Imatges de pàgina
PDF
EPUB

conformity of all orders and degrees to those equitable rules of action by which the meanest individual is protected from the insults and oppression of the greatest. As therefore every subject is interested in the preservation of the laws, it is incumbent upon every man to be acquainted with those at least with which he is immediately concerned; lest he incur the censure, as well as inconvenience, of living in society without knowing the obligations which it lays him under. And thus much may suffice for persons of inferior condition, who have neither time nor capacity to enlarge their views beyond that contracted sphere in which they are appointed to move. But those, on whom nature and fortune have bestowed more abilities and greater leisure, cannot be so easily excused. These advantages are given them, not for the benefit of themselves only, but also of the public: and yet they cannot, in any scene of life, discharge properly their duty either to the public or themselves, without some degree of knowledge in the laws. To evince this the more clearly, it may not be amiss to descend to a few particulars.

[ 7 ]

Let us therefore begin with our gentlemen of independent Its utility to

virtue of the constitution of that government under which he lives. The word "political," to be sure, is of Greek, and the word "civil" is of Latin derivation; but the Greek and the Latin roots, alike, lead us to the conception of civil government.

Mr. Christian, however, though he does not refer to Montesquieu as his authority for making the distinction, may, perhaps, have been led by that author to dissociate the ideas of civil and of political liberty. Montesquieu devotes the 11th book of L'Esprit des Loix to a consideration of the laws which establish political liberty with regard to the constitution; and his twelfth book to the laws that form political liberty as relative to the subject. In the first chapter of the last-mentioned book, he says, "the constitution may happen to be free, and the subject not. The subject may be free, and not the constitution." But mark what he adds in the very next sentence of the same para

graph: "in those cases, the constitution
will be free by right, and not in fact;
the subject will be free in fact, and not
by right." Few Englishmen, it is be-
lieved, would be satisfied with any sort
of liberty short of that which is held both
de jure and de facto. Can a condition
of actual, but precarious, exemption
from tyranny, which is enjoyed only by
sufferance, or a state of licence and im-
munity, the too probable excesses of
which are not controlled by efficient
law, either of them deserve the name
of genuine liberty? If not, and if the
enjoyment of true freedom is secure
only when it is guarded by constitu-
tional laws, which can neither be an-
nulled nor suspended without the assent
of the people, declared through their
bond fide representatives; then, as it
seems to the present writer, it would be
a dangerous verbal refinement to affix
different meanings to the terms "civil
liberty" and "political liberty."

gentlemen of fortune.

[ *8]

estates and fortune, the most useful as well as considerable body of men in the nation; whom even to suppose ignorant in this branch of learning is treated by Mr. Locke (d) as a strange absurdity. It is their landed property, with its long and voluminous train of descents and conveyances, settlements, entails, and incumbrances, that forms the most intricate and most extensive object of legal knowledge (10). The thorough comprehension of these, in all their minute distinctions, is perhaps too laborious a task for any but a lawyer by profession: yet still the understanding of a few leading principles, relating to estates and conveyancing, may form some check and guard upon a gentleman's inferior agents, and preserve him at least from very gross and notorious imposition.

Again, the policy of all laws has made some forms necessary in the wording of last wills and testaments, and more with regard to their attestation (11). An ignorance in these must always be of dangerous consequence, to such as by choice or necessity compile their own testaments without any technical assistance. Those who have attended the courts of justice are the best witnesses of the confusion and distresses that are hereby occasioned in families; and of the difficulties that arise in discerning the true meaning of the testator, or sometimes in discovering any meaning at all: so that in the end his estate * may often be vested quite contrary to these his enigmatical intentions, because perhaps he has omitted one or two formal words, which are necessary to ascertain the sense with indisputable legal precision, or has executed his will in the presence of fewer witnesses than the law requires.

