3. There are two remarkable cases in which, antecedently to the giving of the law, Moses has occasion to mention Sacrifice; in both of which, he speaks, to my judgment, as plainly as possible, as under the belief that Sacrifice was understood by both Jews and heathens, to be of divine institution. The two passages are Exod. v. 3. "Let us go, we pray thee, three days journey into the desert, and Sacrifice unto the Lord our God; LEST HE FALL UPON US WITH PESTILENCE, OR WITH THE SWORD." And Exod. x. 25, 26. "Thou must give us also Sacrifices and" (even *) "burnt offerings, that we may sacrifice unto the Lord our God. Our cattle also shall go with us; there shall not an hoof be left behind; for thereof must we take to serve the Lord our God; and we KNOW NOT WITH WHAT we must serve the Lord until we come thither."

In the former case he tells Pharaoh, that the consequence of his omitting this rite will be the infliction of most terrible punishments. But such punishments could hardly be menaced for the neglect of a rite, which was of mere human institution, or to one which was mere will-worship, such as Mr. Davison represents it †. It is true, that in this case there was a special and particular command; but Moses appears, not to refer Pharaoh to that, but to

* Dr. Richie observes, that " In these two passages Moses and Aaron speak of Sacrificing not as a new, and uncommon thing, but as an usual mode of worship, with which Pharaoh was as well acquainted as themselves; consequently a thing that was not a late, or new invention. In the first passage no particular Sacrifice is mentioned in the latter, burnt-offerings are the only species which is taken notice of."-Pec. Doct. 142.

His arguments for adopting the translation " even," which his last position requires, are stated in his note (u), pages 138, 139. + I may observe too, that the dreaded visitation with sword or pestilence, does not very clearly correspond with Spenser's, and Mr. Davison's notion of Sacrifices having the "anterior character" of Gifts, such as they are described by these writers. If Gifts at all, they were of the nature of Bribes, to avert the above terrible calamities.

rely upon his comprehension of the threat from the universal persuasion, that Sacrifice was a divine institution, a commanded rite, and that neglect of it would incur signal punishment.

In the latter case, Moses informs Pharaoh, that he knows not what he is to Sacrifice. And surely this creates a presumption, that he meant to hold out Sacrifice as under the divine institution. Because, here was a case unprovided for by the ordinary rule of practice,; and Moses could not presume to say, without special authority, what victims would be required. Yet surely, if he believed, that Sacrifice was the invention of human reason, and that the Patriarchs were justified in establishing this rite without divine authority; surely, he might exercise the same liberty, and determine by reason, when he had received no directions, what was proper to be offered for this particular occasion. They would be both cases of will-worship, and the precedent of the former would justify their proceeding upon the same principle in the latter. The same reason which was permitted to institute Sacrifice, might surely be permitted to determine what sort of Sacrifice should be offered in the wilderness.

From these cases before the law, if we turn to the language under the law, we find Moses uniformly claiming divine authority for the ordinances he delivered. He no where pretends to be the originator of any rite; every one has the divine sanction. But God may adopt a human rite, and give it his sanction. Yet where is there a hint, that he has done so. He speaks of Sacrifice, indeed, as a rite already known to man; and it may be asked why, if its divine origin were already understood, he should expressly mention its being now authorised, and commanded by him?

To this we may reply-that no where does Moses appear to mention Sacrifice with a view of stamping it with a sanction, which it did not already possess.

of his fore-doomed condition. As the representative of a forfeited life, the creature slaughtered was a confession made to the divine justice neither inapt to its object, nor arbitrary in its moral import. The action performed, and the sentiment implied, had a determinate correspondence. The one would exhibit the other. The sentiment was just; the representation of it natural. The Holocausts and victims of the primitive age, would not, therefore, in this first sense of them, be so perplexed in their design, that we should be obliged to resort to a supernatural appointment to account for their introduction*"

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I must aver, that after having, to the best of my ability, given Mr. Davison's statements and arguments a" candid consideration," I am disposed to pronounce the matter " inexplicable" upon the principles which he has adopted; and certainly very far, from being explained by his attemptt. On the contrary he appears to have produced not only a very artificial, and unnatural account, but also an account, which, to give it much probability, seems to require an admission of that postulate of Warburton's which, in a preceding page, he has himself justly condemned; namely, the "imperfection of language," and a consequent necessity for representation by action. For, not to mention many other improbabilities, we must suppose Abel to have been

*Davison on Sacrifice, p. 21, 22, 23.

