The Bishop of Bangor's proposition is this: "the example of our Lord is much more peculiarly fit to be used to slaves than to subjects." The author of the letter says, with respect to this proposition, that the bishop's sense is, "that the example of Christ is more properly urged to slaves than subjects, in the second chapter of St. Peter." He says again, "the dispute, as I said, is, whether this example be more properly urged on those who are called subjects, in ver. 13. or those who are called slaves, ver. 18." He affirms a third time; "this is not the question," (that is, whether the example of Christ be fit for all,)"but this,—whether in this chapter of St. Peter the example of our Lord Christ be more naturally and properly urged on, and applied to the people mentioned in ver. 13. who are subjects, or to those mentioned ver. 18. who are slaves or servants? This is the matter in question." On this state of the case he says very justly, "that whichever way it be determined, nobody's ears need to tingle at it."

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I desire this writer now to consider that his exposition is inconsistent with the bishop's words, which do not affirm with respect to St. Peter, " that the example of Christ is more peculiarly urged (by him) to slaves than to subjects," but do affirm with respect to the nature of the example itself, 'that it is much more peculiarly fit to be urged to slaves than to subjects." It is true that the dispute he is there engaged in began about the example as urged by St. Peter; but then both sides argue from the nature of the example, in order to limit the application of it by St. Peter, and not vice versa. I desire this writer to attend to the bishop's own account of his adversary's view in arguing from the nature of Christ's example, p. 61. (how truly he represents it, I inquire not:) "but the example of Christ, say you, is more peculiarly fit to be urged to subjects than to slaves; therefore consequently, this passage (in St. Peter) in which that example is urged though directed to slaves, yet was designed peculiarly for subjects." Here the reader cannot but observe that the nature of the example is urged (by the bishop's own account) in order to fix St. Peter's meaning, and therefore with respect to the example the dispute was, not what in fact it was applied to by St. Peter, but

to what it is in its own nature more peculiarly applicable. The paragraph in the bishop's book, from whence the quotation in dispute is taken, begins thus: "it is so far from being true that his example was more peculiarly fit to be recommended to subjects considered as such, than to slaves (considered as such,) that I think the very contrary to be evident." The contrary proposition to which is what he has truly and fully expressed in the words which I quoted. And in all this long paragraph he does not once argue from the example as applied by St. Peter, but defends his proposition on general topics; such as our Lord's humiliation, being compared by himself to that of a servant; St. Paul's representing him in the same manner, when he says, he took on him the form of a servant;' silence of Scripture, which never compares our Lord's state to that of a subject; the circumstances of his last sufferings, &c. From the nature of the example thus fixed, his lordship makes two observations. The first is, that the difference between the condition of subjects and slaves is so great, that the Apostle St. Peter must be supposed to distinguish them. The second is, "that the example of our Lord is much more peculiarly fit to be urged to slaves, by whose condition he is pleased frequently to describe his own low estate, than to subjects, whose condition is never used to that purpose," &c.

And he concludes this paragraph thus: "this I say (that is, the patient suffering of our Saviour) is particularly proper in their case, (viz. slaves,) for this reason, because he is said with respect to his lowest and most miserable condition to have taken on him their form," &c.

So that here the matter in question plainly was, not this,how St. Peter had applied the example; but this-to which of the two cases the example in its nature was more peculiarly applicable.

And now let the author of the letter consider whether he has not greatly mistaken the true state of the question; whether the occasion I had to express my great dislike of this passage was so very slight; and whether himself has taken the pains requisite to set the reader right, and to leave him as impartial as a reader ought to be when he would judge aright."

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I am sure I have a great deal of reason to wish for my own sake that this writer had read with that impartiality which he has expressed so much concern to preserve to others; and that every reader may see that I had no design to lead him wrong, I will give him the true reason which drew that observation from me.

I did it then to give an undeniable instance of the bishop's running into extremes through opposition, and to induce the reader to consider the true ground on which the present controversy with the bishop stands; for this is the case in almost every article of it; his lordship, not content to oppose what is wrong, suffers his zeal to carry him into very unjustifiable ex

tremes.

