Imatges de pàgina
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had rather be a Brute than a Man: neither could you by this means avoid these natural Evils which

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you

the

concerned in the Attainment, and unworthy of the Enjoyment of them. This is the great Spur and Incitement to many noble actions here, and will be part of the Crown and Reward of them hereafter, (as is illuftrated at large by Dr. Scott in the first Vol. of his Chriftian Life, and by Dr. Jenkin, in his Reafonableness of Chriftianity, 2d vol. C. 12. prop. 2.) And tho' we cannot properly merit any thing at the hand of God, yet Consciousness of having performed fuch Actions as are in themfelves acceptable to, and rewardable by him, and of receiving Bleffings from him in return for fuch Actions, muft very much increase our Happiness in the Enjoyment of thefe Bleffings, both in this World and the next, (as is fhewn in the fame places.) Nor laftly, could we receive this Pleasure which now results from our Choice and Action, if we were determined in every thing by the Deity, fuppofing that Determination concealed from us, and we only made to believe that we were really free to choose and act. For, as our Author obferves, this would be to arrive at the End without the Means, and to have the Effect without the Caufe. All our Ideas of Merit arife from, and are entirely founded in Free Choice: this (as far as we can apprehend) is the neceffary Medium to fuch Moral Happiness; and we can no more conceive how one fhould come without the other, than how we should see without Eyes: and for us to have this Pleasure, tho' another did the Action, would be the fame as for one Man to be conscious of his doing what fome other really did, or for him to fee by fome other's Eyes. Such Suppofitions as thefe would breed endless Confufion. For we muft either know whether another did this Action or not; if we do know this, then how can we attribute that to ourselves, or pride ourselves in that which we know belongs to another? If we do not know this, then how can we attribute to ourselves, or please ourselves in any thing? Since every thing in and about us may, for what we know, be done by another, and fo we in reality may never deserve either praise or blame. The natural confequence of which is, that we might as well never aim at Desert, or strive to do any thing at all: and this is the genuine Product of all fuch Suppofitions as question the Veracity of our Faculties, and would make us fufpect that we may be impofed upon even in the regular Operations of our own Minds. The fame Arguments with those of Bayle, as well as the like method of reafoning, are made ufe of by the Author of the Philofophical Enquiry, p. 98, &c. and p. 71, 72. Where he thinks, "It may not be improper to obferve, that fome of the Pleasures

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you dread fo much as foolishly to wish yourself a Brute, left you fhould fall into them. But fuppofing it were convenient for you to be a Brute, yet it could not be convenient for all Nature: The Syftem of the Universe required free Agents: without these the Works of God would be lame and imperfect; his Goodness chose the Benefit of the Universe rather than that of yourself; especially when this is better for you too, tho' you fhould be fo ungrateful as not to confess it.

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V. Fourthly, As it would be prejudicial to Man, to all Nature, for God to hinder bad Elections by placed as his abfolute Power, fo nothing can be conceived it were to be more disagreeable to himself. We have faid out of the that God made the World in order to have fome- reach of thing wherein to exercise his Attributes externally: Power, But fince he has feveral Attributes, he cannot exer- the Gocise them all in every thing alike. His Power there- vernment fore exerts itself chiefly in one thing, and his Wif- of the dom and Goodness in another. He exercifed his is the proPower in creating the World, and putting it into per ExerMotion; his Goodness and Wisdom in the Order cife of the and Agreement of things: But the Divine Wisdom Wisdom, seems to have fet apart the Government of Free wherein Agents as its peculiar Province. Herein it fully ex- God deerciseth itself, and acts up to its Infinity; for if it lights. were finite it would not be equal to fo great a Task.

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"Man receives from Objects are fo far from being the Effect "of Choice, that they are not the Effect of the least Premedi"tation, or any Act of his own, as in finding a Treasure on "the Road, or in receiving a Legacy from a Perfon unknown "to him." But has a Man the fame Pleasure in thefe Cafes as if he had done fomething to deferve a Treasure of the Public? or had the Legacy conferred on him as a Reward for his good Deeds to the deceased Perfon, his late loved Beneficiary or intimate Friend? If this Author can find a difference in thefe two Cafes, this Obfervation of his must be improper: if he cannot, I am fure he has a different Sense of things from the reft of Mankind, and of confequence is not to be argued with.

