Imatges de pàgina
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tions in the book this only was introduced with the triumph of demonstration; but I have done with it, and hasten to the fourth section to take care of some observations of my own.

SECTION IV.

1. His lordship complains that I impute to him that he supposes barely receiving the sacrament to be the test required by those acts. To which I have this to say, that it appeared to me from his language and his reasoning in this case that such was his supposition; nor has he now produced any words of his own not consistent with such a supposition. However, as this matter does not affect the cause, but is personal between his lordship and me, it is not worth prosecuting; and if I have mistaken his meaning, I beg his and the reader's pardon. 2. I had affirmed that the test lies chiefly on these words in the act, 66 according to the usage and rites of the church of England." His lordship takes notice here that I had a small interval of good sense, which held long enough for me to utter one word which spoiled the whole observation. The observation was, that barely receiving the sacrament was not the test; and I must wait for another interval of good sense before I can apprehend how this observation is spoiled by saying that the test lies chiefly on the rites and usage of the church of England in receiving.

I add that " every man, as a Christian, is supposed to receive the sacrament somewhere," and infer that " barely receiving the sacrament is no test of any affection to the ecclesiastical constitution of this kingdom." His lordship says, "this is making the legislature suppose what is absolutely and notoriously false; for it is manifest that there are many professed Christians who receive not at all." I answer,

1. It is a known maxim in law, that every man is supposed to do his duty till the contrary appears.

2. I say that every man, as a Christian, is supposed, &c. ; and I still think that a man cannot be considered as a Christian without supposing him to receive somewhere. And this his lordship saw, when instead of my words he chose others, and replied that many professed Christians do never receive.

3. His lordship's reasoning here is founded on the common mistake that runs through his answer, "that the legislature were to consider the principles and practices of every single man;" whereas their view necessarily led them to consider only the principles and practices of the several divisions of Christians among us, and from thence to infer what would be the most probable test to distinguish a churchman from dissenters of all sorts. In this view the test is proper; for it is the principle of all sects that their way of administering the sacrament is the true way; and if there be a sect who are in principle against receiving at all, they can no more receive according to the rites of our church than according to any other rites.

4. This justifies the second supposition found fault with by the bishop, namely, "that no man would receive in such a manner but a member of the church of England." The ground of this supposition, namely, "that a man ought not to separate from a true church of Christ settled in the country he belongs to, or join in communion with those who do;" is as old as Christianity; and I am willing to allow that our legislature were intirely unacquainted with his lordship's new principles of church communion with opposite churches, and consequently that they had it not before them to provide against them. But I must remind him too that there was no sect then, nor is there now, (whatever may be the case of some particular men of all sorts,) who owned such principles; and I have already told his lordship that general laws respect general circumstances, and are not founded on the particularities of individuals; and if it be just reasoning in his lordship to say "that these laws were

not intended to exclude sectaries, because some sectaries will comply with the laws;" it will be just as strong with respect to the abjuration oath; and it must be allowed that the law enjoining the oath was not intended to exclude the Pretender, because some men (as we are often told) have found ways of reconciling the oath with strong inclinations to bring him in.

2. Another observation which I made, and am now to answer for, is, "that receiving the sacrament is not the qualification for an office within the intent of the act, but only the proof of it. That the qualification to be proved is good affection to the ecclesiastical establishment.”

1. His lordship's first remark here is, that receiving, &e. has no relation to an esteem of the whole ecclesiastical constitution this has been already considered.

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2. In his second he tells us, "that it may, he thinks, be called an undeniable proposition that the real inward disposition cannot possibly by any human law be made a qualification for any office."

The reason given for this is, that it is not possible to judge of real inward affection, which I cannot allow to be true. There are many ways to judge of it: all that is true, is only this, that we cannot judge of it infallibly; and true it is also, that human laws do not reach to infallibility either in this or any other case moral probability and assurance is all they pretend to; and as Aristotle observes in ethics, so is it in government, that is true which is so ènì Tò πoλú.

