disobedience to God, all men suffered; and the only connection (excepting the indirect one to which I have alluded-the suspension of death, or the grant of long life to general obedience, comprehending attention to the established Sacramental rites) the only direct connection which sacrificial atonement has with this is, that in restoring the offender to the temporal privileges of God's favour, it gave him a pledge and hope of being ultimately restored to the eternal privileges, which had been forfeited by incurring his displeasure. The Mosaic law covenanted no more than temporal privileges, but the comprehensive terms of the charter of atonement mentioned in Levit. xxvii. 11. which though under the Law was the charter, not of the Law, but of the antecedent dispensation, the comprehensive terms, I say, of this charter seem to convey the promise of the future; viz. the restoration of that life and happiness which had been forfeited by disobedience. For as atonement unquestionably did not avert this death, and as atonement was, as I contend, the charter granted before the Law, it cannot be said that the blood was an atonement for their lives; but as it, in its sacramental connection with Christ's blood, restored them to God's favour, and thence to the hope of the restoration of that life, which disobedience had forfeited. It would appear then that sacrificial atonement, in its general, though not in its peculiarly legal character, not only could be made where life was forfeited; but was principally required because life was forfeited. As a strictly legal enactment it simply recognized the forfeiture of temporal privileges of God's protection; and was the appointed medium of their restoration.

In the third remark of Archbishop Magee, that the argument of Sykes and Taylor is altogether impertinent, and inapplicable, I fully concur. That the import both of the legal, and Christian Sacrifices was vacarious, as he has defined it, cannot, I think, with the least shew of reason, be disputed. The only point, in which I dissent from the Archbishop here, is in the sense, in which according to the tenor of his arguments, he seems to have used the term "release" in his definition.

He says, that "the offering of the animal slain in Sacrifice may be considered vicarious," as "representing the penal effects of the offerer's demerits, and his release from the deserved punishment in consequence of the death of the victim."

Now the view which this learned author has taken of the

texts we have examined, seems to rest upon the notion that Sacrifice averted the penalty of transgression; and therefore in this sense he appears to use the word "release". But it is evident, that even the purely legal atonements did not avert the consequences of transgression, but strictly speaking released the offender from them. The moment he committed the crime, he had forfeited God's favour, and he was unfit for the tabernacle service, but atonement RESTORED him to both. In like manner the general charter (before, and not annulled by the law) of atonement for life did not avert death, but led, when offered by faith, to the RESTORATION of life*. The same characteristic feature is plainly discernible in that GREAT ATONEMENT, from their relation to which, the typical offerings both before, and of the law, had derived their respective efficacy. The SACRIFICE OF CHRIST did not avert death; it procured the RESTORATION of life, and favour. "As in Adam ALL die, even so in Christ shall all be MADE ALIVE+." "The first man Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a QUICKENING (WoToLv) spirit."

The vicarious nature of Christ's Sacrifice is declared beyond all question in the New Testament. The import of terms such as these cannot be misunderstood. Την ψυχην αυτε λυτρον αντι πολλων, Matt. xx. 28. αντιλυτρον, 1 Tim. ii. 6. ελυτρωθητε. 1 Pet. i. 18. εξηγορησε, Gal. iii. 13.

In all these cases an equivalent is given for the life of the sinner, but it is an equivalent given to ransom a captive, not one that prevented, or averted captivity. The forfeit must be exacted, but in virtue of the arrivrpov, life will be restored. In contemplating the import of these expressions as applied to the great antitype of all Sacrifice, after observing the general result of sacrificial atonement under the law; viz. restoration to lost privileges; I cannot read the primeval charter of atonement in Levit. xvii. 11. running thus, To yap aμa avтe avтi 4vxns εğıλασerαι, without attributing to it the same character, which I behold distinguishing sacrificial atonement, both in its legal and temporal, as well as in its Christian and spiritual results. I cannot but look upon it as the charter of promise given before the law, but not annulled by the law, as the "sacramental memorial" the pledge, the hope, perhaps the trial, presented to the faith of fallen man, teaching him to acknow

"Thus we may observe that the resurrection of Christ, the first fruit of our resurrection, is the pledge of the ultimate fulfilment of the covenanted effects of atonement. Our restoration to that life and favour forfeited by disobedience. + Ibid. 45.

+ 1 Cor. xv. 22.

ledge his demerits, and to trust, not in his own righteousness, but in the PROMISED SEED for RESTORATION to that life, and happiness, which had been forfeited by disobedience *.

