Our author is clearly of opinion, that a sinner, when he is 'at length imperfectly doing his duty,,' is 'working out a title to the favour of God' (p. 225.); and he strenuously advocates the restored use of the term 'merit,' in this relation. Nay, he would ascribe to such a course the character of atonement; and would not 'scruple'-he thinks hardly any man would,'-'to urge a sinner to endeavour, through God's grace, to make amends and atone for his sins, by living well for the time to come.' (p. 225.) Our author treats likewise of faith; but of faith in Christ, in what may be called the evangelical sense of the term, he knows nothing. What his views are on this point, will appear by the following citation :

That the moral will to please God, or to obey him, or to base our wills on his, or to act accordingly, (all which forms of expression mean only the same thing,) must in all who know and acknowledge, or have the means of knowing, his power and goodness, be absolutely necessary to the being accepted or saved by him. But the having this will is the having faith, in that sense of the word faith in which only it is directly available to the rendering us acceptable in God's sight.

That all to whom Christianity is revealed, and who receive it, can be saved only if Christians; that is, if they add to their faith (or confidence) in God, faith also (or confidence) in Christ'-pp. 180, 181.

We do not know that we need do more, in order to present an effective general view of the system advocated by Mr. Penrose. To the great bulk of our readers, the mere exhibition of it will suffice to secure its rejection, as another gospel, which is not another'; but, as much is doing at the present time to give currency and prevalence to sentiments substantially resembling it, we shall take the opportunity of making a few observations.

We begin by remarking, that we are not to be understood as defending all whom our author assails, or as identifying ourselves with the entire phraseology which he condemns. When he cites divines, who represent the death of Christ as an inducement or motive with God to forgive sins, we concur with him in deprecating the use of such language as incorrect and incautious, and as adapted to conceal that aspect of divine love to sinners, which undoubtedly beams most gloriously in the atonement. But the same effect does not result from regarding the blood-shedding of his Son as laying a ground on which God may consistently forgive; or, (according to the language of Dr. Wardlaw, quoted by our author), as enabling' him to do so. And this sentiment we must firmly maintain.

6

We have no difference with the writer before us, as to the fact that the atonement of Christ is both adapted and designed to produce a moral effect upon the mind of the sinner. Undoubtedly, the most melting and persuasive considerations which

can possibly be conceived arise out of the communication of the 'unspeakable gift;' and they constitute, not only a part, but a very important part, of the means employed by an offended God to reconcile the world unto himself. Mr. Penrose, however, maintains, that this is not merely a part, but the whole of the design and effect of the death of Christ-and here our controversy with him begins.

Our author is misled, we think, by assuming too exclusively the parental analogy as the basis of his reasoning. Of this we have given one example in the passages already quoted, and we may take another.

May we not put the whole case also as follows?-Man is the erring child of a kind father. The father sends another and a faultless son to bring the prodigal back. When brought back, repentant, subdued, grateful, both for his father's kindness, and for that of the brother who mediated, can we estimate as we ought the father's forgiveness, if we hold that it must still pass only through the faultless son, and is not given directly to the prodigal himself?'-p. 60.

Now, it is undoubtedly true, that the parental analogy serves, to some extent, for the illustration of the case' between God and man; but we cannot admit that it avails to the exhibition of the whole case.' Many things are said in the scriptures which cannot by any possibility be reduced to harmony with it. For example, the words of the apostle, in the second chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, v. 6-8, where it is declared that God ، will render to every one according to his deeds; to those who, by continuance in well doing, seek for glory, honour, and immor tality, everlasting life; but, to those who are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath.' The principle of action here laid down is utterly remote from parental instincts and obligations; insomuch that any father who should act upon it towards his children would fill the world with horror and execration. Retribution is an element, not of a paternal, but of a judicial system; and the indubitable introduction of it into the divine ways is a proof that he does not always act as a father, but in part as a governor and a judge.

To this observation it may be added, that, in the divine treatment of the human race, the judicial is the predominating, and the parental the subordinate element. Primarily God is a parent; but on the parental relation he has grafted that of a moral governor, to which henceforth his paternal dispensations must be subordinate, and in conformity with which they must be carried on. The principles of his moral government are inflexible, and must not be turned from their course, even at the voice of pity. They may be considered as, in effect, limiting and restraining

the exercise of his compassion, as by a course of action determined on for higher ends than compassion merely could ever have attained. Hence it follows, that the parental relation is not only liable to be set aside as insufficient to exhibit the whole case' between God and man, but that it is not, in the first instance, entitled to be introduced at all. The question between a sinner and his Maker is not such as may exist between a father and an undutiful child, but such as may arise between a governor and a rebellious subject; and the case of a sinner is not to be treated with the gushing tenderness of parental love, but according to the inflexible rules of a righteous administration.

If we have made our ground good thus far, it will be easy and inevitable to advance to a conclusion quite the reverse of our author's, on the subject of the natural acceptableness of repentance. However acceptable it may be to the heart of a parent, the cry of repentance may not enter the ears of a judge. His business is to do justice according to the laws of the government he administers, often, perhaps, at a great sacrifice of his own feelings. Nor can it be otherwise with the universal sovereign, if as we think beyond question-he is acting as a moral governor. All the principles of such a government he must maintain inviolate; and, being bound to reward every one according to his works, he may not be dissuaded from the infliction of any penalty which transgressors may have incurred. An unwarranted exercise of compassion could do him nothing but dishonour.

