question as it occurs, and should only resort to hostilities after mature consideration, when it is found utterly hopeless to attain some end of great national importance in any other way.

An expedition by sea need not necessarily lead to a landing on a hostile shore, it may only be the sending of a large reinforcement to protect some weakly-guarded frontier, or a demonstration of power with the object of staving off an attack.

In all that relates to the power of a nation for offence and defence, the governing authorities are always in need of the advice of the naval and military experts. Without it they may either rush into a war for which the resources of the country are inadequate, or may abstain from upholding a given line of policy by forming too low an estimate of its fighting strength. In every case, therefore, in which the relations with a foreign power are strained, the first step must be to form a correct appreciation of the military possibilities involved; this cannot be done without obtaining the opinion of the officers who are responsible for the preparations for war, and whose duty it is to watch and gauge the power of other nations.

The decision to resort to war must be the result of the conclusions formed by the political body to whom the interest and honour of the country have been especially confided. It is natural, however, to suppose that when this important step is taken, after a close and intimate interchange of views with

competent and experienced naval and military officers, the Government is able to anticipate that a series of naval and military operations will have some prospect of compelling the adversary to accept a peace which will ensure the settlement of the question at issue.

Having formulated in a general way what are the national interests to be defended, or the aggressive undertakings which are most likely to inflict the greatest injury on the enemy, the chiefs of the naval and military services must again be consulted to see how the ideas of the Government can best be carried into effect. All that relates to the number of troops to be employed, to their composition, to their equipment, to their conveyance, and to the general plan of campaign, requires a larger amount of military knowledge than the generality of statesmen possess, and must be left for the consideration of the combatant officers of the State. In other words, the means for reducing the enemy's naval and military forces to impotence, demand a thorough investigation by men who have made war the study of their lives.

It is from them that the Cabinet must demand a very well-studied and argued exposition of the advantages and disadvantages which the several possible alternatives may offer. When Philip II. threatened to invade England, Elizabeth consulted all the most able ministers and military men respecting the defence of the country. In Tytler's

words, "These councillors were chosen by the Queen, as being not only bred to arms, and some of them, as Grey, Norris, Bingham, and Grenville, of high military talents, but of grave experience in affairs of State, and in the civil government of provinces-qualities by no means unimportant when the debate referred, not merely to the leading of an army or the plan of a campaign, but to the organization of a militia, and the communication with the magistrates for arming the peasantry, and encouraging them to a resolute and simultaneous resistance."*

In a thorough consideration of the question it is not sufficient to gauge the strength and the resources of the adversary and the possible attitude of its allies, for there are other points which must have more or less influence on the course recommended. It will be, for example, necessary to ascertain the nature of the climate at different seasons of the year; the condition and direction of the main roads; the prospect of finding an abundant supply of grass and forage for cattle, of water, of fuel; the general characteristics and disposition of the population and the assistance or resistance we can expect to meet with on their part.

Experience shows how carefully every particular should be investigated. In 1854, the expedition to the Crimea left too late in the year. Even on the

voyage across the Black Sea there were indications

Tytler's "Life of Raleigh."

of this. Referring to the night of the 11th of September, Sir W. Russell wrote, "The night was fine, but the sharpness of the air told of the approach of winter. Two heavy showers of hail, which fell at intervals in the morning covered the decks with a coating of ice a couple of inches thick."

We are bound to go deep into all these and

other details; many will be found amongst the records of the Naval and Military Intelligence Departments; others must be obtained through political and special agents, travellers, or traders, whose business has called them to reside in or visit the countries in question. As a ruling principle, nothing in the way of information should ever be neglected, for who can ever tell what light an observant individual may throw on any unknown circumstances or doubtful points?

We are very often guilty of neglecting local experience. In discussing the expedition to Algeria, 1830, to which the older naval officers were opposed, the French Minister of Marine had the good sense to seek information from those officers who were well acquainted with the African coast in several seasons of the year, and who had special experience of the question under debate. Baron d'Haussez sought the advice of two naval officers, Captains Dupetit-Thouars and Guay de Taradel, both highly qualified through having for two years taken part in the blockade of the Algerian coast. The first was the officer in the French navy who knew most

of the city of Algiers and the littoral, of which he had made a special study.

Before getting involved in offensive action a Government must not only become thoroughly convinced of its necessity, but must see that the preparations are made on such a scale as will offer every prospect of the operations leading to a successful termination. In every contest both sides have to submit to heavy sacrifices, and, as long as the honour and interests of the country demand them, these burdens must be borne with resolution. No important or lasting advantages can ever be reaped by resorting to half-measures; to obtain results proportionate to the cost and waste of life incurred we must not only strike quickly but must strike strongly.

The most promising plan having been accepted, the Government becomes responsible for the general direction of the war, and the officers selected to command are responsible for the management of the naval and military operations. Instances have occurred in which this distinction was not observed, and in which the former, having gone beyond their proper province, and having attempted to dictate how the campaign was to be conducted, have given an unfortunate turn to the course of the operations.

We have an example of this when the Earl of Nottingham laid down the course which Lord Torrington was to pursue in 1690, and ordered him to bring the French fleet to action—just the thing