Jews? Did he not read in the very next verse that the pharisees called on Christ to rebuke the disciples' for what they said? How could he be so shameless as to give this for evidence, that the Jews were in a good disposition, which proves so undeniably that they were in a bad one?

The author of the Trial observed that notwithstanding the story propagated among the people, that the disciples stole the body, yet in all the persecutions raised against them on several pretences, as of heresy, sedition, &c. they never were charged with any fraud in the resurrection. He observed too that the Christian faith, being grounded on the truth of the resurrection as the basis and foundation of the whole," the thing for which they suffered was the truth of the resurrection." "So then," says this smart writer, "the chief priests never so much as charged the Apostles with any fraud in the resurrection, but they put them to death because they believed it."

I wish this writer loved trifling less, or that I liked it better, for at present it is too hard work to follow him. But I submit, and desire him to say whether every man that does not believe the story of the stealing the body by the disciples, must necessarily believe the resurrection; if not, then surely the chief priests might, consistently with their notions, persecute the Apostles for preaching the resurrection, though they did not charge them with stealing the body, or any fraud in contriving the resurrection.

The evidence of the Spirit in the signs and wonders wrought by the disciples in confirmation of the truth of their doctrine, was insisted on in the Trial; and I refer the reader to it, since the Considerer has made no reply to it. He says, "in this age we have almost lost it, except amongst the disciples of the inspired Mr. Whitfield, who has blown up a new light of itand has ventilated it by his bellows." What can be done with this profane buffoonery! I am sorry to see it; and if the author is not quite obdurate, I wish he may come to such a temper of mind as to be sorry for it too.

When the Apostles were brought before the chief priests and the council of the Jews, and preached to them the resur rection, Gamaliel, one of the council, said, if this be the work of men, it will come to nought; but if it be of God, ye cannot

overthrow it." From this passage the author of the Trial argued that Gamaliel could not possibly have said this, or the council heard it with patience, if they had believed the resurrection a cheat, and that the disciples had stole the body. The argument was too strong for the Considerer, and therefore he questions the truth of Gamaliel's uttering these words; and for fear that should not be sufficient, he says, "Gamaliel might be so much a philosopher, as well as a scholar, to dissuade them from rigid persecution." How his philosophical notion of persecution comes in here is hard to say; one would think he was dreaming of persecution and talking in his sleep. The question is, how Gamaliel could make the supposition that the resurrection might be the work of God, if he knew it to be the fraud and cheat of men? What has his notion of persecution to do here? Besides, if Gamaliel knew the Apostles to be cheats, would his philosophy about persecution incline him to spare cheats, who (if they were cheats) were guilty of forgery and perjury, and every other crime necessary to carry on such a fraud?

The case of Agrippa, and the argument from it in the Trial, is much of the same kind. The Considerer supposes Agrippa to mean that Paul was mad, and says, " he had told Paul before he was a madman." Agrippa never did tell Paul so. The Considerer, I suppose, mistook Agrippa for Festus. It was natural for the Roman soldier, who knew nothing of the Jewish prophets, when he heard Paul appealing to them, to say, much learning had made him mad;' but to put these words into Agrippa's mouth, who was bred up in a regard to the prophets, is quite out of character, as well as false in fact.

SECTION IV.

We have now gone through the Considerer's exceptions to the evidence of the resurrection, and to the defence of that evidence in the Trial of the Witnesses; but the business is not yet over. The Considerer has one argument still in reserve, which, were there any thing in it, would strike at the credit of reve

*Acts v. 38. 39.

+ Acts xxvi. 24.

SHERL.

VOL. V.

lation in general. He had given his opinion of miracles incidentally in several parts of his book, but at the conclusion he endeavors to support it at large. He thinks, "that miracles of any kind are impossible and exclude all evidence; that they are an absurdity to common sense and understanding; that they are inconsistent with the reason of man and nature of things; that they contradict all that mankind calls truth and reason; that they are contrary to the experience and reason of all mankind, and utterly impossible."

I shall discuss this point with him, and see what reason he has thus to dogmatise in opposition to the general opinion of all mankind in all ages of the world.

