At

course. Both fleets approached cautiously. about five minutes to 12 o'clock the Japanese could clearly make out their opponents, and soon after Admiral Ito signalled his instructions to his captains. The Chinese fleet, opened fire, ship after ship, to which their opponents did not reply till they were three thousand yards from the centre of the Chinese line.*

Lissa and Yalu are the only two naval battles which have been fought since the introduction of the ironclad. At Lissa the Austrians sunk two of the Italian ships and completely disabled a third; at Yalu the Japanese sunk five of the Chinese ships, and so injured another as to render it henceforward useless. In both instances, after a decided advantage had been gained, and when the enemy's fleet was within their grasp, the victors restrained from annihilating their opponents.

It is a remarkable coincidence that, in both of these recent sea battles, the fleets had been connected with the conveyance of a landing force; at the Yalu, however, the Chinese were not shackled by its presence. At Lissa it was still with the fleet, but, as Albini, who had eight large ships mounting four hundred and twenty guns, took no part in the action on the 20th of July, the transports ran no danger. In both cases it is surmised that it was a want of ammunition which brought the

The details of this battle are fully described in chapter xxi. of Mr. H. W. Wilson's "Ironclads in Action."

contest to an abrupt end; this, however, is not a sufficient reason, for the defeated fleets were not likely to have been better off. The fight at the Yalu lasted till 5.30 in the evening, and possibly, with wearied crews and short ammunition, Admiral Ito may have considered a night action dangerous. Whatever reasons may have influenced his decision, the Chinese fleet was able to retire to Port Arthur unmolested.

Though by the battle of the Yalu the Japanese had asserted their mastery of the sea in Chinese waters, the five transports which had proceeded up the river and landed the troops, were able, four days after the action had been fought, to return to Taku in face of the victorious Japanese fleet.

When we compare the small size of the British Islands with the vast extent of our empire, we should be the first to recognize the great importance of the command of the sea. The Empire of Great Britain has been created by it, and, as there are British interests of one kind or another at every place where the sea touches land, the nation should not consider any effort to maintain the mastery on the sea too costly a sacrifice.

It is too evident that unless the British fleets are supreme at sea the Empire must crumble to pieces. The mastery on the sea means the possession of an invincible navy, of a navy which has either gained a decisive victory, or such a succession of victories as to render the prolongation or renewal

of a struggle hopeless. In default of these victories, for there are often long periods of peace, no effort should be spared in maintaining the thorough efficiency and spirit of the navy, so that the attained superiority of the nation on the seas may be generally acknowledged.

After all the British navy had accomplished, and with all its commanders trained in many years of war, the British in 1812 could not boast of the mastery on the seas. Certainly, in the war with the United States there were no large naval battles, but in the small engagements that occurred the Americans had the best of it. Possibly our past triumphs had made us careless, or it may have been the superior build and picked crews of the Americans that told. Anyhow, the fact remains that the United States ships always had the chances on their side in a combat. According to a naval writer, the American frigates—to which England refused that name-could throw nearly eight hundred pounds of iron in a broadside, the English frigates only five hundred; they had crews about one-third larger in number than those of the ships they captured; they were also of greater tonnage and had thicker walls.

The dominion of the Athenian Republic depended on her empire of the seas, and, though it is stated that the citizens of that small state of an age to bear arms did not average more than thirty thousand, as Creasy observes, Athens could only

VOL. I.

G

have acquired her dominion "by devoting and zealously training all its sons to service in its fleets." The full value of the mastery on the sea was thoroughly understood by the ancient rulers of the world. In the words of their greatest orator, 'Qui mari potitur eum rerum potiri "-Who is master of the sea is master of everything.

Referring to the multitude of transports gathered in the Gulf of Pechili, for the Chinese war of 1860, Lord Wolseley remarks: "No collection of men-ofwar in one spot could impress foreigners with the fact of our power or greatness afloat nearly so much as that immense display of our mercantile marine in such an out-of-the-way place. Fleets of war exhibit the metal wrought up and finished for immediate use; but in our vast merchant service we have the inexhaustible mine from whence the ore is drawn. Other nations may have the former upon the breaking out of hostilities; but after a couple of years' war, and the losses consequent thereon, from whence can they recruit? Sailors cannot be made in one voyage, and until other nations can compete with us in their mercantile marine, we may rest assured of having ever our existing preponderance at sea. sea.”

* "Narrative of the War with China in 1860," by LieutenantColonel G. J. Wolseley, p. 85.

CHAPTER III.

PREPARATIONS.

Expeditions across the seas need thorough preparation-All captains have devoted attention to this-Waste in warDistance from national base adds to other difficulties-Distinction between peace work and preparation for war not always observed-Want of preparation in 1854-Carrion Nizas on the plan for the campaign of 1796-Senior staffofficers not to be wasted on routine work-Plenty of leisure in peace to prepare for war--Former wars and expeditions contain a wealthy store of useful lessons-Standing army is an insurance for peace-Preparations for war must be continuous-Must possess finality-As little as possible should be left to chance-Preparations in expeditions across the seas are more necessary than in other cases-The French fleet unprepared for war in 1870-Preparations should include a study of the intended theatre of operations-Want of information about the Crimea-Our disdain to pry into the enemy's circumstances-Lord Raglan's letter on scantiness of information-Sir Edmund Lyons' conception of the expedition-Allies ignorant of the defences of Sebastopol-Sir E. Creasy's remarks on the perseverance of the Athenians -Preparation of reserves-Kinglake on the waste of the Ottoman forces in 1854.

AN expedition across the seas differs from other military operations, inasmuch as an army does not step over a frontier or advance from a selected base of operations, but is thrown into a hostile