from the common Stock than fall to his Share. Those things then which are preoccupied by the Choice of other Men belong to the Choofers, and cannot justly be taken from them: therefore he that covets them would have what is not his due: i. e. endeavours by undue Election to rob others of their Right, This is to be referred in an especial Manner to fuch things as are pre-occupied by the Choice of the Deity; for these are to be esteemed by all as facred and prohibited: nor can any one meet with Succefs Success that opposes himself to God, and chooses what God disapproves. For what God wills muft neceffarily come to pafs, but God wills the Happinefs of all Men as far as it is poffible; therefore he that offends unneceffarily againft the Happiness of any one, is fuppofed to offend against God, and to choose what is not his due. chofen V. Fifthly, On this account it is unlawful for Fifthly, us to defire those things which are burtful to ourselves When or others. By hurtful things I understand those that thofe lead to natural Evils, viz. fuch as are prejudicial to which things the Body or Mind. It appears from what has been tend to faid, that things please because they are chofen, Natural but Reason perfuades us to abftain from fuch Elec- Evils, are tions as may prove pernicious to our own Minds, without or those of others; or fuch as defraud the Appetites Neceffity. unneceffarily for we owe a Gratification to these Appetites, when it can be procured without greater Detriment. Therefore an Election opposed to these gratis, and without any reason, must be judged an undue one, because it deprives us of the due Enjoyment of our Appetites. (W.) : NOTES. SECT. (W.) It has been objected, that 'tis a Contradiction for God to create fuch a Faculty as is above described, and yet that it fhould choose amifs: for what can be amifs to a Faculty that can make every thing good by choofing? But the answer is plain, the Faculty is not fo indifferent but it has Limitations, and he that has limits certainly does amifs by tranfgreffing them. Tho' there is a natural Power in the Will to choose a thing in oppofition to all its natural Appetites and the dictates of the Understanding, and hereby to give itself fome degree of pleasure for the time, and we fee that it fometimes doth fo; yet the Evils that proceed from fuch an exorbitant exercise of this noble Faculty plainly fhew that it ought not have done fo; and the Author never faid, or imagined any one would think he meant that Wisdom and Prudence were useless to such an Agent, or that he ought not to regulate the exercise of this Faculty fo as to prevent its choofing impoffible, abfurd or inconfiftent things, or the clafhing of his Choice with his na tural Appetites and their Satisfaction. A King must have a Power to punish his wicked Subjects with Death, and to re ward thofe that deserve it with Honours and Riches; if he had not this Power, he could not govern. But shall he therefore kill the innocent and fquander away his Favours on the undeferving? So Man has Free-will by which he may choose Objects, and gratify himself in the Choice; doth it therefore follow that he may choose things impoffible, things beyond his power, or contrary to his natural Appetites ? Yet if he had not this natural Power to choose, he could no more be happy, than a Prince could govern that had not the Power of Rewards and Punishments. This is done five ways. Firft, By Error or culpable Igno rance. SECT. IV. How it is poffible for us to fall into undue ITIS I.' IS difficult to comprehend, as was faid before, how one can fall fhort of Happiness who has it in his Power to please himself; yet if he choose in the foregoing Manner, or the like, he must neceffarily fail of his Choice, and his Appetite be fruftrated, i. e. he must be unhappy. But how is it poffible, you'll fay, that any one fhould make fuch a Choice? + I anfwer, This may proceed first, from Error or Ignorance. Secondly, from Inadvertency or Negligence. Thirdly, from Levity. Fourthly, from a contracted Habit. Fifthly, from other Appetites implanted in us by Nature. Not that the Will can be determined by thefe, or any thing elfe which is external; but that from hence it takes an handle and occafion of determining itself, which it would not have had otherwise. II. First, As to the first of these, we have proved before that we are liable to Errors and Ignorance; and that this is to be reckoned among natural Evils. When therefore we are forced to choose. + See Locke's Chapter of Power §. 5, 7. c. among |