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the Union with Great Britain. 8vo. Is. Jordan, Smith. The Speech of Patrick Duigenan, L.L.D. in the Irish Houfe of Commons, on the Subject of an Incorporating Union - between Great Britain and Ireland. 8vo. Is. 6d. Wright. Thoughts on the English Government. In a Series of Letters. Letter the Third. 8vo. 25. Wright. Morality united with Policy; or, Reflections on the old and new Government of France; and on various important Topics of civil and ecclefiaftical Reform. By Robert Fellows, A. B. of S. Mary's Hall, Oxford. 8vo. 2s. 6d. White.

Strictures on the Afiatic Eftablishment of Great Britain. By William Playfair, Author of the Political and Commer. cial Atlas, &c. 4to. 128. Murray and Highley.

Tenth Report of the Society for bettering the Condition and increafing the Comforts of the Poor. 8vo. Is.Hatchard, Rivingtons.

The Twenty-eighth Report of the Select Committee on Finance to the House of Commons; with the Appendix. 8vo. 2s. 6d. Symonds, Clarke, Portugal Street.

The Speech of the Hon. C. J. Fox againit the Addrefs to his Majefty, approving of the Refufal to enter into a Negotiation for Peace with the French Republic; with a Lift of the Minority, &c. 8vo. Is. Jordan, Smith. Peace or War! Which is the beft Policy? By Peter Brady Crols, Elq. of Lincoln's Inn. 8vo. IS. Bickeritaff. A Letter addreffed to the Hon. Charles James Fox, relpecting an inaccurate Quotation of the Annals of the French Revolution" made by him in the Debate in the House of Commons the 3d of February. By A. F. Bertrand de Moleville. 8vo. 15. Hookham, New Bond Street.

Sermon.

The predicted Stability and Permanence of Chriftianity, illuftrated with hiftoric Teftimony: a Sermon, delivered at Salters' Hall, November 3, 1799, to the Supporters of the Sunday Evening Lecture at that Place, and published at their Requeft. By Thomas Morgan. 8vo. 18. Johnton. Caution against the Philofophy of the Times. A Sermon preached before the Synod of Glenelg, July 17th, 1799. By John Macleod, D. D. Minifter of the Golpel in Harris. 8vo. Is. Print

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Theology.

Funeral Orations pronounced at the Interment of Henrietta, Duchefs of Orleans, and Louis of Bourbon, Prince of Condé. B. Boffuet, Bishop of Meaux. Tranflated from the French. Second Edition. Small 8vo. 29. Clarke, New Bond Street.

A Funeral Ora ion on the late Sovereign

Pontiff, Pius VI. By the Rev. Arthur
O'Leary. 8vo. Is. 6d. Keating,
Booker.

Remarks on the Prefaces prefixed to the firft and fecond Volumes of Dr. Geddes's Tranflation of the Bible. By the Rev. John Earle. 28. Smal: 8vo. Coghlan, Booker.

Confiderations on the Book of Genefis, in a Series of Letters, humbly addref fed to the Righ Rev. Father in God, Richard Lord Bishop of Landaff. 8vo. 38. 6d. Pitkeathly. Reformation-Truth restored: being a Reply to the Rev. Charles Daubeny's Appendix to his Guide to the Church: in a Series of Letters to Mr Daubeny. By Sir Richard Hill, Bart. M. P. 8vo. 4s. Cadell and Davies. Letters to a Prebendary; being an Anfwer to Reflections on Popery; by the Rev. J. Sturges, L. L. D. By the Rev. John Milner, M. A. F. S. A. 4to. Ios. 6d. Robbins, Winchefter; Cadell and Davies, London. An Apology for the Disbelief of revealed Religion; being a Sequel to Sober and ferious Realons for Scepticifm, &c. By John Hollis, Efq. 8vo.

A Call for Union with the Established Church, addreffed to English Proteftants. By George Ifaac Huntingford, D. D. Warden of St. Mary's College, Winchefter. 8vo. 45. 6d. Cadell

and Davies.

