sailed on the 5th. On the 8th he was overtaken by the British ships under steam. The British fleet and convoy were anchored at the rendezvous on the 9th; the French and Turkish convoys were anchored within thirty miles of them by the evening of the 11th. The landing only commenced in the early morning of the 14th.

If the adversary's fleet is likely in any way to interfere with the movements of the armada, it will be necessary to afford the latter the protection of a convoying squadron. From what we are able to gather from naval experts who have written on the subject, the aim of this squadron is to search for the enemy, and, by defeating him at sea, to remove any impediments that might stand in the way of the expedition reaching the intended theatre of operations. Interference can be best forestalled by boldly confronting the enemy, and not keeping too close to the mass of transports.

In quite recent times we have an example of this. In the Chino-Japanese war, Admiral Ito convoyed Marshal Yamagata's force to Chemulpho. His look-out ships and advanced squadron covered the main body of the fleet, which was concentrated and kept ready to repel any hostile demonstration.

CHAPTER IX.

SELECTION OF A SUITABLE LOCALITY FOR LANDING.

The country where a landing has to be effected is determined by the Cabinet-Secondary points to be ascertained by personal observation-Brueys reconnoitres the landing-places at Malta -All possible alternatives to be examined-A knowledge of the coast is essential-Good anchorage near the shore indispensable-Measures for obtaining information as to local obstructions-Considerations which may influence the choice of a landing-place-Ports, harbours, and open coast-Influence of the weather-Some cases in which rough weather prevented a landing-Knowledge of the prevailing winds at certain seasons of the year indispensable-Sir Arthur Wellesley's landing at the mouth of the Mondego-Sir John Moore's landing at Maceira-Landing in the Crimea-Landing in China, in 1860-Description of Peh-tang-Abyssinian expedition-Committee sent to examine the coast-Reasons for its recommending Zula-The reconnaissance to take into account the peculiarities of the climate-Natural difficulties at Peh-tang, and at Sfax-Localities favourable for a disembarkation.

As the object of a military expedition must always depend on the political aims and obligations of the Government, the country in which a landing is to be made, and the nature of the subsequent operations, are matters to be determined by the Cabinet. When the tension between two states becomes such as to indicate the prospect of having at no distant

date to resort to hostilities, the Government will naturally call on the Great General Staff to supply all the information it possesses, with regard to the power and country of the possible enemy.

However valuable this information may be, there will always be many secondary points on which information must be ascertained by personal observation. During the crisis, it may often be possible to send officers or confidential agents, men of tact and knowledge, to conduct secret inquiries; however, the suspicion and distrust which strangers are sure to draw on themselves at such a time will make their task a difficult one.

Previously to the capture of Malta by Bonaparte in 1798, Rear-admiral Brueys, on his way to Toulon from the Adriatic, sent one of his ships to Malta on pretence of getting repaired. In reality Brueys had received orders to surprise the place, where de Poussielgue had been endeavouring to form a party favourable to France. Considering the enterprise too risky, the Admiral concealed all hostile designs; nevertheless, during their sojourn in the neighbourhood, the French took soundings all round the island, and ascertained precisely every spot where it was possible to effect a landing.*

Once the Ministry have determined the preliminary points of the enterprise, the chiefs of the naval and military services will have to be invited to submit their views as to the most promising James, "Naval History," vol. ii. p. 151.

*

locality for disembarkation. There will possibly be several alternatives; these must be very carefully examined, so as to select the one which appears best adapted for the purpose, and which is likely to yield the best results.

Throwing a large body of troops ashore in a foreign country requires a preliminary knowledge of the coast. The charts and nautical works referring to a particular coast will furnish much information with regard to the rise and fall of the tide, the obstructions in the way of reefs and rocks, the description of the shore, the depth of water, and the general nature of the anchorage. Notwithstanding all this, a careful reconnaissance will have to be made in most instances to ascertain the comparative merits of the various places deemed suitable for a disembarkation.

However promising a certain locality may be for the commencement of the land operations, it cannot be considered well adapted for a large landing unless it has good anchorage. It is highly important to know what is the exact nature of the anchor-ground, and at what distance from the shore deep water is to be found. A good anchor-ground requires a combination of favourable circumstances, and is of great consequence now that steam transports, being of much larger tonnage, draw more water than the smaller ships of former times.

With the great progress made in cartography and naval hydrography, with the large number of

geographical works and records of travels, with the special staff at the headquarters of the armies, whose business it is to acquire all possible information about foreign countries and to prepare schemes for war, we may with good reason presume that the difficulties heretofore experienced in ascertaining the strength of any place to be attacked, and the most suitable localities in which a landing might be attempted on a hostile coast, have considerably diminished. To ascertain beyond doubt that the navigation close to the shore has not been rendered dangerous by the establishment of submarine mines, and to gain some insight into any special defences which may have been improvised on any special part of the coast, there is no other course open but to employ spies, or to capture some intelligent individual who may be induced to supply important local information.

The character of the coast and the nature of the country thereabout are not the only points which will influence the choice of the landing-place. The selection must further be guided by the direction of the roads and the difficulties which lie along them, by the productiveness of certain provinces and the probability of being able to turn their richness to account in maintaining the invading army, and by the prospect of securing a railway line of supply. At times political reasons may make it imperative to forego the most advantageous spot in order to land in a part of the enemy's territory where we expect