demands time, and if the conveniences are, as in this case, wanting, the operation cannot but be slow.

Looking at the probability of the insurgents deserting him in the hour of danger, Sir Arthur refused to separate himself from his ships. He had to hold to the coast for ship supplies, to avoid detailing detachments of his small force for the protection of magazines on shore, and to be in a position to cover the landing of any reinforcements.* It was only after the occupation of Lisbon, consequent on the convention of Cintra, that the British obtained a safe base of operations.

The army was unable to move until the 9th of August, owing to the defective state of the commissariat department, of which Wellesley wrote to Lord Castlereagh, "The existence of the army depends upon it, and yet the people who manage it are incapable of managing anything out of a counting-house."†

Something has been said regarding the dangerous nature of the Portuguese coast. At Maceira, where Sir John Moore effected his disembarkation, great difficulty was experienced in getting the troops ashore, and some loss of life ensued. The operations

* "I have commenced my landing, which will not be completed, on account of the difficulties of this iron coast, till either Spencer or the English reinforcements shall arrive.”—Sir Arthur Wellesley to the Duke of Richmond, H.M.S. Donegal, off the Mondego, 1st August, 1808.

+ Wellington's letter to Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State, Lavaos, 8th August, 1808.

entailed five days of incessant exertion on the part of the navy; the boats were constantly swamped by the surf, and at the conclusion of the disembarkation it was found that no more than thirty were fit for further service.

The Crimean War offers considerable instruction on many points connected with military expeditions by sea, and on the manner of conducting a disembarkation on a hostile coast. The landing in Kalamita Bay was the largest which has occurred for a very long period of years, and of which we have a good record.

The French and English Governments having rejected the alternative of carrying the war beyond the Danube, decided to transfer the seat of operations to the Crimean peninsula. In conformity with their orders, the allied commanders had to make arrangements for ferrying across the Black Sea the two armies and a small contingent of Turkish infantry.

Crimean Tartary was a country about which little was known, and the principal concern was to choose some part of the coast where the landing could be easily effected. It had been ascertained that the Russian Black Sea fleet had retired within the harbour of Sebastopol, and it was presumed that there was no prospect of the allies being exposed to an attack whilst on their voyage across the Euxine. Our men-of-war experienced no hindrance in carrying out a reconnaissance of the

coast; at first H.M.S. Fury was sent to reconnoitre and report on the most suitable places for landing an army on the north of Sebastopol. The ship went so close to the shore that it became possible to make a very comprehensive survey.* Later on, H.M.Ss. Agamemnon, Sampson, and Caradoc, in company with a French war steamer, reconnoitred the coast and sought for a landing-place. Lord Raglan, who was on board of the Caradoc, examined the coast from Balaclava to Eupatoria, and after what he saw chose as the landing-place for the allied armies the stretch of beach near Old Fort in the Bay of Eupatoria.t

Marshal de Saint Arnaud, in his journal, under date of the 11th of September, writes: "I would have preferred a landing de vive force on the Katcha, nearer to Sebastopol. I dread the five leagues we have to march before coming to water.

Nevertheless, I give in; the disembarkation

will be effected at Old Fort."

As will be seen later on, the attention of the Horse Guards had been directed to the smooth water anchorage and landing facilities which existed in the bays of Kamiesh and Kazatch. The landing on the open beach, with all its dangers from bad weather and surf, was preferred to a safer locality. Who can tell but that the vicinity of these bays to the town may not have induced Lord * Kinglake, "Invasion of the Crimea," vol. ii. p. 125. † Ibid., pp. 156-158.