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH SESSION, OF THE EIGHTEENTH PARLIAMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN.

HOUSE OF LORDS.-Jan. 28, 1800. LORD Montford took the oaths and nis feat, upon his acceffion to the

title.

The Order of the Day for taking into confideration his Majesty's Message having been read,

Lord Grenville faid, that although the prefent queftion was as important as any which ever came before the Houfe, it would be unneceffary for him to dwell upon many particular points, as they had fo often been difcuffed, recognized, and approved. The Correfpondence, how ever, alluded to in the Meffage, rendered it requifite for him to enter somewhat at large into a review of the conduct of our enemy, to fhew how far any reliance could be placed upon profeffions, or whether we were likely to obtain any advantages or fecurity by a Peace. In the firft place, while the fame principles were perfevered in which had actuated every fet of men who had been in power from the commencement of the Revolution, which principles went to overturn every regular form of Government, it was im poffible we could be benefited by a Peace; and as the first Note profeffed to originate from men of different fentiments from the former Directors, he thought the official Note fent in anfwer gave them an opening to prove they profeffed different principles alfo, and thereby to make one fair Rep towards a Negociation; but inftead of this, their fecond Note was a complete attempt to justify every action, even of the most abandoned of their Revolutionary Governments, and to throw the odium of the War upon this country, when even the man who now was their Minifter, and wrote this juftification, knew the contrary to be the fact; and he would prove this beyond bare affertion.-The much talked of Treaty of Pavia was a glaring forgery, and he pofitively knew not of any Convention at Pilnitz; at leaft none was ever figned or countenanced by the British Cabinet: indeed directions to prevent any fuch Treaty had been fent over to our Minifter there. Of. this Monf. Talleyrand was perfectly aware; for it was a curious fact, that he at that time acted in conjunction with Monf. Chauvelin; nay, he was named in the commiffion fent over by the unfortunate Lou's as the Bishop of Autum Ed. Mag. March, 1800,

fo to do, and actually brought over the Meffage wherein that unfortunate Monarch was made to exprefs his thanks to our Sovereign, whom he then poffibly began to look upon as a protector, for his declining to take any part in fuch a Convention; and yet this fame Talleyrand attempts to defend now what he then knew to be falfe. In this fecond Note a Sufpenfion of Arms is propofed, but that he thought more objectionable than even the entering into a Treaty ; to France indeed fuch a measure would be of the greateft advantage-it would immediately open all her ports, and thereby affift her Commerce: it would enable her to receive a fupply of Naval ftores, to re move her fleets to fuch places as the fhould confider the moft advantageous for the renewal of hoftilities, and even to provide fuccours for her armies. But of what benefit could it be to England? Her fleets were not blocked up in ports; we were in no dread of attack; we had no invafion to apprehend; our Commerce flourished, and our merchants' hips were no longer captured: France might there fore with to fufpend our hoftility, while from her we had no mifchief to apprehend. In examining their fincerity, his Lordship obferved, they had always profeffed a great regard for Peace; and yet it was a fact, that fince the Revolution they had been at War with every Power but two, Sweden and Denmark, in Eu rope and even towards those they had acted with fuch repeated aggreffions, that their Minifters had at this time been ordered to quit Paris. I was by her Treaties and Sufpenfions of Arms that they had been enabled to fpread their devaftation, both of which they broke through the moment they faw it would be to their advantage. This led him to trace through the different Treaties which the Directories had entered into, from a lift of them which had been published lately in France. Having ftrongly animadverted on thefe, his Lordhip again adverted to the papers on the table, in the fecond of which, he faid, what was there tranflated, "Affailed on all fides, the Republic could not but extend univerfally the efforts of her defence," gave by no means a full idea of the French phrafe, which he confidered as conveying in the French idiom, a more diabolical Ff