For the possibility of the resurrection, I must do the reader the justice once more to refer him to the Trial of the Witnesses; where he will find this point stated and explained in such a manner that no man, that is less a sceptic than the Considerer, can have any doubt about it. The Considerer has made a show of answering this part of the Trial, without stating the author's argument, without seeming to understand one word of the scope of it, and without citing one sentence fairly. So far as that author is concerned, it is sufficient to say in his own words, what is the real truth," that he has said nothing on this occasion than what any man who never saw ice might say against a hundred honest witnesses, who assert that water turns to ice in cold climates."

For the reason and possibility of miracles in general, I shall now beg leave to talk with him. He is very frank in declaring his opinion with regard to this point, and I have laid it before the reader in his own words. Nothing can well be stronger than the language in which he has expressed it. He seems plainly to declare that miracles are not only impossible in a moral, but in a physical sense; that they are not only inconsistent with the moral attributes, but impossible even to the power of God.

But be this as it will. I shall take the arguments as he himself has stated them, and examine them by the rules of common language and common sense. He has indeed so involved himself in words, that when he has a meaning, it is not easy to come at it. Reason, right reason, truth, and the na

ture of things, are words of great weight in the apprehensions of most men. Let us see what place they hold in the Considerer's estimation. "What conceptions any man frames to himself of the course of nature from his own experience and observation, are not prejudices and imaginations; but what sense and reason are concerned about. This is the very foundation of that right reason, which can never contradict the truth of things." In the first edition it stands thus: "this is the very foundation of right reason; and reason formed from hence can never contradict the truth of things."

If every man's notion of the course of nature is the very foundation, &c. of right reason, then right reason varies as much as people's notions of the course of nature. It is then right reason that says the sun goes round the globe, for this the vulgar reckon to be the course of nature. It is right reason also, to say the sun is fixed, and the planets move round him; for this appears from the experience and observation of astronomers to be the course of nature. But how absurd is it to

make right reason depend on the notions which men entertain of the course of nature; when it is the very office and business of reason to rectify the errors which men perpetually fall into in the judgments they make in this case. Experience and

observation show that a cane half in the water and half out is crooked; but reason, on the principle of true science, informs us otherwise. Here then experience and observation are on one side, and reason on the other; and the same conclusion holds true in a thousand instances, and every instance indeed where men make a wrong judgment of what they see. And the fault in this case does not lie in the experience and observation, but in the reasoning on them. Thus men do not err in their observation when they say that water never grows solid in hot climates; but they err in reasoning on this observation, and concluding that the case can never be otherwise. That men die and come not to life again here, is a true observation; but will this observation prove that it can never be otherwise? We see by observation the effects of the course of nature, but this course of nature depends on causes removed out of our sight. Observation shows how these causes operate generally,

but cannot show that they are immutable, and must operate invariably in every instance.

But let us see how he reasons the point of miracles. Take the proposition as it stands, with the reason annexed. "Things asserted which are contrary to the experience and reason of all mankind, and what they know of the law and usual course of nature, (that is, miracles,) are to the common sense and understanding of man utterly impossible." must rectify the proposition before we come to the reason. In the first part, which is intended as a description of miracles, the Considerer assumes too much; a miracle is indeed contrary to common experience and the usual course of nature, but why contrary to reason? If by reason he means right reason or truth, it is supposing the very thing in question. If he means the faculty of reason, it will come to the same thing, supposing that faculty to be rightly used, otherwise it is nothing to the purpose.

With the Considerer's leave then, I shall expunge the word 'reason,' (which will not injure the argument,) and the proposition will stand thus: "things asserted, which are contrary to the experience of all mankind, and to what they know of the laws and usual course of nature, (that is, miracles,) are, to the common sense and understanding of men, utterly impossible." Now comes the reason; "because such assertions contradict all men's notions of such laws that are known by experience," That is to say, things contrary to experience are impossible, because they are contrary to experience; or things contrary to what men know of the laws of nature are impossible, because they are contrary to what men know of the laws of nature. This is what the Considerer calls giving a

reason.

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But I cannot yet part with the proposition. Miracles, it seems, are to the common sense and understanding of men impossible." How are we to understand this expression? Does he mean impossible to the reason of men, or impossible to the conceptions of men? Impossible to the reason of man they are not, because the reason of man tells him there is a being who originally gave laws to matter, and regulates the