No benefit appears to be proposed by Mr. D. as the expected result of sacrifice so offered.

"Language," says Dr. Magee, which Scripture expressly states to have been derived to our first parents from Divine instruc tion, cannot be supposed so defective, in those terms that related to the worship of God, as to have rendered it necessary for Abel to call in the aid of actions to express the sentiment of gratitude or sorrow; and still less likely is it that he would have resorted to that species of action, which, in the eye of reason, must have appeared displeas ing to God, the slaughter of an unoffending animal." Magee on Atonement. Disc. II. Sec. also No LIII.

very deficient in the use of language, if he were unable to express his "contrition, and self-condemnation." without shedding the blood of an innocent lamb. Neither do I perceive the aptitude of the symbol, or the connection which could present itself to the mind of the offerer between the death of an unoffending * animal, and the sentence due to guilty mant.

The improbability of the human invention of this rite has been amply discussed by various writers, and the principal arguments may be seen in Dr. Magee's work upon the Atonement. They are generally known and I shall not enumerate them. But I wish to adduce one, which I have not observed to have been previously urged. It is this: that a strong degree of improbability opposes itself to the supposition, that Abel could have been led by reason, to offer animal sacrifice; because the natural reason of a good man, instead of expecting to propitiate God, would discover greater grounds to apprehend his displeasure, and must have shrunk with horror at the bare idea of inflicting upon an innocent animal death, which had been denounced as a CURSE AND PUNISHMENT upon himself. This very consideration alone would have been sufficient to deter a good man, and alone, I contend, is sufficient to explode the fanciful theory of Mr. Davison respecting man's offering sacrifice as a symbol of "contrition,

* But how forcibly does the aptitude press itself on our reason, -when we contemplate it as the type of our sinless Redeemer, our Lamb without blemish and without spot.

"By this reason," (says Jeremy Taylor, Duct. Dub. p. 356) we are taught that God must be worshipped, yet that cannot tell us how God will be worshipped," &c.

Against this cannot be urged what Mr. D., when discussing the subject of will worship, claims as concessions of Taylor's opposed to his own views. For here man has no principles, no previous knowledge to argue upon, no attributes of God from which he might deduce an inference that such offerings could cause him to be pleased with us.

C

1st. Neither of the terms rendered in our translation "subdue" and " have dominion" (See Ainsworth on the verse, and also the LXX) necessarily conveys a licence to take life. They simply imply man's rule and lordship, investing him merely with possession of the earth, and superiority over all created beings.

2dly. The grant was given before the Fall, in PARADISE; where we have no authority to assume, that any such rivalry could exist between man and the animal creation, as would justify him in INTRODUCING DEATH into that region of life and happiness; qr as would lead them to molest him. Hostility between man and beast is no where to be traced, till the serpent occasioned the Fall; and seems to be a notion at variance with the description of man's state.

3dly. The recorded fact (Gen. ii. 19.) of the beasts being brought to Adam to be named is positively opposed to such a notion.

4thly, If we could even consent to waive these arguments, and concede that the grant implied permission to take, in self-defence, the lives of the wild beasts, still this would be far from amounting to a permission, to take the life of an inoffensive lamb, without an adequate occasion, which occasion, as being connected with his worship, could be determined by only God-men could not presume to do it without express permission.

The argument built upon the probability (for positive proof is not here claimed) that the skins (Gen. iii. 21.) in which our first parents were clothed, were those of animals slain in sacrifice; Mr. Davison has treated with a scorn scarcely decorous, considering the high character of Dr. Kennicott: and the feebleness with which Mr. Davison has sustained his own position.

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They argue," says he, "that God would not have given the lives of the animals merely for the sake of raiment, that the skins could have been none other than the remains of sacrifice; and sacrifice