principle

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principle than any suggested by the vileft and rankeft Jacobin; for the meaning went to this effect, that if they were af failed by one man, they were authorized to wreak their vengeance on the most innocent; fo that, in fact, if they were at Peace with England, fhould they meet with any aggreffion in Turkey, they would feel themfelves warranted to retort upon this country; a principle the moft vile that ever could enter into the mind of man. From this, his Lordship took notice that the principal leading feature held out as fecurity for the Peace, was, "the many proofs the Firft Conful had given of his eagerness to put an end to the calamities of War, and his rigid obfervance of all Treaties concluded."This remark rendered it highly neceffary to inveftigate a little the character of the man upon whom so much reliance was to be placed. First, as to the personal conduct of Bonaparte-As to his difpofition for Peace, and his peculiar love for maintaining Treaties, it was not fafficient to take this merely on the affertion of the party himself, which requires the evidence of facts, and the refult of ex perience. Look back to his hiftory! Here is a man who has borne a diftinguifh ed part in all the tranfactions of the laft three years, and let us fee whether he is a man who defires the reftoration of Peace, and a difpofition to preferve Treaties. It was at the mouth of the cannon that he enforced the Conftitution of the third year; that very Conftitution which he has now at the point of the bayonet abolished. The moment he was placed at the head of the Army, the moft attrocious attacks of the French Republic were made upon Piedmont by this very man. If the King of Sardinia is attacked, it is by Bonaparte; if Tufcany be invaded; if Leghorn be feized and laid under contribution; the armiftice broken; Parma ravaged; if Venice be firft dragged into the War, and afterwards compelled to receive terms of Peace, and then bound hand and foot, and delivered over to Auftria (though, to protect her from that Power, was an oftenfible reafon for entering her dominions ;) who, he would afk, was the principal promoter of these events, but the prefent Firft Conful of France? If that refpectable old man the Pope was hurried from his country and connections, we know by whofe authority and influence they acted who were the chief agents in this event. By whom alfo was the Conftitution of Genoa overthrown?

By whom was the Invafion of Switzerland prepared and executed; but by the General felected by Bonaparte. Even the violation of the Treaty of Peace made with the Cifalpine Republic was promoted unter the fame aufpiees. If we pafs from Italy and the Continent of Europe, and follow this Obferver of Treaties to Malta, there he is feen fledfaft to his plan of making unprovoked feizures: from thence invading and taking poffeffion of Egypt. What his conduct has been in that quarter is well known. Paffing over the injuftice of the original attack, it is fufficient to contemplate the horrible cruelty of the maf facre at Alexandria. At the very moment when he was feizing upon Egypt, he declared to the Ottoman Porte that he had no defire of invading that country, whilft to his own Generals he declared quite the reverfe. Need to all this be noticed his vile apoftacy, blafphemy, his profeffion of the Muffuman Faith in his Manifefto, where be ftated, "We Frenchmen are true Muffulmen," and which is followed by the moft horrid blafphemy against the Founder of the Cariftian Faith. We have feen him, in the Intercepted Correspondence, advising his General (Kieber,) to amule the Ottoman Porte with propofals for Peace, in order to gain time, without any intention of fulfilling the conditions which might be entered into. In the inftruc tions given to this General, we find him faying, "you may fign the Treaty, but do not execute it; of fuch importance is it to retain the poffeffion of Egypt.". This Treaty hall either be executed or not at a time according to circumftances. And now we find Negotiations attempt ted with England, firft to amufe Eng land, and then, if liftened to, calculated to give offence to the Allies of this coun try. Such is the line of conduct which Bonaparte has uniformly adopted. During the recent tranfactions, Bonaparte has done nothing to redeem his character. He trufted that he was not too flow of heart to believe, if he hesitated to give full credit to the affertions of fuch a man, efpecially, when he found how his prin ciples were indentified with thofe of the former Rulers of France, and that he took fo large a fhare in the former politi cal tranfactions of that country: and he could not fuppofe that he had wholly a bandoned his former principles. But it might admit of another enquiry, whether fecurity in negotiating a Peace could be found in any regard he might have for

