do, without embarking in any intermediate scheme for the deliverance of Europe!-He concluded with wishing that the energy of this country might be directed to the interest of Great Britain, and not be wasted in visionary projects of ideal conquests. To himself it would always be a consolation to reflect that he had lifted up his voice, unsupported and feeble as it was, in the cause of patriotism and truth.

be attributed to a false impression on his mind of the conduct of ministers in former negotiations: he seemed to retain a confused recollection of what had passed at Lisle; he remembered that an embarrassment had been thrown in the way by a question about allies, but utterly forgot that the allies, who had created this embarrassment, were the allies of France, and not of Great Britain; and under this mistake he was applying to this coun try a cure for the misconduct of the enemy. Yet, Mr. Canning said, he was prevented from admitting even this foundation for the proceeding, by the approbation expressed of the manifesto published, at Lisle, which Mr. Tierney had acknowledged exhibited undoubted proofs of the pacific disposition of the ministers. Yet what had been that gentleman's conduct under this avowed belief? Convinced (as he himself expressed) that his majesty had done all in his power to obtain peace-that he had exceeded all that could have been expected of him in forbearance and moderation

Mr.Canning arose, and in a speech ofconsic erable length re-stated most of those objections which Mr. Tierney had anticipated, but not in his opinion removed. On the first, Mr. Canning said, he was not inclined to lay the greatest stress (constitutional form); the nature of this motion, though extraordinary, was not unprecedented; much less did he mean to deny the right of the house of oommons to offer its advice to his majesty on the subject of negotiation or of war. It had several times interfered in both; though a fatality had always seemed to attend these interferen ces, as almost in every instance from the revolution to our own time, they had been either nugatory or mischievous. But, whatever might be the force of precedents, these alone would not be sufficient to justify the motion, unless it could be proved that some necessity existed which called for such an interference of the house of commons. And this could only arise from some opening for peace now presenting itself, of which ministers did not show themselves disposed to take advantage, or from their having evinced a disposition hostile to it at former periods.

That any such opening now existed, the hon. gentleman had not urged; his motion therefore must

that he had displayed, even after the victory of lord Duncan, the most decided dispositions for tranquillity-convinced that the abrupt conclusion of the negotiation had been the act of the enemy-that his majesty had no choice, and must of necessity carry on a war which the ambition of France would not allow him to terminate-in this conviction Mr. Tierney had voted against the supply! He meant not to impeach this conduct; doubtless he had his reasons for it; but he submitted it to the judgment of the house, whether (if no solid advantages were derivable from supporting this extraordinary motion) it was worth while to adopt an unnecessary and mischievous measure

the Porte to be considered as powers on whom no teliance could be placed, and from whose exertions no advantage could be gained? Are the errors of the guilty to furnish ground of presumption against the innocent? The words in his majesty's speech, mentioning "the vigour and decision of the Öttoman Porte," seem to have conveyed something obviously absurd and ridicalous-he could not imagine for what reason. Why should not the Grand Seignior take as correct a view of his interests, as any other power whose customs might be more conformable to our own? The declaration of the motives which had actuated the Porte was as able and masterly a composition, as sound in principles of policy and justice, as any state paper ever published by any cabinet.

But this Tork was a Mahometan, and therefore an ally unfit for a Christian. For his own part, he thought an alliance with a Mahometan might be as good as a peace with an atheist; the sanction of its engagements be as sacred, and is stipulations as likely to be fulfilled. Yet this was not all: the Turk was slow to anger, hard to be driven into action. If such were his character, what must have been the provocations that had roused him!

But the Turks and Russians were natural enemies:-what did this prove, but that the aggressions of France had been so multiplied, so various, and so extraordinary, as to unite against her those powers the most opposite in nature and interest -to make the necessity of resistance, and the duty of self-preservation, supersede every narrower consideration, every motive of contracted policy?

can be made, no good reason be alleged why they should be more worthy our confidence, or true to their own interests: yet, had we not known individuals in our own country whose ideas respecting France had totally been changed? Had not the invasion of Swisserland, the swindling transaction with America, and the negotiation at Lisle, wrought a surprising change in the public mind in England? And why should we limit the benefits of experience to our own countrymen only? Might not the statesmen of Austria or Prussia have caught some light from the proceedings on the continent? Were they not to be believed, if they made this declaration; and whatever engagements had formerly subsisted between them and the directory, when they detected the fraud which had been practised on their judgments, and the atrocity of their allies, they withdrew their friendship and their allegiance?

Mr. Canning dwelt long upon the credit which was due to this penitent retraction; it would be the interest of England, he said, to profit by any future offers of co-operation from such quarters: they had suffered, and in the school of affliction had learnt wisdom.

But, however willing they might be to seize a favourable opportunity for shaking off their yoke to France, were we even able to rally them on our side in the onset, their assistance was worth nothing. Exhausted and dispirited as they were, they had neither the heart or strength to fight the battle of independenceand too true it was that they had been cruelly reduced and broken down-yet

Spoliatis arma supersunt.

