to recover from his surprise, the disembarkation must consequently be conducted with all possible rapidity, so that the enemy may be prevented from bringing up reinforcements or strengthening his position. The following case is given to illustrate the unfortunate consequences which may result from giving the adversary time to gather forces for the defence.

In the latter part of 1799, Sir Sidney Smith, to draw the attention of the French from the Turkish army then advancing from the side of the desert, attempted a landing of Turkish troops near Bogas. The boats of the Tigre first took possession of a ruined castle, situated on the eastern side of Bogas; the inundation of the Nile had isolated this castle from the mainland, leaving a passage which was fordable.

The French from a redoubt on the mainland tried to dislodge the garrison. The firing between the castle and the redoubt lasted for three days, when the magazine at the redoubt blew up and silenced one of the French 36-pounders. Orders were then given to disembark, and on the 1st of November a landing was attempted.

"The delay had given time to the French to collect a force more than double that of the first division landed, and to be ready to attack before the return of the boats with the remainder. The French advanced to charge with the bayonet. The Turks, when the former were within ten yards of

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them, rushed on, sabre in hand, and, in an instant, routed the first line of French infantry. Their impetuosity, however, carried them too far, and the fate of the day was suddenly changed. The flanking fire from the castle and boats, which had hitherto been plied with effect, was now necessarily suspended by the impossibility of pointing clear of the Turks in the confusion. The French then turned a random fire on the boats, to make the latter take them off; and the sea was covered with turbans. The Turks sent up piteous moans for assistance, which with difficulty and risk was afforded them; all being brought off, except two thousand killed, and about eight hundred, whom the French took prisoners, by wading into the water after them.”*

By seizing a favourable opportunity and acting quickly, an alert officer will be able to place his troops on shore before the enemy has time to come up. We have a remarkable example of this in the expedition sent to Java in 1811.

After the capture of the Isle de France the British Government resolved to complete its dominion in the East by wresting from the Dutch the island of Java. Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Auchmuty commanded the land and Commodore W. R. Broughton of the Illustrious the naval forces. At Malacca, in the end of May, the troops from Madras and Bengal effected a junction, * James, "Naval History," vol. ii. p. 303.

making a total of 11,960 officers and men, of whom 5344 were Europeans. On the 30th of July the fleet arrived off Boompjis island, which lies abreast of the Indramayo River on the Java coast; there it lay till the 2nd of August in expectation of being joined by some frigates which had been sent out to gain intelligence. That day the fleet had not proceeded far before the frigates hove in sight; the officer who had been deputed to reconnoitre the Java coast reported that the village of Chillingching, about twelve miles to the east of Batavia, was the most convenient place for landing the army. The ships accordingly anchored abreast of Chillingching on the 4th of August before two o'clock p.m. The spot had been so well chosen, that before dark eight thousand men were landed

The sudden approach of the fleet had kept the enemy from ascertaining the intended place of landing, in time to send a force thither to guard it. Captain Cole, seeing the necessity for rapid action, made a signal from H.M.S. Caroline for the army to disembark immediately, and took his ship close to the shore. The boats were not arrayed in any special order, but despatched as soon as filled with troops. The wisdom of this action was recognized when, soon after dark, the advanced guard had a skirmish with the enemy's patrols, as, but for Captain Cole's alacrity and promptitude in making the signal, much time would have been lost in marshalling the boats, and

this would have enabled the Dutch to take post in a wood at the back of the beach, which might have occasioned a heavy loss to the invading force.

It may appear strange to suggest that the attack should be delivered where it appears most difficult. Yet such a step has much to recommend it, for experience shows that it generally meets with success. The enemy, relying on its natural difficulties, does not guard it adequately; often the locality is entirely neglected and scarcely comprehended in the plan of defence.

To return to the attack on Teneriffe, Nelson fixed on the Mole as the landing-place for his crews. Though it was commanded by thirty or forty guns, he looked for success to the audacity of his plan; he wished to surprise the enemy by suddenly seizing the spot where he was least expected.

It is reasonable to believe that most states with a sea-board have considered all the possible points where an invader might land, and have made some preparations to meet such a contingency. These, however, may not have been made on a sufficiently large scale. To draw the enemy's attention from any desirable spot demonstrations should be made in other places, advantage being taken of the moment when he is off his guard to put the troops ashore.

The application of steam as a motive power has added immensely to the possibility of effecting a successful surprise on the open beach. It has

multiplied an invader's chances, owing to the promptness with which advantage can be taken of any neglect or indecision on the part of the opponent. Steamships lend themselves to this, for a demonstration can be made with a portion of the forces to rivet the enemy's attention to a false locality, and, as soon as this object has been attained, the steamers can withdraw and rejoin the rest of the armada more speedily than the enemy's troops can march on land. The transports which contain the troops which are to be landed last are those which should be employed for this ruse; they will answer a better purpose than in being simply kept riding at anchor.

At the landing in the Crimea, the 4th Division of the French army, commanded by General Forey, was ordered to execute a demonstration to divert the attention of the Russians. This demonstration was composed of five steam frigates or corvettes (French) and three British warships. In the neighbourhood of the Alma there was a camp of about six thousand or seven thousand Russians, on which the British ships and the Caffarelli opened fire. The French troops were embarked in boats and rowed to a distance of a hundred and twenty yards from the shore, as if intending to land. The Russians did not return the fire, but struck their camp and moved further inland. The allies then moved towards the Katcha, where the scouts only discovered two Cossack posts; they then steered