his own intereft? Perfonal intereft and ambition were, he acknowledged, powerful ties; but had this country even fuck fecurity in the prefent inftance? It bad, indeed, been faid that this confideration alone ought to balance ali the diftruft which other circumftances may create, and might obtain complete fecurity. But he found but little fecurity from obtining a Negotiation, unlets it led to Pace. He had the wn that Bonaparte had an interes in the conclusion of a Sufpenfion of Arms. It might be a contrivance to fave the effufion of Republican blood, but not to prevent that of Eng ifhmen. By opening a Negotiation, the spirit of this country would fink; it would infufe diftruft and jealoufy into thofe Powers who looked up to this country, and it would diminish our means of future exertion. His Lordship concluded a fpeech of three hours, by obferving that he had heard it afferted out of doors that it was advilable to enter into a Negociation, for fomething might be gained, and if it broke off, you were but where you began; but fuch doctrine, he trufted, would not be maintained in that House, because it was by no means the fact, as he had already fhewn, by the advantages France might at this moment obtain by a fufpenfion of hoftilities. Taking it, therefore, in every point of view, he trufted their Lordships would confider the anfwer as perfectly agreeable to the circumftances, and unite with him in an humble Addrefs to his Majefty; (which Addrefs was, as ufual, an echo of the Meffage.)

The Duke of Bedford began by obferving, that if he had not felt the prefent queftion of the utmost importance to the country, he fhould not have troubled the Houfe; but feeling as he did, he could not do less than give the Addrefs which had been moved his moft decided negative. His Grace then went into a general reply to the arguments ufed by Lord Grenville; obferving, how ever, that he did not mean to defend the conduct of the Rulers of France fince the commencement of the Revolution :-a3 foon would he undertake to defend the conduct of the Partitioners of Poland, or that of his Majefty's Minifters.-The reflections upon Bonaparte he thought ill-timed, and he was rather furprised at their having been made, because they could not poffibly answer any good purpofe. He treated the idea of re-eftablihing the ancient line of Monarchy in France, as the moft chimerical idea that

ever entered the mind of man; it went to nothing short of an eternal War; for did their Lordships confider that their were now near 2,000,000 of perfons in that country that held their poff ffions for a tenure of a date nor antecedent to the Revolution; of courfe, if the return of the ancient Royal Family was to be attended with the return of the ancient Nob eff, what an interefted and strong oppofition muft continue to be made to it. Was it not poffible, if Royalty fhould be their choice, that another family might have the preference?-The whole of the reafons adduced by the Secretary of State against entering into a Treaty of Peace at prefent, his Grace contended, applied at the time his Majesty's Servants fent a Minifter to Lifle, and another to Paris; and therefore, if they were ferious then, they could not have any rational reason for declining at the prefent moment. Having noticed the leading obfervations of Lord Grenville, his Grace faid, that during the little time he had taken a part in the difcuffions in that House, he had found that all his efforts had been exerted in vain, and he could not even flatter himself that he should be more fuccefsful on the prefent occafion: there was every appearance that their Lordships would be againft him as they had been before, and he muit fuppofe the People were so alfo, becaufe although, as he had ever contended, they had been deprived of many of their pri vileges, yet they poffeffed the power to addrefs his Majefly and Parliament; and as no fuch addreffes had appeared, it was his duty to believe they were fatisfied; but if that was really the cafe, he muft believe they were so from an implicit confidence; and therefore he muft entreat their Lordships to paufe, before they came to a refolution; for equal to the confidence of the People must be the refponfibility of that Houfe: it was poffible that another mite might be drawn from their hard earnings; but it fhould be recollected that they were now beat down with the heavy burthens of taxation, and it was incumbent on that House to preserve them from falling, for it might be beyond their power to raise them again; and, in his opinion, they would then either fink into flavery, or a Revolution would be the confequence; and France was too recent an inftance of the dreadful effects of a People affuming to themselves the power of governing: for his part, fhould he find he had been, as ufual, unfuccefsful in obtaining any Ffa