Thus :

1. Because some have laid too much stress on a regular succession of the clergy, and confined the validity of the gospel institutions to it without allowing for cases even of necessity;

Therefore his lordship not troubling himself to consider what regard ought to be paid to a regular succession, and what not, calls it in contempt, "the invention of men," " "vain words," "niceties, trifles, dreams."

2. Because some have claimed such a power of excommunication as is indeed inconsistent with the terms of the gospel, and the reason of man;

Therefore his lordship, not concerning himself to show the true use of excommunication in the church of Christ, and thereby to shut out all false claims, exhorts all Christians to act, "without any regard to the outcries of human terror, or the solemn denunciations of any men on earth;" and represents human benedictions, human absolutions, human denunciations, human excommunications, as human engines permitted to work for a time (like other evils) by Providence.

3. Because some claim an unwarrantable power to the governors in the Church over particular members:

Therefore his lordship, not endeavoring to show the just limits of church power, declares there is no power in the church, "that no one of Christ's subjects more than another

hath authority to judge, censure, or punish the servants of another master, in matters relating purely to conscience and salvation."

4. Because some claim an unjustifiable authority to impose articles of faith, and their own interpretations of the Scripture for such, on the Christian people :

Therefore his lordship, not considering that many Christians cannot read, that more of them cannot read the Scriptures without an interpreter, affirms, with respect to all Christians equally, that the Scriptures in necessary points need no interpreter.

5. Because the authority of the magistrate in matters of religion has been often abused, and persecutions have been carried on by the pretence of it:

Therefore his lordship, not endeavoring to state the just limits of the civil authority in this matter, affirms that there is no such authority; and that "if any men on earth have a right to add to the sanctions of Christ's laws-they are so far kings in his stead, and reign in their own kingdom, and not in his" that is, as he explains it himself in his sermon, they so far take Christ's kingdom out of his hands, and place it in their

6. Because it had been urged to the bishop that temporal encouragements, when rightly applied, do promote true religion :

Therefore his lordship, rather than allow temporal encouragements, when applied in the best manner, to be of any service to true religion, frames a new definition of religion on purpose to throw out temporal encouragements, and affirms that the "belief of another world is what alone renders our best actions religion, from whence they flow, and from whence, when they do not flow, they cease to be religion." †

I call now on every reasonable man to judge whether I had not sufficient and great occasion to make the observation I

* This passage was fully considered in an Answer to a Letter sent to the Rev. Dr. Sherlock; of which the bishop, in his Answer to the Report, has not thought fit to take any notice.

† Answer to the Report, p. 152.

did, of his lordship's being carried into extremes through opposition; and whether I was to blame for choosing an instance out of a controversy of his lordship's, in which I had no hand, and therefore the less prejudice; an instance which appeared to me so flagrant, that I no more thought the bishop would justify his assertion, than I did that he would accuse me of calumny for producing his own words.

But his lordship knows best how to manage his own part of the controversy: if it is for his advantage to draw the eyes of the world from the merits of the cause, and turn them to personal matters, he may go on complaining either with or without cause. Were I to recriminate, I too could give a catalogue of abuses that have been cast on me by his lordship and his friends; but I do not think fit yet to trouble the world with them, and therefore will only give one instance of his lordship's charity towards me, which I should be glad he would explain : I had said "that the Convocation cannot, if they will maintain the trust reposed in them, be silent under such an attack on the rights of the Christian church and the Christian magistrate."* What says his lordship to this? Why truly he says nothing to the trust reposed in the Convocation, but speaks of some particular trust reposed in me; and says, "I do not at all doubt the truth of what you say, that you could not have been silent in Convocation on this occasion, if you would maintain the trust reposed in you.Ӡ

In the first place I had said nothing of any trust reposed in me particularly, and therefore his lordship is very injurious in representing it to the world as if I had. Secondly, his lordship here allows that I acted according to the trust reposed in me; but he complains often of the Lower House of Convocation for treating him ill, and therefore not according to the trust reposed in them; from which it is evident that his lordship's intention here was to charge me with a private underhand trust; and indeed he took care to fix his meaning so as not to be mistaken by any reader; for he “ I will never suffer on any says, account in the world any such trust to be reposed in me as can

* Answer to a Letter sent to the Reverend Dr. Sherlock. + Postscript to Sykes.