3. His lordship's next argument is, that affection to the established church is not the qualification required in these acts; because he who performs only the outward act of receiving, &c. is duly qualified according to the acts, whether he be friend, or a professed enemy to the church established. I beg leave to repeat what his lordship ought to have taken notice of, "that the word test is a relative term, and always respects something that is to be testified." The outward act of receiving required by these laws is required as a test; the question then is, what is the thing to be testified? His lordship must either affirm that these laws require no test, and that all the world has been under a mistake from the making of the acts to this time; or he must say that they require a test, but without intending that any thing should be testified by it. His lordship's present argument only shows that human laws may be easily evaded, which will never amount to a proof that they have no meaning. Try the argument in other cases, and see how it will do. Whoever, be he friend or enemy to the church, performs the outward act of subscribing the articles, of declaring his assent or consent, &c. is qualified by law for a living; the laws therefore requiring such subscriptions and declarations, have no intention to keep such as dislike our articles or service, and are enemies to the church, out of livings; but their only true intent is, that men should perform these outward actions merely as outward

actions, and by so doing be fully qualified for offices in the church, and this equally whether they be friends or enemies to the church.

But is it not, you will say, true in fact that they who perform the outward acts required by the laws, are in the eye of the law qualified for an office? I answer, it is true.

Was it not likewise the intention of the legislature that such should be reckoned duly qualified? I answer, it was their intention. But still this will not do his lordship's business; for it remains to be answered as plainly on his side-for what reason did the legislature make choice of these outward acts rather than any other, and lay all who were to be in offices under an obligation of performing them? Was it mere humor that led the parliament to this choice, without respect to any purpose that was or could be served by it? Whenever his lordship thinks fit to answer these questions, he will answer his own book; in the meanwhile I desire it only of the reader to try if he can answer them consistently with his lordship's principles, and the arguments made use of by him in this case.

4. His lordship's next argument is the same with that which went before, excepting only that he is so bountiful as to argue with me on the supposition of the truth of what I assert, namely, "that receiving in the church is required by the legislature as a probable mark of affection to the church." And yet this being allowed, we are still told that the material outward action is the qualification in the intention of the lawmakers that is, allowing the sacramental test to be required only as a sign by the legislature, yet it is the qualification for an office, not as a sign, but merely as an outward material action or in plainer words, it was the intention to require it as a sign, yet it was not the intention to require it as a sign, but as an external act, without regard to its significancy. I am very sorry this argument did not stand with its fellows under the title of demonstration.

But to show the sophistry of this reasoning, we need only consider the difference between the primary intention of a law and those intentions which attend it merely in order to attain the main end. In the present case it is the primary intention of the law, that only such should have offices as are well affected

to the church. To compass this intention, it is necessary to settle what shall be taken as a proof of such affection, and to limit places to such only as give such proof. This being settled, it may be said (which is what his lordship says) that it is the intention of the law that all who give the proof required should be capable; but then this intention is evidently subservient to the main intention that only the well affected to the church should be capable; and it is very absurd to suppose any inconsistency between this intention of the law, and that which is the main and primary intention or ultimate end of it. What his lordship farther adds under this head, that an enemy to the church is qualified by law when he has done what the law requires, amounts only to this, that men may defeat the end of a law, even whilst they comply with the letter of it. His lordship declares, I know," that the letter of the law is the law, and they who perform all that the (letter of the) law of men requires, obey the law of men." The contrary has always been held as an undoubted maxim, with respect to all laws human and divine; and it has been the agreed sense of divines and lawyers, and of all men of understanding, that the true sense and meaning of the law is the law, even in opposition to the letter of the law. What will his lordship say to hundreds of texts even in Scripture? Must we, according to the letter, rejoice evermore, and pray without ceasing, and yet mourn with those who mourn, and every man do his own business, working with his hands? So in human laws: does he who subscribes the declaration against transubstantiation according to the letter of the law, and yet believes it; or he who renounces the pope in the words of the law, and yet firmly adheres to him and his claims; do these men obey the law whilst they defeat the intention of it? Let the world be told this plainly, and we shall soon have an end of this controversy; a controversy that cannot subsist without the support of such principles as confound and destroy all the laws of God and man.

To proceed

His lordship's original charge against these laws was, that they were an abuse of the sacrament, that they "turned it aside from its original and natural design, to a purpose against its own nature," &c. Having shown, from a true state of the

SHERL.

VOL. V.

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