Waterloo was borne by the British, the Duke's forces were composed as follows:

Total

...

25,389 British.

6,793 King's German Legion. 10,995 Hanoverian Militia.

6,303 Brunswickers.

2,926 Nassauer's.

17,488 Netherlanders.

69,894.

In this army the number of Peninsular veterans was small; the British section was made up of second battalions, or regiments full of recruits. A large proportion of the soldiers had never been under fire, and the behaviour of some of the foreign troops during the battle was extremely embarrassing.

Jurien de la Gravière makes the following remark:-" Like Wellington, Nelson, as a real Anglo-Saxon, did not dream of questioning the patriotism of a soldier well paid, well clothed, and well fed." The British soldier and sailor are not the only men who are likely to fight pluckily under these conditions, for solicitude for their well-being, when combined with good training, has ever made good soldiers of men who possess a martial spirit.

Kinglake makes some strictures on the "pedantic dislike of wild troops," "the hatred of undrilled warriors," which, he states, is so common amongst military men. He quotes the cases of the Peninsular War, of the Waterloo Campaign, and of the Indian Mutiny, in which the inadequacy of the British.

regulars had to be made up by Portuguese, Germans, and the native soldiery of Hindostan. He blames Lord Raglan for not having taken advantage of the warlike men who abounded in the Ottoman Empire in 1854, and who, when properly officered, might have enabled him to take the field with a numerous army.

As in any expedition sent across the seas, the troops which Great Britain can put ashore must be limited by the number of vessels required, no one will contest the great advantage of adding to them a body of hardy and warlike auxiliaries led by officers who are born leaders of men, who can rule them, and restrain their often too impetuous and disorganized mode of action. For all that, a country with a population of thirty-nine millions should experience no difficulty in providing soldiers enough to fight its battles.

It is a questionable policy to detail a small force for a distant expedition with the intention of augmenting it by raising a number of native levies. In several instances where this was done, though the levies were taken from the most warlike tribes, they were raised in a hurry, and had not sufficient. training and discipline to act alongside regular troops. Native levies under these circumstances are more a source of weakness than of strength; no effort, therefore, should be spared to send out a force of disciplined and trained troops in keeping with the resistance likely to be met with from the enemy.

To show with what thoroughness we should like to see an expeditionary force quit our shores, we borrow the words used by Sir Edward Creasy when reviewing the preparations made by the Athenians for the expedition against Syracuse, "The armament which the Athenians equipped against Syracuse was in every way worthy of the State which formed such projects of universal empire; and it has been truly termed 'the noblest that ever yet had been sent forth by a free and civilized commonwealth.' . . . The zeal of individuals vied with that of the Republic in giving every galley the best possible crew, and every troop the most perfect armament."

CHAPTER IV.

SECRECY AN ELEMENT OF SUCCESS.

An intended landing in an enemy's country to be concealedDifficulty in keeping preparations from leaking out-Well concealed in the expedition to Holland-Sang-ko-lin-sin disbelieves our boasted intentions-Bonaparte employs every artifice to conceal his expedition to Egypt-Rumour reaches the British Government-Nelson sent to the Mediterranean -Bonaparte sails from Toulon-Nelson is reinforced and goes in quest of the French armada-Outstrips the French and arrives at Alexandria-Bonaparte reaches Egypt-Nelson sails along the coast of Anatolia and reaches SyracuseBonaparte hastens the disembarkation-Kinglake shows how the expedition to the Crimea was dictated by our people— How England gave her plans to Russia-How the latter failed to turn our want of reticence to account-Difficulties in concealing movements and intentions have greatly increased -At Rochefort a French ship sails amongst the British fleet, escapes, and gives the alarm-Efficient measures observed in 1882.

THE fundamental source of success in all military operations lies in keeping our intentions thoroughly concealed from our adversary and from his allies. A disembarkation in the enemy's country is such

risky undertaking that every effort must be made to prevent an idea getting abroad of the purpose we have in view.

Whilst the arrangements for the mobilization

and concentration of the land forces as an ordinary and general measure of precaution will not cause any excessive uneasiness to the adjoining powers, those for an expedition by sea, being extraordinary, are liable to arouse greater suspicion. The preparations involved require to be made on such a large scale that it is almost impossible to prevent the news leaking out. At all periods, but more so in abnormal times, it is the business of diplomatists to ascertain all that is going on, and special shrewd agents are very largely employed in gleaning news.

James, in his account of the expedition to Holland, observes: "On account of the unshackled state of her press, on the activity and intelligence of her journalists, England, of all countries in the world, is the least adapted for carrying into effect a secret expedition. In this instance, nevertheless, the British Government had in a most surprising manner concealed its designs, until the expedition, which was on an immense scale, was on the eve of departure." * The same secrecy had been observed in the expedition against Rochefort in 1757. The ships had been a week at sea before the object of the undertaking was made known.

In our last war with China, Lord Wolseley † relates how some very interesting papers were found in the house of the Mandarin at Sinho. In one of these documents Sang-ko-lin-sin contended James, "Naval History," vol. ii. p. 307.

*

"Narrative of the War with China in 1860," p. 122