Nor does the case stand any better on the plea of imperfect virtue. It seems to be of the nature of law, that it requires obedience according to its tenor-its full and complete tenor. Every part of a law partakes of the obligatory character of the whole, and the law is broken if any part of it is broken. No principle is more commonly acted on than this in human judicatures. And it must be so. For, if any one part of a law might be violated with impunity, so also might another; and so on, until, amidst an infinite multitude of trangressions, any part of it-that is to say, the whole-had been trampled under foot. If law is to have any respect-it might be said, any existence-every iota of it must be jealously guarded, and the sanctions annexed to every precept of it scrupulously executed. And on this principle, what becomes of imperfect virtue? When weighed in the balances and found wanting, is no notice to be taken of the defect? The imperfection of virtue is only a softer name for the commission of sin; it means only that a man has not committed all the sins which he might have committed; but, if those which have been committed are to pass unpunished, what becomes of the law of which they are the acknowledged

violations, or of the government which subsists by the administration of the law? It seems to us beyond question, that a person of imperfect virtue cannot be judicially accepted as righteous. If he have done a thousand deeds of rectitude, and his transgressions might be reduced even to a unit, how, unless the law be violated, is he, for that one, to escape condemnation?

Mr. Penrose's confidence in his own views betrays him sometimes into a mode of argument, by far more dogmatical and less convincing than we should have expected from so experienced a writer. Who sees not,' says he, that since all men are sinners, the alternative is unavoidable, that either God will accept repentance, or, if not repentance, yet an imperfect virtue, or none can be saved? This is enough; or, if there be any one who, on reflection, does not think so, it must be in vain to argue with him.' p. 51. At the risk of being included in this summary mode of ejection from the benefit of our author's future instructions, we must venture to class ourselves among those who do not think so.' We venture, moreover, to ask him whether he was not writing under some strange influence of forgetfulness, when he put it down as an unavoidable alternative, either that God must accept repentance, or imperfect virtue, or that none could be saved. He knows very well-his volume contains abundant proofs of itthat a scheme of salvation by the imputed righteousness of Christ, altogether adapted to the crisis he has stated, is held by many to be set forth in the scriptures. We can have no difficulty in saying, that, although God should accept neither repentance nor imperfect virtue, sinners may be saved by the virtue of that divine righteousness of the Son of God, which is 'unto all and upon all them that believe.' The 'unavoidable alternative' is, therefore, a mere fiction of Mr. Penrose's imagination, and is far from being 'enough' to prove the position he assumes. It is quite true, that the rejection of imperfect virtue and repentance requires, in order to the salvation of sinners, the introduction of a vicarious sacrifice, but it requires no more. Our author rejects this as incompatible with the parental analogy. Yet he can scarcely have found any divine, we think, who has attempted to graft it on the parental analogy. For ourselves, we make no such attempt. It is, in our view, a part of a system of moral government; and Mr. Penrose has yet to show, either that the divine administration is not a system of moral government, or that atonement is an incongruous and incompatible element of such a system.

From the point at which we have now arrived, a clear view may be taken of what appears to our author extremely unaccountable and embarrassing, namely, the distinction generally made between the penalty and the power of sin, and a release

from the former as apart from the extermination of the latter. The difficulty felt on this point surprises us in so exact a writer. Nothing can be clearer, we suppose, than that subjection to the penalty of sin is one thing, and that subjection to the power of sin is another. And as the things are two, and not one, so it is, at all events, conceivable that we may be released from them, not by one process, but by two. And, in a system of moral government, such a course would naturally be adopted. It is as a transgressor of the law that a sinner has to do with the divine government; and his carliest and most direct question with it is, how far he is liable to the sanctions of the law which he has broken. In the first instance, indeed, this is the only question, the settlement of it being preliminary to the entertainment of any other. To this point, therefore, and to this point exclusively, must the intervention of divine mercy be first directed. Unless the sinner be, in the first instance, released from the penalty which hangs over him, nothing can be done for his welfare. This transaction is to be effected distinctly and alone; and it is to be effected by a process of substitution and atonement conducive to the honour and maintenance of the law, and not by any change in the character of the sinner, or, which is the same thing, by his release from the power of sin. The basis of this transaction is the expiatory bloodshedding of the Son of God; and the sinner is to avail himself of it by faith, that is, by acquiescence in this most gracious interposition. Thus he is justified, or judicially accounted righteous; and this is all that is yet done. The whole proceedings have respect to no other question than how he shall be judicially regarded. Hypothetically, he may yet love sin, or be in subjection to its power. Really, however, he is not so. The germ of a radical change in this respect has been produced, in the faith which has been the instrument of his justification. That very act evinced a change of his heart. In that very moment new principles came to the birth, and sprang into being, destined to exert a predominant influence, in progressive and ultimately perfect sanctification. Thus the sinner is released from the power of sin, as well as from its penalty; but it is by two different processes. From the one he is released by the expiatory value of the sacrifice of Christ, which he accepts; from the other he is released by the quickening and transforming power of the faith which he exercises. In this manner the interests of moral rectitude are as effectually secured as those of judicial rectitude; while, nevertheless, the holiness of a believer in Jesus enters not at all into the elements of his justification, to which, in the order of nature, it is altogcther subsequent, and with which it has no other connexion than that of a certain and admirable sequence.