B 4

ing

ing were arms most terrible to tyrants-their wrongs, their desperation. and the desire of revenge! Let France appeal to the bad passions of our allies-let her cajole their fears, or inflame their appetite for aggrandizement - the foundations of our tacit alliance with the allies of France were already laid in their just resentment, in their proud indignation, in every virtuous and every honourable feeling!

When did such a contest terminate in giving permanent preponderance to evil? Another and a graver doubt was started: Whether, with half the world in arms at our side, the objects which we strove to obtain would be in any politic sense British objects? There was a time when any doubt, whether the situation of the powers of the continent relatively to us, or to each other, and the balance of Europe, were objects of British concern, would have been ridiculed and reviled. But all this was now changed, it seemed therefore, without stating any affirmative opinion of his own, he would only inquire of the gentlemen on the opposite side of the house, what were actually such?

:

Mr. Tierney had alluded to the expedition to Egypt, as having threatened our possessions in the East. Was then the deliverance of Egypt from a French army a British object? Was not the cooperation of the Turk desirable to enable us to effect this purpose? If, by the joint assistance of Russia and the Porte, we could sweep the Levant and the Mediterranean of the remains of this piratical armament; if the coasts of Italy were thus rendered unassailable by the enemy, and the southern parts of France thus laid open to our attack, and the ports and commerce secured to

us; were these British objects? Were the Netherlands? There was a time when the dependence of these upon France was considered as so prejudicial to this country, that there was no case in which they would not have been thought a sufficient cause for engaging in a war. He did not pretend to say it was so; but such had been the opinion of their importance by able politicians. If, by the aid of Prussia, we could rescue Holland from her present state of servitude and degradation, raise her once more among the independent powers of Europe a rich, flourishing, and a happy country, connected with us by old habits, common interest, and the reciprocation of commercial advantages; would any person deny that this was a British object, or be proud hereafter to have thrown an insuperable impediment in the way of its accomplishment?

If, then, any one of these might possibly be attained by our foreign alliances, much more if we could suppose it would open á passage to all, was it not surprising that a member of the British parliament should entertain so perverse an ambition as to be able to say hereafter, "All this might have been accomplished, but by my single motion to prevent it?"

Yet he was far from undertaking that, if the motion did not pass, our ardent wishes would be accomplished. The debate was not, whether such exertions would lead to such results, but, whether we should throw away the only chance we bad for their being made? The hon. gentleman had not affirmed that Europe could not be saved; he only desired that we might give no encouragement, have no share in saving it! It was not necessary to argue whether the success was pro

bable,

bable, but whether it was so improbable as not to deserve the experi

ment

Was this motion intended as a motion for peace? If so, why had he not the candour to say so? Was it delicacy or national honour which stood in the way of direct negotiation? For himself, he had no such delicacy, and did not approve it. Mr. Tierney would not speak to France, but at her; he had not proposed that we should boldly say to the directory," Will you make peace?" but say, loud enough to be overheard by it, "I wish these French gentlemen would make an overture to us."

Was this a mode of preserving the dignity of our country? or, was it not doing that sneakingly, which, if it was fit to be done at all, must, to have effect, be done openly, unequivocally, and directly?

But the ministers had lost all their pacific dispositions, and were become inveterately and incurably warlike: the spirit of moderation in the last manifesto was evaporated; and however they had borne the tidings of lord Duncan's victory, that of lord Nelson had intoxicated them to madness. That the confi dence of the country was high, that the government partook of the spirit of the people, he was happy to acknowledge; but that this spirit bad started suddenly out of the late victory he would not allow : confirmed it was, indeed, by a triumph which must have created enthusiasm if it þad not been there. Let the days and months of anxiety be recollected which we passed before the intelligence of this memorable event ar rived. We asked not that Nelson might conquer Buonaparté, but that Buonaparté might not deceive and escape him; not that we might gain

the battle, but find the enemy; for the rest we had nothing to fear.

"Concurrant pariter cum ratibus "rates,

"Spectent numina ponti, et "Palmam qui meruit ferat!"

In our present situation, then, fortified by confidence, prosperity, and the success with which it had pleased Heaven to bless our arms, what was the advantage we ought to make of our strength? "Hoard it up for your own life," said the hon. gentleman. Could an Englishman forget that the nations of the continent stood by whilst we were engaged in a struggle wherein our very existence was at stake? They neither offered assistance, nor manifested any interest in our preservation." Undoubtedly this had been their conduct, and undoubtedly revenge was in our power. We might tell those who had abandoned us, that it was now our turn to breathe, whilst they were contending; that, as they had left us contentedly to our fate, we would consign them unpityingly to theirs. We might thus act in strict retaliation; but a British house of commons would feel that it had a nobler vengeance in its powereven to say to the nations of Europe, "You deserted us at our ut most need; but the first use we make of our prosperity is to invite you to partake of it! We disdained to call you to share our danger, but we are now by our own exertions secure; come and take shelter under our security."

This would be real triumph; this would be powerful recrimination, and a conduct which would immortalise the country!

Mr. Canning ended with remarking,