however great, would overcome the tenacity of their sailors, if led by men who knew how to inspire them; and the people of the Confederacy might well have felt that the victory would never be theirs." *

It was said, many years before, of the Highland clans at Culloden, that in great attempts it is glorious even to fail; and certainly there is very much truth in Sir Walter Scott's exclamation, "Never talk to me about brave blood being shed in vain; it sends a roaring voice down through all coming time."

If the enemy is near, a commander should not simply content himself with landing the troops, but should lose no time in moving forward to attack him. Historians have justly condemned the inaction of the Persian commander in one of the earliest invasions by sea (490 B.C.) of which we have a fair record. Datis disembarked his army, and encamped on the plains of Marathon; his galleys, according to the custom followed in those days, were drawn up on the shelving beach. Notwithstanding that the Persians were far superior in number to the Greeks, Datis remained inactive, and surrendered the initiative to his adversary.

Five out of the ten Athenian Generals voted for holding the strong position overlooking the plain of Marathon, arguing that it afforded great advantages to a small force against the masses of the * H. W. Wilson, "Ironclads in Action," vol. i. p. 17.

assailants. Miltiades counselled a bolder course, and induced Callimachus, the War-ruler, to give the casting vote in favour of an attack of the Persian host.

The only reason adduced in explanation of Datis' want of enterprise was that there were at that time machinations going on amongst the Athenian partisans of Hippias. To place greater trust in treachery than in the valour of his troops was highly blamable in a commander who led an army then deemed invincible, and which, in several encounters with Greek troops, had invariably beaten them. The terror which the resistless career of the Persian arms inspired was a great element of success; but this was wasted in the hope of securing a bloodless conquest.

In 1799 Said Mustapha Pasha threw away his best chance of success. At the time of his arrival at Aboukir, in July, Marmont had in Alexandria only eighteen hundred troops of the line and two hundred sailors of the Nautic Legion. The Turkish commander first directed his attention to a redoubt held by Captain Godard, and to the little fort of Aboukir. Having captured these, he disembarked his forces; but, instead of marching boldly on Alexandria, he began intrenching himself in the peninsula.* This gave Bonaparte ample time to repair to Alexandria, and to gather sufficient troops for an attack of the Turkish works. James, "Naval History," vol. ii. pp. 296, 297.

Landing almost at the same place, Abercrombie, notwithstanding the losses he sustained in getting his troops on shore, advanced on Alexandria as soon as most of his war materials and stores had been disembarked. Anderson states, "The fort of Aboukir was summoned to surrender before we proceeded; but, on its refusal, a party was left to reduce it, as the General did not wish to detain the army a moment from the important purpose before us."

END OF VOL. I.

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