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therefore

Divine

It does not seem a very extraordinary thing for God to be able to govern and abfolutely direct fuch Beings as are merely paffive, and deprived of all Motion of their own, whereby they might make any Refistance. For those things obey easily which do not move but when they are moved. Neither is there need of infinite Wifdom to govern them; for infinite Power, with a moderate use of Wisdom, would have been fufficient. That there might be a Subject therefore whereon the infinite Wisdom of God fhould display itself, he created Free Agents; which, being as it were put out of his Power and left to themselves, might act in a manner independent of his Will. 'Tis evident to any Perfon how much more difficult it is, and how much greater Exercife of Wisdom it requires to direct a Multitude of these to a certain End, and make them confpire to the common Good, than to order Brute Beafts, and fuch as have no Power of themselves, in what manner you please. To them that confider the vaft Multitude of Free Agents, which is almost infinite, and their Independence (fince every one is, at least in many Cafes, abfolute Master of his own Actions, and is permitted by God to act according to that Liberty) God seems to have given a Specimen of the Extent of his Wisdom, which is able thus certainly and effectually to bring to the End proposed, so many Free Spirits, fo many Agents that were in a manner fet at Liberty from his Dominion, and committed every one to his own Government. Here is the proper place for Wisdom, wherein (fetting afide, and in a manner fufpending the Exercife of his Power) he attains his Ends by Prudence only, by mere Dexterity of acting, and brings it to pass that fo many jarring Wills depending on themselves alone, and no more inclined to either Side by the Divine Power, than if there were no fuch thing, fhall yet confpire together to promote the Good of the Univerfe. 'Tis impoffible that

this Exercise of Wisdom should not be very agreebe able to the Deity, if any thing in his Works may esteemed agreeable to him. But if he were obliged to interfere with his Power, t'would feem to argue a Defect of Wisdom; for what occafion is there for him to interpose and stop the Liberty of Election before granted, if his Wisdom could provide fufficiently for the Good of the whole without altering his Plan? *

It would

therefore

to us, that

VI. From hence it seems fufficiently evident why God would not interpofe his Power, or intermeddle be neither with our Elections, fince that could neither be ad- agreeable vantageous to ourselves nor to the whole System, to God, nor agreeable to God. "Tis no wonder then that nor useful abfolute Goodness permits Evil Elections, fince for God the most part they could not be prevented without should algreater Evils. But if that can ever be done, there's ways hinno doubt but God will take care that the very beft der bad fhall be done. (70.)

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(70.) What has been urged in the foregoing Subfection about the Divine Interpofition in human Elections must be understood in a limited Sense, viz. as relating only to an immediate Influence, or an abfolute Determination of the Will, i. e. to fuch an intermedling with Elections as would make them to be no Elections at all. For it from the following appears Subfection, that our Author did not intend to exclude all kind of Interpofition in the Government of Free Agents, but only that particular fort which would fubvert their natural Powers, or be destructive of their Freedom. Though God has established general Laws both in the animate and inanimate World, yet he has not left these entirely to themselves, but influences, directs, and governs them in such a manner as is most conducive to the great End for which he designed them; which End could not be attained without fuch a particular Influence, as will be fhewn below. In determining the manner of this Government we must beware of the two Extremes of fuppofing either first, that the Deity always influences fecond Causes or acts (as Malebranch terms it) by particular Wills, in the Natural or Moral World; which would diffolve all Laws of Nature, deftroy the Liberty of the Creature, and reduce every A a 4 thing

See Dr. Jenkin, 2d Vol. C.12. p. 240, &c, 5th Edit.

Elections.

Devout

SUBSECT. IV.

Concerning the Efficacy of Prayer.

I.COME

fo

Men hope SOME may apprehend that God is not so averfe from interpofing immediately in the Affairs of this World as is here afferted; and that the Laws and Order of Nature are not of fo great

for a
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thing to Fate or fecondly, that he never interpofes in the Government of either World, but lets the general Laws of MePrayers. chanifm or of Liberty take their natural Courfe, and operate as it were independently of himself; which would entirely deftroy a particular Providence, and render the general one in a great measure ufelefs. The bad Confequences which would attend the former of thefe Schemes have been touched upon above: The latter (which is particularly efpoufed by Leibnitz in his Syftem of Pre-established Harmony, and by Mr. Whiffon in his New Theory of the Earth) will be obviated in the following Subfection. I fhall here only add the Opinion of Mr. Colliber on the prefent Subject; "[s.] 'Twas highly fuitable "to the Divine Wisdom in the Government of the World, "both to pre-ordain fome of the principal Events with "relation to the entire human Community, or to the more 'confiderable parts of it, and to reserve to himself a Right "of interpofing and influencing particular Agents, as in other "Cafes, fo more especially in order to the accomplishment of "thefe Events. That he has actually done fo is abundantly "clear from Scripture Prophecies, and Hiftories. And that "in fo doing he has acted in a manner most worthy his Wif"dom, is no lefs manifeft. For hereby it appears that the "Divine Government is equally opposed to Chance and Deftiny. Had the Deity taken no Care of Futurity, but left every Man to the Conduct of his own Inclinations, and na"tural Effects in general to the Influence of their Causes, "without ever interpofing to direct them to the attainment "of his great Defign; this would have been almost in effect "to diveft himself of the Government of Rational Agents, " and to fubject their Affairs to Chance, and to the hazard of "the utmolt Disorder and Confufion. Or had he on the contrary abfolutely or fatally determined every Event, tho' this "would have been far enough from divefting himself of the "Government of the World, yet it would have been a Go

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[s.] Impartial Enquiry, &c. p.115.

vernment

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