weight

weight with their Lordships, he should retire from troubling them any more, and endeavour to beftow thofe comforts in the small circle of his connections, which it would have been his ambition to have procured for the country at large. Before, however, they decided against what he should propofe, he wished them to look at their means for carrying on the War: the old mode of raifing money had for two years been abandoned; a new fyftem had been then adopted; the firft plan was rejected, and he underflood the fecond was to be more ftrongly enforced. Thofe of their Lordships who went into the country, muft be fenfible what would be the effects of fuch a measure: at prefent you could not go into a wood without tracing the depredations of neceffity; and if you paffed through a village, you were befe by the cries of children, the diftreffes of their parents not being able to teach them to bear want in filence: befides this, those who acted as Magif trates must have frequently met with a very common cafe of an appeal from a lufty countryman against the parish of ficers, for not granting him relief-hey fay he is ftrong and healthy, and ought to work for his family-what is his reply?It is true I am ftrong and healthy, and it is equally fo that no man works harder than I do; but instead of getting comfort after my day's work, I am dif treffed by the cries of my children, my earnings not procuring fufficient to fatisfy their wants. Such, he faid, were his principal inducements to give his decided negative to the Addrefs moved by the Noble Secretary of State, and to propofe that which fhould have Peace for its immediate object. His Grace then of fered an Amendment, which, from his exhaufted condition (having fpoken nearly an hour and a half,) was read by Lord Holland. The Amendment ftated the various declarations of his Majefty's readiness to treat with the enemy at feveral periods fince the War, and concluded by expreffing it as the opinion of the Houfe, that there was, in the prefent inftance, no objection fufficient to prevent our entering into a Negotiation with the French Republic.

The Earl of Carlisle spoke to order. He thought it unprecedented that one Noble Lord fhould read in part the speech of another Peer.

The Duke of Bedford denied that it was part of his fpeech which had been read. It was merely the Amendment which he offered to the Addrefs.

The Lord Chancellor admitted that what had been read was no part of the fpeech of the Noble Duke.

Lord Boringdon then rofe. A great part of what had fallen from the Noble Duke, he contended, was either irrelevant or had been anticipated by the obfervations which had fallen from the Noble Secretary of State. The queftion was, in his opinion fimply, Whether we should continue the War until we were perfectly affured of our fafety? The late extraordinary Revolution had certainly vefted the fupreme power of France in the hands of a moft extraordinary man: but as his power was recent, it was uncertain how long it might be retained. We fhould not therefore rifk, by any hafte or impatience, the placing of ourfelves, perhaps, at the mercy of fome new Ufurper, or foine new faction. Our fir answer to the Letter of Bonaparte contained an intimation "that we should not treat but in concert with our Allies;' but to this he had not deigned to return any answer. Let it be fuppofed, then, that we had actually concluded a Peace with the exifting Power in France; we may afterwards find that we had left the flames of War alive on the Continent→→ that we had infufed diftruft and defponds ency into the minds of our Allies-and that we had hazarded all our prefent advantages only for the purpose of expof ing ourfelves to fome new jacobin infult. The perfonal character of the new Conful, he muft alfo obferve, formed no fmall part of the prefent queftion. That character was perfectly understood in this country. Was it to be fuppofed that the attainment of fupreme power could of itfelf change the nature of Bonaparte? Could it be thought that it could make him more regardful of the expenditure of human blood, fupprefs the treachery of his difpofition, or cure him of his ambitious projects? He had been but a month inftalled in his new powers; was it not right to wait until we saw to what ufe they were converted, and to attend until we were better affured of their ftability ?

Lord Romney declared that he should not vote on the prefent queftion. The Earl of Carlisle poke in favour of the Addrefs.

Lord Holland was for the Amendment. The Earls of Carnarvon and Liverpool, and Lord Auckland, fupported the Address; when the question being called for,

The Lord Chancellor faid, he should take

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