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Dr. WILLIAM KING,
Late Lord Archbishop of Dublin.
To which are added,
on the FALL of Man.
THE FOURTH EDITION CORRECTED.
By EDMUND LAW, D. D.
Freedom from Necesity as well as Compulfion.
with the former concerning the Goodness grees with or Agreeableness of Objects to the Appetites, nor the former
in most is there much difference in 'what relates to the di
in those or preference of the Mind, and only relates to the execution of relating to such choice by an inferior faculty: † But then, besides this Idea the Appeof Liberty, which is nothing to the present Question, there is tites, to another previous and equally proper one, which regards the Good, very determination, preference or direction of the Mind itself; Pleasant, and may be called its Power of determining to do or forbear Profitable particular Action, or of preferring one to another; and if Free- and Hondom can with any propriety of Speech be attributed to one of eft : but these Powers I as he has constantly attributed it, why may makes this it not with equal propriety be applied to the other? He pro- to be the ceeds therefore to state the. Question concerning the latter, difference which he would not have put, whether the Will be free? but between a whether the Mind or Man be free to will? both which I think Man and amount to the same thing with common Understandings, fince Brute, in the first place we only ask, Whether this will be properly viz. that an active power of the Mind (i. e. as opposed to Mr. Locke's the one is palive Power) and in the second, Whether the Mind be active deteror indifferent in exerting this Power called Will ? and both mined by which will be equally improper Questions with regard to his its bodily former sense of the Word Free, i.e. as only applicable to the Appetite, Actions subsequent on Volition. However, he goes on in the the other second place to enquire, whether in general a Man be free by him• To Will or not to Will, when any A&tion is once proposed self. • to his Thoughts, as presently to be done. In which respect he determines that a Man is not at liberty, because he cannot forbear Willing or preferring the one to the other: || which tho'it be scarce consistent with his other Notion of Suspension, whereby a Man either avoids a particular determination in the case, and continues in the same state he is in [not by virtue of a present Determination of his Will, but of some precedent one] or else wills something different from either the existence or non existence of the Action proposed*, and tho' it should
+ See Note 42. $ 16. 1923, 24. * See Note 48.
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