CHAPTER II.

THE MASTERY ON THE SEA.

No successful landing possible without the command of the seaLessons from the last English and French war-First step to measure the enemy's strength at sea-William the Conqueror and Napoleon-What led to the success of the former -Danger of William when Harold ordered the reassembling of his fleet-Effect of the weather in a successful invasionAsclepiodotus evades Allectus's fleet in a fog-The conditions as to the command of the sea have been the same in all ages -Napoleon's scheme for withdrawing part of the British fleet from the coast-What became of it-Bonaparte's communications lost when his fleet was destroyed at Aboukir—His departure for Europe-Sir Sidney Smith-Bonaparte defeated before St. Jean d'Acre-Condition of the British and French in Egypt in 1801-Danger from the combined action of two or more fleets-Copenhagen-Superiority at sea depends more on knowledge of naval tactics and good seamanship than on the number of ships-Advantages in conveying troops and materials conferred by the mastery on the seaEvery effort to be made to maintain the superiority on that element-Lord Wolseley's remarks on the wealth of our mercantile marine.

INVASIONS of a country by sea have played a very conspicuous part in the history of the world, and have been fraught with very important and lasting consequences.

Of all the conditions necessary for effecting a

successful landing on a hostile coast, the most essential one is to possess a decided superiority over the adversary at sea.

Bearing in mind the helpless state in which a large number of fighting men are, whilst being conveyed from one country to another, an operation of this nature is most hazardous as long as the adversary has a fleet in a condition to give battle. Before embarking on such an enterprise, therefore, the first thing to be done is to form an accurate estimate of the actual extent of the enemy's power at sea. If this is such as to afford a sufficient number of vessels for the protection of his shores and to cruise about to ward off an attack, his fleet must, as a preliminary measure, be overcome or driven off, and thus prevented from in any way obstructing the landing of our forces.

Nothing demonstrates the full value of holding the command of the sea better than the wars between England and France from 1793 to 1802, and from 1803 to 1815. These wars, above all, deserve to be diligently studied, for they are full of most useful lessons.

The mastery on the sea, in so far as it enables a state to take its power for offence to a distant land, is a means to an end. It may be accepted as an axiom that nothing will be attempted in the way of a hostile landing as long as this mastery is a matter of uncertainty. The real or reported superiority of the adversary's naval forces will make a nation

very chary about engaging in such a doubtful enterprise.

No one would ever dream of comparing the military talent of William the Conqueror with that of Napoleon, although the former enjoyed the reputation of being the most renowned knight, and the most capable general of his age. Nevertheless, the Duke of Normandy was able to land his knights and archers on the shores of England, whilst the Emperor, with the whole military forces of France at his command, and with even greater preparations, was compelled to abandon his most cherished design. The narrow belt of sea which separates the two countries proved a more effective barrier to his progress than the steep and ice-covered peaks of the Alps. His brilliant military talents, by the aid of which he planted his eagles in most of the capitals of Europe, were powerless to devise means for overcoming the wooden walls of Great Britain.

William the Conqueror was successful in his invasion of England because there was no fleet to oppose him at sea, and no army to contest his landing.*

In the Hotel de Ville at Bayeux is an old tapestry which gives a representation of the invasion and conquest of England by the Normans. This pictorial history is more minute than any written history we have, and what adds to its interest is, that tradition asserts it to be the work of Matilda, wife of William the Conqueror, and her maids, who afterwards presented it to the Cathedral of Bayeux. The tapestry represents seventy-two distinct occurrences, each bearing an explanatory Latin inscription.

In the spring of 1066, in all the ports of Normandy many hands were employed in constructing and fitting ships, whilst armourers and smiths were busy preparing lances, swords, coats of mail, and other armour.

By the middle of August, William had assembled his ships at the mouth of the Dive--a river which falls into the sea between the Seine and the Orne; but for some time the winds, which have often marred similar enterprises, were adverse, so much so that his first attempt to cross the Channel ended in disaster. They eagerly embarked, and set sail" -writes Creasy-" but the wind soon freshened to a gale, and drove them along the French coast to St. Valery, where the greater part of them found shelter, but many of their vessels were wrecked, and the whole coast of Normandy was strewn with the bodies of the drowned. William's army began to grow discouraged and averse to the enterprise, which the very elements thus seemed to fight against."

Harold had assembled a fleet at Harwich, and sailed with it to the Isle of Wight. He was not ignorant of William's preparations, and was in the south, watching for the invaders, who had been expected for some time with great uneasiness. All the summer was spent in such places as lay nearest to the Norman coast, and most favoured a disembarkation, but the delay seemed to indicate that nothing would be undertaken till winter.

Another, and a real danger, however, threatened

in the north, where the Norwegians had actually landed on the British coast. Under the circumstances, Harold conceived that it would be possible for him, by a rapid march, to crush the Norwegians, and to be back in the south in time to face the Norman invaders. He accordingly led his forces to York.

The delay caused by the weather was fortunate for the Norman Duke, for not only had Harold's army quitted the south to do battle with Harald Hardrada, but his fleet had dispersed with the object of refitting and taking in fresh provisions. At this very opportune moment William made his second attempt. The wind having changed, and the weather turned fine, preparations were instantly made for the embarkation, and the Norman armada set sail, steering with a favourable breeze direct for the English coast.

In warrior-chiefs, knights, and soldiers of inferior degree, the army numbered about sixty thousand men. According to the Norman chronicle, professional adventurers and vagabonds flocked from all parts of the continent and offered their services, so promising seemed the return they were likely to reap. Thierry states that the vessels employed to convey the army from the Norman coast comprised seven hundred large sails, and more than a thousand transport boats.* In a return prepared some years "Histoire de la Conquête de l'Angleterre par les Normands," Augustin Thierry, vol. i. p. 303.