CHAPTER V.

THE COMMAND.

Success depends on the ability and knowledge of the naval and military commanders-Much must be left to the mutual understanding and common sense of the two-Examples of happy combination of generals and admirals-Naval commanders anxious for the safety of their ships-Expedition to Algeria -Duperre's over-anxiety-He lies inactive in the Bay of Palma-His want of knowledge of the African coast-French advance delayed through want of provisions and storesSelection of a leader-Should possess the love of his troops -Duke of Medina Sidonia-Blake-Captain DupetitThouars and the Dauphin-Military qualities of Generals Lee and Jackson-A commander should have the confidence of his Government-He needs sound judgment and promptitude in changing his plans He must venture something-Pitt's selection of officers for command-Sir John Mordaunt-Pitt selects Amherst for the command of the forces sent to Cape Breton-Pitt's selection of WolfeWolfe's services Bonaparte's early promotion - Wolfe allowed to choose his officers-Difficulties in getting Carleton nominated Quartermaster-General-Cases of commanders who have distinguished themselves at an advanced ageKinglake on Lord Raglan-The power of commanding can be acquired Unity of command-Marlborough hampered in his first campaigns-Lord Raglan and St. Arnaud in the Crimea Sir Hope Grant and de Montauban in China-The French fortunately refuse to co-operate with the British in Egypt in 1882.

In all cases of military expeditions beyond the seas there are three distinct phases, viz. the voyage, the disembarkation, and the subsequent operations. The direction of the movements of a large number of ships and of the squadron detailed to convoy them, requires the technical knowledge and experience of the admiral commanding. The second phase is a combined effort of the army and the navy, in which the general and the admiral are equally concerned; and, though in the third the former acquires the supreme direction of the operations, still he is very often dependent on the co-operation and assistance of his naval comrade.

In expeditions of this nature, much will always depend on the ability, professional knowledge, and determination of the admiral and general to whom the undertaking is intrusted. Where the task of the two services requires a great unity of ideas is in settling the most suitable locality for the landing, and in laying down the order in which it is to be effected.

If it is only a question of the best spot where the troops can be put ashore, the opinion of the naval commander may be allowed to carry most weight, for there are many points, such as the nature of the coast, the prevalence of certain winds and currents, the depth of water for anchoring a large number of ships, etc., which are essentially nautical. As there are, nevertheless, other matters to be

taken into account with regard to the military operations which will follow the landing, no hard and fast rule can be laid down on this point. It appears more reasonable, once every care has been taken to appoint two able and enterprising officers who are likely to pull well together, to rely on their mutual understanding and common sense.

There was a time when the officers of the sea and land forces cherished little love for one another, and joint expeditions often failed from want of a similarity of views and perfect concord between the commanding officers of the two services.

A glaring case, in which a disagreement between the naval and military commanders marred an operation which promised a fair measure of success, is given by Professor Laughton in his "Studies in Naval History." After having cruised with success on the coast of England and Scotland, Thurot was given six warships, with which he was directed to make a diversion in the north. The ships weighed from Dunkerque on the 15th of October, 1759. The crews were smaller than was usual in French ships, but these carried a number of soldiers for service on shore; in all about 1200 men, under the command of Brigadier-General de Flobert.

Thurot had been a privateer, smuggler, or pirate, possibly a little of each; nevertheless, he was a bold seaman and a daring adventurer. De Flobert's resentment at having to serve under him soon led to

a quarrel which was for the time smoothed over by Thurot producing the orders of the King, in proof that he was absolutely the commander-in-chief of the expedition. The breach was widened through want of provisions, and there was mutiny amongst the officers of the land and naval forces. De Flobert wanted to return to France; Thurot was loath to do so without having first attempted to do something for the honour of his country.

After having touched at several places, on the 20th of February, about midnight, Thurot entered Belfast Lough. He then urged de Flobert to attack Belfast in the first instance, and by threatening to set fire to the town to get the inhabitants to furnish stores and provisions quickly, and pay down a large contribution. After that Carrickfergus should be attacked, and the French prisoners detained there set free. The place The place being small, little money could be got out of it. The thing was to be done speedily, so as to re-embark before the English ships could receive notice of the French having landed.

attacking the smaller 21st of February he

De Flobert insisted on place first; by noon on the landed six hundred men at Kilroot, two or three miles from Carrickfergus. Carrickfergus had a ruinous castle and a garrison of two hundred recruits; the opposition was feeble, and the place soon capitulated. In return for good treatment, the town as ransom agreed to supply the squadron with provisions.

Thurot vainly pressed de Flobert to move the next day on Belfast, which was weakly protected; on the following day he reiterated his demand, stating that he would not re-embark the troops, as it would be better that they should remain prisoners in Ireland than die of starvation on board. Mons. de Cavenae had succeeded de Flobert, who had been wounded; he wrote that the enemy was mustering in force, and it was absolutely necessary to take the troops on board. Seeing that the officers would not lead the troops on Belfast, Thurot reembarked them on the evening of the 25th. Anxious as he was to get out of the bay, he could not weigh anchor till midnight of the 27th, being held back by a contrary wind. This delay had permitted the English Government to bring up a small squadron from the south of Ireland, which eventually proved the ruin of Thurot's expedition.

Professor Laughton remarks, "In point of fact this quarrel between Flobert and Thurot was an extreme instance of a case which, in the last century, and in England more than in France, rendered futile so very many expeditions in which sea and land forces were required to act in conjunction. Of these Vernon's failure at Carthagena in 1741 was perhaps the most marked and the most disastrous; but there were scores of others; and the constant recurrence of difficulties seems to point to a radically false system, and an honest misunderstanding, rather