But to proceed from private concerns to those of a more public consideration. All gentlemen of fortune are, in consequence of their property, liable to be called upon to establish the rights, to estimate the injuries, to weigh the accusations, and sometimes to dispose of the lives of their fellowsubjects, by serving upon juries. In this situation they have frequently a right to decide, and that upon their oaths, questions of nice importance, in the solution of which some legal (d) Education, sec. 187.

(10) The subtleties of this branch of the law have, in a considerable degree, been done away with: see post, p. 36,

n. 42.

(11) See post, Vol. 2, pp. 376, 382, with the notes thereto.

skill is requisite; especially where the law and the fact, as it often happens, are intimately blended together. And the general incapacity, even of our best juries, to do this with any tolerable propriety, has greatly debased their authority; and has unavoidably thrown more power into the hands of the judges, to direct, control, and even reverse their verdicts, than perhaps the constitution intended (12).

But it is not as a juror only that the English gentleman is called upon to determine questions of right, and distribute justice to his fellow-subjects: it is principally with this order of men that the commission of the peace is filled. And here a very ample field is opened for a gentleman to exert his talents, by maintaining good order in his neighbourhood; by punishing the dissolute and idle; by protecting the peaceable and industrious; and, above all, by healing petty differences and preventing vexatious prosecutions. But, in order to attain these desirable ends, it is necessary that the magistrate should understand his business; and have not only the will, but the power also, (under which must be included the knowledge), of administering legal and effectual justice. Else, when he has mistaken his authority, through passion, through ignorance, or absurdity, he will be the object of *contempt from

(12) A late annotator, in a note upon this passage, says, "the true meaning of the verdict 'guilty' is, 'let the offender be fined.'" And he adds, "a strange perversion of terms has made the word guilty refer to the commission of crime, as made up of the facts, instead of to the punishment, not the crime."

If the supposed original meaning of the word guilty were proved, still, what is assumed to be a perversion of the term has, at any rate, long ceased to be "strange." The general, the almost universal, idea conveyed, now, by the word "guilt," is the commission of some fact, constituting moral, or legal, crime. In some cases, a jury has to find the facts, only; in other cases, it is the province of juries, or at least it is competent to them, to determine the law, as well as the fact: but, it would be a strange perversion of the powers of any

jury, in any case, to find both the facts
and the law against a prisoner, and yet
to pronounce him not guilty, because
the law had declared that the offence
should be visited with personal, and not
with pecuniary penalties. (See post, p.
91, n. ).

The present writer will hereafter, at
a more suitable place for such discus-
sion, endeavour to support the views of
those who think that the punishment
of death should, at all events, be in-
flicted for the crime of murder, only,
even if that ought to be a case of ex-
ception; (see post, p. 57, n. ); but it
would be childish to hold that all other
offences might be effectually restrained
by the terrors of fines alone;—a system
which would hold out virtual impunity
to the very rich, and absolute impunity
to the very poor. (See Vol. 3, p. 220,
n.).

[ *9 ]

his inferiors, and of censure from those to whom he is accountable for his conduct.

Yet farther; most gentlemen of considerable property, at some period or other in their lives, are ambitious of representing their country in parliament: and those, who are ambitious of receiving so high a trust, would also do well to remember its nature and importance. They are not thus honourably distinguished from the rest of their fellow-subjects, merely that they may privilege their persons, their estates, or their domestics (13); that they may list under party banners; may grant or withhold supplies; may vote with or against a popular or unpopular administration; but upon considerations far more interesting and important. They are the guardians of the English constitution; the makers, repealers, and interpreters of the English laws; delegated to watch, to check, and to avert every dangerous innovation, to propose, to adopt, and to cherish any solid and well-weighed improvement: bound by every tie of nature, of honour, and of religion, to transmit that constitution and those laws to their posterity, amended if possible, at least without any derogation. And how unbecoming must it appear in a member of the legislature to vote for a new law, who is utterly ignorant of the old! what kind of interpretation can he be enabled to give, who is a stranger to the text upon which he comments (14)!