* That my views upon the import of Expiatory Sacrifice, under the law, may be opposed by Rabbinical authority, I am fully aware; but, standing, as we do, upon higher ground, and having before us the same source of information, there is no apparent necessity for placing unlimited confidence in their decisions.

But in offering an explanation, professedly differing from those of many able, and learned writers of our own Church, I cannot but feel much diffidence. Freely do I admit my desire, to look farther into this question. I am, and profess to be, not the maintainer of a long established conviction, but an earnest inquirer on a point, to which my attention has been recently directed; and on which I am anxious, that the reasonings (though, in my present judgment perfectly sound) should be farther submitted to the ordeal of public examination.

APPENDIX II.

I cannot pass without some notice Mr. Davison's observations respecting the term Awpa used by the Apostle, Heb. xi. 4. He says in his note upon this subject,

"Nor is it possible to silence Spencer's argument. For if the legal and commanded sacrifices were designated by the name of gifts, that appellation indicates some anterior or separate character. The legal command at least could not invest them with the nature of gifts. That attribute must be derived from another principle in them, viz: the principle of oblation to God. For assuredly it cannot be maintained, that sacrifices were called by the name of gifts merely because they were commanded, or merely because they were sacrifices. Whether they proceeded from God or man, the reason of that name must be sought in the intention and import of the thing. Sacrificial gifts, then, they were, and not mere sacrifices."

This reasoning, however imposing in appearance, is extremely sophistical, and not much to the point. There is no question "that the legal command, at least could not invest them with the nature of gifts." But it is maintained that they had not at all the nature of gifts, in the sense which Spencer's and Mr. D's theory requires; and that the application of the term Awpa (which is the interpretation of attributes to them no other quality, than their being delivered or dedicated to the service of God. Mr. Davison's unsupported assertion, that this appellation indicated an anterior or separate character will not carry much weight, when compared with the fact, that korban was the general name for things dedicated to God (see Outram de Sac. 81 and 82.) of which many, nay most, not only had no anterior character" but no anterior existence, till they were COMMANDED by the Law. Thus the Levites as being dedicated to God's service are called korban. Is this the expansion, and illustration of Spencer's argument which "it is impossible to silence"?

66

And what are those arguments of Dr. Magee's which Mr.

K

in

Davison has somewhat contemptuously passed by as not worth notice. He observes that the apostle " has applied the term Sapa in the same sense as he has in every other passage which it occurs throughout the Epistle; namely as referring to oblations under the Mosaic law, which consequently were the result of specific institution, and in which no one part even of the ceremonial oblation was left to the free choice of the offerer." He proves the practice of the LXX, in rendering 17 by dwpa; that Sapa being used by them in describing the offerings of Cain and Abel is naturally used by the writer of the Epistle. And (No. 61) that "being derived from signifies whatever was brought to God before the altar; whether dismissed, as the scape-goat; dedicated to the service of the sanctuary as the sacred vessels, and the conductors of the sacred rites, the Levites; or offered, as the sacrifices properly so called, which were consumed at the altar."

What arguments Mr. D. may have withheld through his apparently somewhat lofty confidence in the strength of Spencer's reasoning, I cannot pretend to determine; but till he is pleased to produce them, neither his expressed commendation, nor the additional elucidation which he seems to suppose he has given, will convince me, or, I apprehend most readers of Dr. Magee's reasonings, that "it is impossible to silence Spencer's argument," or that it is not most effectually silenced.

On the liability of this theory of Sacrifices, considered as Gifts, to the charge of absurdity, as conveying the notion of Bribes offered to the Almighty, I need not dwell, as that point has been already well handled by that able writer. I shall, however, take the liberty of directing Mr. Davison's attention to the seeming inconsistency, in which the defence of, what I cannot but term a paradox, has involved him. Both Mr. Benson (p. 239) and Mr. Davison speak of Sacrifices as gifts; but to divest them of the character of bribes they endeavour to describe them as "acts expressive of the gratitude of the offerer." But I would ask Mr. D. how that corresponds with the deprecatory character, which he has in other places attributed to Sacrifice, as for instance when he speaks of the offerer making "confession of his guilt and of the deserved penalty of his transgression, by presenting the Victim to be slain as the appropriate, but interposed symbol of his contrition and self-condemnation." (p. 22.) Was it then a gift to deprecate this penalty? If so, I say a bribe! Or was it after all no gift, but what he here describes " a symbol of contrition" &c.? Mr Davison perhaps can answer this question.

The only sense in which God appears to consider them in