(13) By 10 Geo. 3, c. 50, the privilege of parliament in nowise attaches to domestics.

(14) Near the close of chap. 46, dialogue 2, of the Doctor and Student, is the following passage, of which, though the language is antiquated, the plain good sense is as fresh as ever, and its substance as applicable to the present day, as to that in which it was written.

"As for knights and other nobles of the realm, meseemeth that they should be bound to take knowledge of the law. ... For though they be bound to acts of chivalry for defence of the realm, yet they be bound also to acts of justice, and that (it seemeth) more than others be, by reason of their great possessions and authority, and for the well-ordering of the tenants, servants and neighbours,

that many times have need of their help; and also that they be oft called to be of the king's council, and to the general councils of the realm.... And therefore if the noblemen of this realm would see their children brought up in such manner, that they should have learning and knowledge more than they have commonly used to have in time past, specially of the grounds and principles of the law of the realm, wherein they be inherit, (though they had not the high cunning of the whole body of the law, ...) I suppose it would be a great help hereafter to the ministration of justice, a great surety for the prince," (and for themselves also, it might have been added,)" and a right great gladness to all the people. For certain it is, the more part of the people would

Indeed, it is perfectly amazing that there should be no other state of life, no other occupation, art or science, in which some method of instruction is not looked upon as requisite, except only the science of legislation, the noblest and most difficult of any. Apprenticeships are held necessary to almost every art, commercial or mechanical: a long course of reading and study must form the divine, the physician, and the practical professor of the laws: but every man of superior fortune thinks himself born (15) a legislator. Yet Tully was of a different opinion; "it is necessary," says he (e), "for a senator to be thoroughly acquainted with the constitution; and this, he declares, is a knowledge of the most extensive nature; a matter of science, of diligence, of reflection; without which no senator can possibly be fit for his office."

The mischiefs that have arisen to the public from inconsiderate (16) alterations in our laws, are too obvious to be

(e) De Legg. 3. 18. Est senatori necessarium nosse rempublicam; idque late patet:-genus hoc omne scientia,

more gladly hear that their rulers and governors intended to order them with wisdom and justice, than with power and great retinues."

The "power and great retinues" of our nobility are no longer of paramount importance; it is for them to consider, whether they will be acting wisely if they grasp at the mere shadow of that whereof the substance is removed beyond their reach. They still have weight in "ordering" the people, which, if employed with "wisdom and justice," may be not less beneficial to the country, than it will assuredly be honorable to themselves. (See p. 4, n. 3).

(15) If this sarcasm was just, at the time when our author wrote, we have the consolation to know, that, at present, it cannot apply, very extensively, to an assured prospect of sitting in the House of Commons. That the privilege of voting in the upper House of Parliament should, still, be matter of inheritance, is, at all events, a theoretical, perhaps, a practical, blemish in our system of legislature: it is difficult, indeed, to con

diligentiæ, memoria est; sine quo pa-
ratus esse senator nullo pacto potest.

ceive how, if a theory be sound, a prac-
tice at variance therewith can be right.
(See p. 11, note 18).

(16) Inconsiderate alterations, alone,
are objected to by Blackstone: he had
too sound a mind to fancy that legis-
lation ever had reached, or ever will
reach, absolute, unimprovable perfec-
tion; or that any human code ever was,
or ever can be framed, which must not,
necessarily, require modifications, from
time to time, to adapt it to altered cir-
cumstances. Provisions, the most ad-
mirably fitted for one state of society,
may be utterly unsuited to a more ad-
vanced state. The Jewish and the Chris-
tian dispensations were both imparted
by the same Omniscience; yet, how
widely do they vary in many points.

Professor Sullivan, in his first Lecture on the Laws of England, observes, that, "in societies so small that their members are, in general, contented with little more than the bare necessaries of nature, a few rules will be sufficient. But when arts are not only introduced, but become common among any people;

[*10 ]

« AnteriorContinua »